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All inquirers must have a grasp of implication and contradiction which they employ to 
structure their investigations.  Logical ability is thus some kind of prerequisite for cognition.  My 
dissertation scrutinizes this relationship and argues that different ways of understanding it 
underlie a deep debate about naturalism and the objectivity of our knowledge. 
Frege’s dismissal of logical aliens as mad exposes his conviction that logical ability is 
exhibited in our practice of demonstrative reasoning, and is a constitutive necessary condition for 
cognition.  By denying the existence of an independent standard for objective truth that a 
codification of inferential principles must meet, Frege avoids logical “sociologism” (under which 
the validity of inferential principles is identified with their agreement with our practice).   
Quine objects to ascribing a “pre-logical mentality” in radical translation, but only 
because doing so would represent one’s interlocutor as affirming something one finds obviously 
false.  Under his naturalism, the logician is guided by usefulness to ongoing empirical inquiry, 
not the search for the constitutive prerequisites of thinking.  I argue that the properly-understood 
naturalist excises various skeptical attacks from epistemology.   
Davidson recovers a privileged status for logic as central in the theories of truth that are 
necessary to interpret another as—and also to be—a cognizer.  Under his humanism, it is only 
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through interpreting others that one can grasp the objective/subjective contrast and acquire 
beliefs that are properly about the world.  We do not exhibit our grasp of objective truth by 
engaging in a practice informed by logic, but by interpreting others who are engaged with, and 
through, us in such a practice.   
Despite initial appearances, naturalism and humanism are not incompatible positions.  
After examining Quine’s “sectarian” and Davidson’s “ecumenical” attitude to the truth of 
empirically equivalent theories, I endorse ecumenism about their metaphilosophical 
disagreement.  By renouncing a proprietary attitude to truth, this particular form of tolerance 
avoids the fragmentation of philosophy into distinct, yet totalizing, and hence warring, programs.  
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Introduction 
 To structure investigations, each inquirer must have some grasp of implication and 
contradiction.  One who exhibits no such grasp is not recognizable as an inquirer.  Thus, logic is 
a kind of prerequisite for cognition.  Other minds become intelligible once we perceive them 
reasoning according to logical standards; logic makes thoughts, reasons, and arguments 
intelligible as thoughts, reasons, and arguments.   
 In this dissertation, I argue that different ways of understanding how logic makes 
cognition intelligible underlies a deep debate about the objectivity of knowledge.  In twentieth-
century analytic philosophy, this epistemological issue has been bound to the methodological 
problem of how philosophy ought to be done.  By scrutinizing how different conceptions of the 
relationship between logic and cognition subtend different philosophical approaches, I will 
illuminate the recent history of analytic naturalism and its malcontents.1
 In chapter one, I argue that one understanding of logic’s relationship to cognition informs 
Gottlob Frege’s conception of logic.  In defending his view of the autonomy and objectivity of 
logic against psychologism, Frege imagines logical aliens (beings who sincerely deny a logical 
law) and dismisses them as “mad.”  This dismissal exposes Frege’s conviction that logical ability 
is exhibited in our practice of demonstrative reasoning.  Frege thinks that this ability is a 
constitutive necessary condition for cognition—indeed, for the capacity for thought.  I argue that 
Frege conceives of his Begriffsschrift as an explicit codification of the inferential principles 
  This allows me to 
contribute to recent interest in the epistemology of disagreement by considering the case of 
intractable disagreement in philosophy.  
                                                 
1 Throughout this dissertation, I use “cognition” to refer to a cluster of epistemic capacities, including our capacities 
to judge, to infer, to justify, and to think.  Each of the philosophers I discuss elaborate our cognitive abilities in 
different ways.  Looking at their different accounts of the relationship between logic and cognition is, and at the 
same time, to look at their different accounts of logic and their different accounts of cognition.  
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implicit in our demonstrative practice, and so holds that any inquirer who understands his 
formulations of these principles should embrace them as certain.  Tyler Burge is therefore 
incorrect about the order of justification for Frege’s notation.  Burge thinks that the principles of 
Begriffsschrift are pragmatically justified because instances of our demonstrative reasoning can 
be formally reconstructed using the notation.  Yet, any such pragmatic certification would 
necessarily fall short of the certainty that Frege demands.   
 On my reading, the Fregean logician formulates the principles of inference implicit in our 
demonstrative practice.  Peter Sullivan argues that such a view amounts to what I call a 
“sociologism” that (analogously to the psychologism Frege rejects) is incompatible with the 
objectivity of logic and truth.  This view, Sullivan claims, forces one to identify the validity of 
inferential principles with their agreement with our practice.  But, Sullivan’s objection 
presupposes the existence of an independent standard for objective truth that a purported 
codification of inferential principles must meet.  Against him, I argue that there is no such 
standard.  For Frege, the principles of inference are not valid because they are implicit in our 
practice, but are implicit in our practice because they are valid.  Frege understands recognition of 
the laws of logic (which he also calls the laws of truth) to be constitutive of an inquirer’s grasp of 
objective truth. 
 Frege’s view of logical ability as a constitutive necessary condition for cognition 
provides a helpful backdrop for contrasting W.V. Quine’s and Donald Davidson’s conceptions of 
logic and objectivity.  Frege dismisses logical aliens as mad.  Similarly, Quine maintains that 
translating another person as affirming contradictions is evidence of a mistake in our translation 
manual.  For Frege, the aliens fail to meet the constitutive standard for the attribution of 
cognition: recognition of the logical laws as immutable, eternal “boundary stones” for thought.   
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Yet Quine’s objection to ascribing a “pre-logical mentality” is not that in so doing we represent a 
putative thinker affirming things that no genuine thinker could intelligibly affirm; it is simply 
that we represent a thinker as affirming something we find obviously false.  Just as translating 
people consistently calling red objects “blue” is not credible, it is not credible to translate people 
as affirming simple contradictions.  No principled difference in status distinguishes logical from 
physical truths.  Rather, beliefs toward the periphery of our “web of beliefs” are easily given up, 
while obvious ones near the center (both logical and physical) are more difficult to reject.  
Denying logic a privileged, fixed relation to cognition means that Quine cannot adopt Frege’s 
account of the link between our conception of objectivity and our logical ability.  So how does 
Quine establish objectivity? 
 To answer this question, I unpack Quine’s appeal to naturalism in chapter two.  Quine 
holds philosophical and scientific inquiry to be one continuous, fallible enterprise.  This view has 
often been misunderstood.  Against Barry Stroud and Gary Ebbs, I show how the naturalist 
excises a variety of skeptical arguments from traditional epistemology.  Quine’s denial that the 
philosopher—including the logician—can occupy a supra-scientific position stems from his 
rejection of “cosmic exile,” the notion that it is intelligible to look down from above and evaluate 
all of our beliefs at once.  Instead, Quine claims that we can only question our beliefs from the 
side, on the basis of other beliefs that are not then and there at issue.  He esteems scientific 
methodology as the best method inquirers have for such sideways evaluation.  It has proven to 
result in theories of reality with unparalleled predictive and explanatory power.  Naturalist 
inquirers show themselves accountable to the objective standard of truth by recognizing their 
own fallibility, continually refining (and accepting others’ refinements of) their theories.  The 
codification of logic developed by a naturalist logician is an attempt to explicate “implication,” 
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the relation between sentences to which scientists informally appeal when reasoning.  Such a 
codification allows ontological philosophers to regiment our theories and delineate the categories 
to which we are currently committed.  The principle guiding the naturalist logician is usefulness 
to ongoing empirical inquiry, not the search for constitutive prerequisites of thinking.    
 Davidson refuses Quine’s naturalism.  In chapter three, I examine his argument that 
interpreters form an “epistemological triangle” with the world.  To emphasize the importance 
intersubjectivity has to this account, I designate Davidson’s view “humanism.”  Davidson’s 
humanism recovers a privileged status for logic as central in theories of truth that are necessary 
to interpret another as—and also to be—a cognizer.  I argue, against Simon Blackburn, that 
Davidson’s argument against uninterpretable languages is not tacitly verificationist, but 
transcendental.  Not only does Davidson think that developing a truth theory allows us to 
interpret another person’s utterances as meaningful; he thinks that it is only through engaging in 
such interpretive acts, grounded in quantificational logic, that one can become aware of the 
objective/subjective contrast and so come to have beliefs that are about the world.  The social 
condition humanism imposes upon cognition distinguishes it from constitutivism.  We do not 
exhibit our grasp of objective truth by engaging in a practice informed by logic, but by 
interpreting others who are engaged with us in such a practice.   
 In chapter four, I evaluate how we should view the dispute between Quine and Davidson.  
By separating unconvincing ancillary considerations from the core of Davidson’s objections to 
Quine, I expose that attributing scheme/content dualism to Quine, as Davidson does, is to argue 
that he lacks an adequate conception of objectivity.  This charge stands despite the various 
modifications that Quine makes to his views under pressure from Davidson’s sustained critique.  
Whereas Quine can turn to naturalism to convincingly respond to skeptical attacks that others 
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have mounted against him, Davidson’s more nuanced attack reveals that in refusing to follow the 
humanist in externalizing epistemology, the naturalist cannot rule solipsistic threats 
unintelligible. 
 Despite initial appearances, naturalism and humanism are not incompatible positions at 
most one of which is true.  I close by tentatively endorsing a version of metaphilosophical 
tolerance which, by forcing us to occupy that perspective which our current inquiry demands, 
avoids the fragmentation of philosophy into distinct totalizing programs.  In my view, the choice 
between adopting naturalism and humanism depends upon the details of the philosophical 
problem currently occupying us, a lesson that can be generalized to other cases of intractable 
philosophical disagreement.   
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Frege’s Constitutive View and Our Certain Knowledge of Logic 
 
 According to Tyler Burge, Gottlob Frege believes that the wide applicability of his 
Begriffsschrift in mathematics and science justifies holding it true and holding it to truly codify 
the objective laws of logic.1
 After presenting Burge’s interpretation in section one, I argue in section two that he fails 
to provide it with adequate textual support.  In section three, I explain why the passages that 
Burge cites better comport with Joan Weiner’s deflationary interpretation of Frege’s conception 
of logic and epistemology.  By articulating the role that Frege’s constitutive view plays in his 
account of the distinctive unintelligibility of a particular species of logical aliens in section four, 
I argue that, unlike Burge’s, a deflationary interpretation can capture the sense in which Frege 
understands engaging in our inferential practice to be a requirement of cognition.  In section five, 
I consider Peter Sullivan’s rejoinder that so interpreting Frege implausibly commits him to what 
I shall call “sociologism” about logic.  Although Sullivan’s objection is not convincing, it 
highlights Frege’s peculiarly static conception of our inferential practice and reveals that his 
account of logic’s role in communication is underdeveloped.   
  This “pragmatic” reading of Frege’s epistemology of logic is 
mistaken.  A consequence of Frege’s constitutive account of the relationship between logic and 
cognition is that logical laws neither need nor admit of justification.  For Frege, we exhibit 
certain knowledge of logic by engaging in demonstrative reasoning.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Throughout this chapter, I shall use “Begriffsschrift” to refer to Frege’s 1879 book and “Begriffsschrift” to refer to 
his logical notation.   
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1.  Burge’s Frege: A Pragmatic Euclidean 
  From his recent work, we can extract four theses to which Burge thinks Frege is 
committed:  
(B1) Objectivity as Ontological Independence: Thoughts—including the laws of 
logic—are “objective” in the sense that they exist wholly independently of human 
activity.2
 
 
(B2) Platonism about Thoughts is an Explanatory Theory: The existence of 
thoughts in a “third realm” explains the possibility of intersubjective 
communication.3
 
 
(B3) The Begriffsschrift admits of semantic “bottom-up” justification: Arguments 
using a truth predicate for purposes of semantic ascent can justify that the 
syntactically-specified inference rules of the formalism are truth-preserving.4
 
 
(B4) The Begriffsschrift admits of pragmatic “top-down” justification: The 
application of the formalism to informal scientific and mathematical reasoning 
can justify taking its axioms to be true, taking its inference rules to be truth-
preserving, and taking it to codify the logical principles implicit in colloquially 
stated demonstrative argumentation.5
 
 
I do not think that Frege is committed to any of these theses, and attributing them badly distorts 
his conception of logic and epistemology.  Although I shall not explicitly criticize Burge’s 
attribution of B1-B3 to Frege in this chapter, in this section I want to discuss how B1-B4 figure 
in his overall interpretation, before arguing that Burge’s textual evidence for attributing B4 to 
Frege is not convincing in the next section.6
                                                 
2 Burge (2005, 145; 2005, 305).   
  There are three reasons for this exegetical work.  
Firstly, B4 is motivated by the epistemological problems that Burge interprets Frege’s project as 
facing.  Secondly, exploring Burge’s position in detail will allow me to contrast it with Weiner’s, 
thereby showing why scholars like Dirk Greimann are wrong to count their interpretations as 
3 Burge (2005, 304-305). 
4 Burge (2005, 333-337). 
5 Burge (2005, 342; 2005, 355). 
6 For criticisms of attributing B1 and B2 to Frege, see Thomas Ricketts (1986, 1996) and Weiner (1995a, 1995b).  
For criticisms of attributing B3 to Frege, see Ricketts (1996) and Weiner (2005, 2008). 
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terminological variants (2008, 406).  Finally, this work positions us to see how Burge’s reading 
of Frege’s constitutive view is incompatible with Frege’s texts.  
 Frege writes that, although the process of thinking is subjective, the thoughts that 
individual inquirers think are “objective,” “independent of those who judge,” and are true or 
false regardless of whether any person judges them to be so (T, 73; FA, §26; GGZ1, xvi).  Were 
thoughts subjective, Frege claims, two scientists could not contradict each other because 
“each…[individual would only be] concerned with [the] contents of his own consciousness” and 
so “it would really be idle to dispute about truth” (T, 69).  Emphasizing Frege’s apparently 
Platonist claim that thoughts “belong” to a “third realm” (T, 69), Burge interprets his attribution 
of “objectivity” to thoughts ontologically (B1).  Since Frege views his argument against the 
subjectivity of thoughts to be a reductio,7 Burge takes Platonism to be a substantive theory meant  
to explain intersubjective communication (B2).8
 Scientists inquire by inferring truths on the basis of others.  The science of logic studies 
the relation of inference upon which such inquiry depends.  Burge views Frege’s approach to 
logic as belonging to the Euclidean tradition.  Euclid used an axiomatization to make the special 
science of geometry rigorous.  Euclid’s axioms express basic truths about simple geometric 
vocabulary that can be used to define and prove theorems about more complex geometrical 
figures.  Since one must appeal to principles of inference to justify inferring theorems on the 
basis of axioms, Euclid’s method relies upon logic.  This complicates Burge’s Frege’s project of 
  Burge’s Frege thinks of scientific inquiry as the 
quest to discover which Platonic thoughts are true. 
                                                 
7 See, for example, (CP, 368), where Frege writes that he is certain that he does communicate with other judges.  
8 Burge resists affirming that Frege’s Platonist ontological theory is properly prior to his logical theory, instead 
claiming that, for Frege, logic and ontology are “mutually entangled” (1992, 644n).  But this is enough to situate his 
reading in opposition to Weiner’s, who, following Ricketts (1986), argues that Frege’s conception of ontological 
categories supervene on his conception of logical categories (1995b, 376-378).  It is the supervenience claim that 
prohibits interpreting Frege as committed to a substantive ontological theory whose expression violates logical 
categories, as I shall show in section three.    
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developing an axiomatization of logic, for, in addition to identifying some Platonic thoughts and 
expressing them as logical axioms, it must make explicit the logical rules of inference that 
license the deduction of further truths from those axioms and given non-logical truths.   
 Let us begin with the logical axioms.  How must Burge’s Frege view them?  Frege writes 
that the Euclidean axioms govern our thoughts about “spatially intuitable” domains (FA, §14).  
In contrast, axioms of logic ought to govern our thoughts in every domain, and so, must abstract 
away from the content of special sciences.  Frege concludes that logical axioms must express 
maximally general truths, capable of being articulated using only topic-universal notions 
necessary for the expression of knowledge in any special science.9
 The demarcation problem questions why we should think a given formalism codifies 
logic.  But there is a second epistemological problem for Burge’s Frege: why should we think the 
axioms of a formalism true, and its rules truth-preserving?  Although Frege tells us that we can 
justify a statement by proving it from primitive truths (FA, §3), logical axioms are foundations 
and do not admit of proof.  How, then, are axioms justified?   
  Similarly, logical rules of 
inference must express valid transitions between statements in any science, not statements of a 
particular science.  However, in the context of the Platonism Burge attributes to him, Frege’s 
project raises what has come to be known as the demarcation problem.  If maximal generality is 
going to serve as a criterion by which logical truths are distinguished from non-logical truths in 
the third realm, we need an account of how to identify topic-universal vocabulary.  For 
otherwise, why think that Frege’s Begriffsschrift, as opposed to some stronger (or weaker) 
axiomatization with a richer (or poorer) vocabulary counted “topic-universal,” accurately 
demarcates the objective principles of demonstrative inference?  
                                                 
9 Frege writes, “logic is the science of the most general laws of truth” (PW, 128).  For discussion, see Ricketts 
(1986b).  
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 Frege, in keeping with the Euclidean tradition, calls the basic laws of his 
Begriffsschrift—both its axioms and its rules of inference—selbstverständlich or einleuchtend or 
unmittelbar klar, all of which are usually translated as “self-evident” (FA, §5; §90; PW, 39; 208-
210).  He never defines these terms.  They seem to indicate that Frege thinks logical laws 
obvious.  Once one understands an axiom, one is wholly confident that it is true.  But 
“obviousness” and “confidence” are matters of psychology.  Frege cannot mean to invoke 
obviousness as a justification for our knowledge of primitive truths as true, for then—like the 
psychological logicians against whom he tirelessly crusades—he would be allowing psychology 
to cloud his logical investigation.10  One may doubt what another judge finds obvious.  One’s 
confidence about a putative truth may be eroded.  Nor does attributing “self-evidence” in the 
sense of obviousness to his codification answer the demarcation problem.  If he were to conclude 
that any general law obvious to him was logical, then his demarcation would rely upon his own 
psychology.11  What role is left for self-evidence in Frege’s epistemology of logic?12
  Burge credits Frege with a nuanced understanding of self-evidence (2005, 346-354).  He 
claims Frege believed that the psychological and subjective impression of obviousness was 
distinct from the non-psychological and objective property of self-evidence, in the sense of being 
self-justifying, enjoyed by the true laws of logic.  Just as theoretical physicists attempt to 
formulate the laws which govern motion, Burge thinks that the Fregean logician attempts to 
formulate the laws of inference.  Yet neither inquirer is, nor thinks herself, infallible.  The 
 
                                                 
10 Frege explicitly rejects the possibility that psychological facts can justify logical truths (GGZ1, xvii).  As Ludwig 
Wittgenstein would later put it, “if the truth of a proposition does not follow from the fact that it is self-evident to us, 
then its self-evidence in no way justifies our belief in its truth.” (2002, 5.1363). 
11 Wittgenstein observes: “it is remarkable that a thinker as rigorous as Frege appealed to the degree of self-evidence 
as the criterion of a logical proposition” (2002, 6.1271).  I do not think this objection is decisive against Frege, 
because the demarcation problem is irrelevant to his actual project.  I discuss this point in the following section.  
12 Frege’s claim that “we cannot accept a thought as an axiom if we are in doubt about its truth” (PW, 205) might 
suggest that he thought rationally indubitable obvious truths self-evident.  But this modification does not provide a 
non-psychological answer to either epistemological problem, since the truths which appear rationally indubitable to 
Frege are not necessarily truths that are rationally indubitable.  
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Fregean logician’s confidence in her codification is partly justified by her subjective intuitions 
about its obviousness.  But her intuitions about its obviousness do not establish its truth or 
logicality.  She recognizes that what she holds to be self-evidently true might turn out to be false, 
and that what she holds to be a primitive logical truth might turn out to be true but in need of 
proof on the basis of still more primitive (and actually logical) truths.  
 Robin Jeshion’s recent development of Burge’s interpretation clarifies how this nuanced 
conception of self-evidence shapes the epistemological problems of justifying one’s codification 
as true, and as logical (2001, 2004).  Recall that Frege uses a variety of German terms 
(selbstverständlich, einleuchtend, unmittelbar klar) all of which are translated as “self-evident.”  
Although Jeshion admits that Frege never gives these terms different technical meanings, and 
that no putative explication fits all of his texts precisely,13
A true proposition p is selbstverständlich if and only if p is foundationally secure, 
yet p’s  truth is not grounded on any other truth.
 she offers the following explication of 
Frege’s view:   
14
 
 
A true proposition p is self-evident [einleuchtend, unmittelbar klar] if and only if 
clearly  grasping p is sufficient and compelling basis for recognition of p’s truth.15
 
 
Jeshion takes neither definition to be subjective or psychological.16
                                                 
13 Jeshion (2001, 953).  Burge also confesses that he has not “found consistent differences in Frege’s usage” of these 
terms (2005, 346). 
  She characterizes Frege’s 
logicist project as the “search for foundational arithmetical axioms…[that are] both 
selbstverständlich and self-evident,” and believes that, since all self-evident propositions are 
selbstverständlich, Frege “relied on judging propositions to be self-evident as part of his method 
14 Jeshion (2001, 949).  Jeshion writes that “A ground of a true proposition indicates from whence the proposition’s 
truth derives” (2001, 945).  Thus, the truth of a selbstverständlich thought does not derive from any other thought. 
15 Jeshion (2001, 953).  Jeshion leaves selbstverstandlich in German because she can find no clear correlate in 
English, but accepts the standard translation of einleuchtend as “self-evident.”  She believes that Frege’s use of 
unmittelbar klar (immediately clear) is also intended to convey “self-evidence” in her technical sense. 
16 This is clear for Jeshion’s explication of “selbstverständlich,”  but less clear for her explication of “self-evident,” 
since its mention of “grasping” implies a grasper.  But in Jeshion’s view, the implied grasper is an idealized, fully 
rational grasper, not a particular human grasper.   
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for identifying a foundation for arithmetic” (2001, 939).17, 18  But it is necessary, in turn, to rely 
on subjective obviousness as a guide to judging propositions self-evident (967).  Obviousness is 
a fallible guide, because not all propositions one finds obvious are self-evident, and one may not 
find all self-evident propositions obvious (if one lacks the requisite understanding of component 
concepts).  Nevertheless, Jeshion thinks obviousness is “normally necessary” for identifying 
primitive truths.19
 Under Jeshion’s explication, Frege’s invocation of “self-evidence” is not psychological 
but normative.  It concerns the immediate recognition of a thought as true by an ideally rational 
person who possesses an entirely clear understanding of its component concepts.  Logic is 
demarcated by what is actually self-evident to, as Burge puts it, an “ideal rational mind” (2005, 
350), not what seems obvious to particular minds, such as Frege’s own.  Unlike the author of the 
Tractatus, whom Jeshion characterizes as “preoccupied” with certainty (2001, 972), Frege 
“never took particular proposed foundations as certain” (973)—even his own proposed 
codification of logic, the Begriffsschrift.
   
20
                                                 
17 Frege, according to Jeshion, believes that the converse implication does not hold.  An example is the equation 
Frege gives in (FA, §5): 135664+37863=173527.  All such true arithmetical equations are really disguised 
definitions, and so, are selbstverständlich.  They lack the generality required to stand as axioms of arithmetic, but 
are nevertheless foundationally secure in and of themselves (2001, 950).  Yet if, like this equation, they are 
sufficiently complex, they are not self-evident and thus require proof.  To Jeshion’s Frege, “if one grasps a self-
evident proposition p yet fails to thereby recognize its truth, the failure to do so implies a deficiency in conceptual 
understanding or rationality” (956).  Since a rational agent can understand such an equation and yet (prior to 
checking it for herself) refrain from endorsing or rejecting it, the equation is not self-evident.   
  However, Frege was extremely confident that he had 
successfully codified logic (GGZ1, xxvi).  If Burge and Jeshion are correct that Frege thought his 
method (insofar as it relied upon the perception of obviousness) fallible, then he owes any reader 
18 Although Jeshion does not develop this idea explicitly in her paper, it seems that if she is correct, Frege would 
view axioms in the ideal axiomatization of a special science to be selbstverständlich but not self-evident (PW, 205).  
An example might be Henry’s Law in the science of gases.  Henry’s law is itself foundationally secure, a general 
expression of the natural proportion of pressure and concentration of gases at constant temperatures; but recognizing 
its truth requires a good deal of empirical investigation.  
19 It is only “normally” necessary because we are also guided by the pragmatic considerations that I will discuss in a 
moment.  For some inquirers, these pragmatic considerations could be methodologically sufficient by themselves.   
20 Jeshion complains that Wittgenstein’s considerable influence has caused Frege’s nuanced Euclideanism to have 
been missed (2001, 973).   
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who does not find the Begriffsschrift obvious a justification for his confidence in its truth and 
logicality. 
 Burge claims Frege offers two sorts of considerations that are meant to transmit his 
confidence to his reader.  The first are the “semantic claims” he makes when introducing each 
individual rule and axiom of his Begriffsschrift (2005, 328).  Burge correctly notes that, since 
Frege thought his system codified the objective laws of logic, he could not have thought that its 
axioms admitted of proof on the basis of more fundamental considerations.  So the purpose of 
the semantic claims cannot be to support (or justify) the truth of the axioms (330).  Instead, they 
serve to bring out the self-evidence of the axioms to a readership unfamiliar with Frege’s novel 
notation.  In contrast, in §14 of Grundgesetze, Burge interprets Frege as developing a genuine 
semantic argument to justify the soundness of the Begriffsschrift inferential rule of modus 
ponens (2005, 332).  By reflecting on the meanings of the material conditional, the horizontal, 
and the judgment stroke, one ought to recognize that the transition licensed by the notation’s 
inference rule from true sentences whose syntactic forms are a conditional and its antecedent to 
the sentence whose syntactic form is the conditional’s consequent is a truth-preserving inference 
(B3).21
 Yet while such bottom-up semantic considerations might plausibly transmit confidence in 
the truth of individual Begriffsschrift laws, they do little to transmit confidence that the 
Begriffsschrift codifies the principles of demonstrative inference.  We now learn predicate logic 
as logic in introductory classes, but Frege’s readers would find many of his innovations (such as 
using the artificial material conditional rather than the syllogistic forms to express universal 
categoricals) obscure.  In fact, readers put off by the Begriffsschrift’s lack of familiarity might 
   
                                                 
21 Burge acknowledges that this semantic bottom-up justification of the soundness of individual inferential rules is 
unsystematic by modern lights (331).  He finds the second set of considerations Frege offers to be his most 
significant contribution to the Euclidean tradition.   
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not find Frege’s semantic considerations compelling due to lack of comprehension or diligence.  
To meet this problem, Burge reads Frege as offering “pragmatic” considerations as a top-down 
“justification” for the Begriffsschrift (B4):  
What is original about his position is not his view that a thought might be self-evident but not 
seem self-evident—self-evident but not obvious to an individual.  It is not his idea that subjective 
obviousness or subjective unobviousness might submit to reversal through deeper conceptual 
development and understanding.  What is original is his integration of these traditional views with 
his deep conception of what goes into adequate understanding.  This conception rests on his 
method of finding logical structure through studying patterns of inference…[U]nderstanding 
logical structure derives from seeing what structures are most fruitful in accounting for the 
patterns of inference that we reflectively engage in…Frege’s pragmatism…[plays a] role in his 
epistemology.  [It] not only play[s] a role in accounting for understanding.  [It provides] a 
secondary, fallible, non-demonstrative justification. (2005, 354-355, my emphasis) 
 
What sort of “justification” is Burge thinking of?  Pragmatic considerations cannot justify that 
the axioms of the Begriffsschrift are true, because (to repeat) those axioms are meant to express 
objective logical laws that are selbstverständlich.  Rather, Burge writes, these considerations 
constitute a justification “for us” (2005, 315): a justification not only for holding the formalism 
to truly codify logic, but for us to hold the Begriffsschrift laws to be true and its rules truth-
preserving.   
 This pragmatic justification is puzzling.  Burge variously calls it “inductive” (343, 355), 
“probable” (343), and “fallible” (355).  One might use these terms in suggesting that Frege 
advances an enumerative inductive justification for Begriffsschrift.  On this view, since the proof 
of every theorem that we have so far considered can be plausibly captured within Frege’s 
notation (perhaps having made explicit any enthymematic premises upon which we had been 
tacitly relying), we are justified in holding its axioms to be true and its rules truth-preserving.  
But, given Frege’s criticism that formalists erroneously think themselves justified in holding a 
system to be true on the basis that it has yet to engender a contradiction (see especially FA, §96), 
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he would surely not have accepted this contingent judgment about the Begriffsschrift’s 
expressive power as constituting anything worth calling a “justification.”22
 I think that Burge has something more sophisticated in mind.  Since mathematics and the 
more rigorous sciences are saturated with the quantificational inferences that the Begriffsschrift 
makes explicit, Frege’s notation plausibly captures the patterns of inference upon which working 
scientists depend.  Reflecting upon the Begriffsschrift’s palpable expressive power to formalize 
reasoning that the doubtful reader informally recognizes as valid ought to increase her 
confidence that it codifies the principles of demonstrative inference, and also that its laws are 
true.  But our scientific theories—and the patterns of inference that we take to be legitimate—
evolve with our discoveries.  Burge calls pragmatic justification “fallible,” then, because in the 
course of ongoing scientific inquiry we might discover thoughts whose contents or 
interdependent structure cause us to adopt (or reject) a pattern of inference which Frege’s 
Begriffsschrift had omitted (or enshrined).
   
23
 In Burge’s view, recognizing this “secondary” justification for the Begriffsschrift will 
pave the way for inquirers to recognize its primary justification: its objective self-evidence.  
Inquirers who use the notation will come to grasp its novel concepts.  In time, they will find the 
axioms involving those concepts subjectively obvious.  This subjective obviousness will give 
them reason to think that the axioms do indeed express thoughts that have the objective property 
of self-evidence.  Burge thinks that pragmatic considerations also speak to the demarcation 
   
                                                 
22 Burge is certainly aware of Frege’s criticisms of formalism (2005, 332-333), so I do not think he means to 
attribute this sort of inductive justification to Frege.   
23 It is worth noting that the claim that a Begriffsschrift law could be rejected with scientific progress does not 
contradict Frege’s famous insistence that the laws of logic “are boundary stones set in an eternal foundation, which 
our thought can overflow but never displace” (GGZ1, xvi).  On the pragmatic Euclidean interpretation, the objective 
laws of logic are eternal and immutable; but Frege’s Begriffsschrift is only a fallible, human attempt to codify them.  
It might turn out to be incomplete if the logician lacks a requisite concept that will only come to light in the future.  
And its laws might be false if she has erred (and here, Burge makes much of Frege’s erroneous Basic Law V which 
led to Russell’s contradiction [2005, 352-353]).  
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problem.  Beyond linking Frege’s formalism to reasoning already informally recognized as valid, 
inquirers’ eventual judgment that the Begriffsschrift’s laws are self-evident just is a judgment 
that the system expresses the objective logical laws; or, as Jeshion puts it, that the Begriffsschrift 
“mirrors the natural ordering of truths.”24
 In this section, I have explained how B1-B4 fit into Burge’s pragmatic Euclidean reading 
of Frege.  Burge’s rational reconstruction of Frege’s conception of logic and epistemology is 
both sympathetic and comprehensive.  It is also mistaken.  In the following section, I will argue 
that the textual evidence Burge claims in support of his reading is unconvincing.  
 
 
2. Burge’s Evidence for attributing a “Pragmatic” Justification to Frege  
 Although Frege emphasizes the power of his Begriffsschrift to formalize explicit, gap-
free proofs of informally accepted demonstrative reasoning, he gives no indication that such 
pragmatic considerations give inquirers grounds for thinking his axioms true, or his rules of 
inference truth-preserving.  The rhetoric of “justification” and “holding true” does not appear in 
the passages Burge cites.  Instead, Frege wishes to exhibit advantages of his formalism over 
alternatives so as to recommended its adoption by scientists.  The various proofs he provides of 
accepted theorems within his notation are intended to informally convey its universal 
applicability, not to ground its truth (PW, 38).  In other words, Frege is attempting to 
demonstrate that his notation is complete (that any informally accepted theorem can be formally 
                                                 
24 Jeshion (2001, 961).  Jeshion acknowledges that her metaphor of the Begriffsschrift “mirroring” the objective 
logical laws is imperfect, since Frege did not think that logic had a unique axiomatization (BGS, 29; PW 206).  He 
thought that a logical truth could find legitimate expression as an axiom in one codification and a theorem in 
another, meaning, to pursue Jeshion’s metaphor, that two genuine codifications of logic may not be “reflections” of 
each other.  But I think that this imperfection should make us seriously question whether Jeshion’s metaphor is 
appropriate at all.  It tacitly supports the Platonic idea that logical truths—which stand as the ground of “the” natural 
ordering of truths—exist independently, and that our codification is (currently) our best attempt to “reflect” them.  
But if the objective logical laws cannot be uniquely mirrored, why think that they have independent existence at all?  
Less metaphorically, why think that they constitute an independent standard against which our codification can (and 
must) be evaluated? 
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derived within the Begriffsschrift), not sound (that any theorem formally derived within the 
Begriffsschrift is true).  Since there is no evidence that Frege intended pragmatic considerations 
to play a justificatory role, these passages cast doubt upon the epistemology of logic Burge 
attributes to him.  In the next section, I shall turn to Weiner’s more persuasive account of how 
Frege conceived of his project.     
 Burge bases his reading on three texts: Frege’s unpublished article comparing his 
Begriffsschrift to Boole’s logical calculus, late sections of Foundations of Arithmetic, and the 
introductory remarks to the first volume of Grundgesetze.  He begins by noting that Frege 
repeatedly adverts advantages of his Begriffsschrift when introducing it, rather than stating that 
its basic principles are self-evident (2005, 338; 342-343).  Frege writes that his novel use of 
courses-of-values of functions is a “vital advance” not just because he uses it to define Number, 
but because it allows a “far greater flexibility” in the expression of derivations (GGZ1, xi-x).  He 
claims that his introduction of truth values makes “[everything] simpler and sharper” (x).  
Compared to his Begriffsschrift, he complains that the “Boolean formula-language only 
represents a part of our thinking” (PW, 35).  Frege thus appeals to considerations of flexibility, 
simplicity, and generality as advantages of his Begriffsschrift.  However, Burge mistakenly 
interprets Frege as giving reasons for holding the Begriffsschrift to be true:  
The basic principles [i.e. the axioms and rules of the Begriffsschrift] gain something from our... 
recognizing “advantages” of simplicity, sharpness, and the like...Frege is defending not merely the 
logicality but the truth of his basic proposed principles. (2005, 344)   
 
But there is no evidence that Frege intended these comparisons to convince his reader about the 
truth of his basic principles.  The fact that Frege does not introduce his notation by insisting that 
its basic principles are self-evident rather implies that he is not worried that his reader will doubt 
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their truth.  He is only worried that his reader will not grasp the value of using his notation.25  
What the Begriffsschrift “gains” from its advantages is not a justification for us to hold it true, 
but an underlining of its value for scientific inquiry.  By emphasizing its capacity to express gap-
free proofs simply and to do so for diverse instances of reasoning (i.e. generally), Frege gives 
reason for thinking that his formalism captures basic principles of inference, not for holding 
those inferences justified.  Frege employs courses-of-values of functions to represent second-
order reasoning in first-order terms.26
 Secondly, Burge cites Frege’s claims that “fruitfulness is the acid test of concepts” (PW, 
33) and that “definitions show their worth by proving fruitful” (FA, §70) as evidence of 
“pragmatic considerations...[entering] into Frege’s conception of the justification of definitions,” 
and concludes that “instead of reflection, Frege appeals to mathematical practice...as a way of 
confirming the worth, and seemingly the correctness, of the definition” (2005, 342).  Burge is 
right that Frege believed that the “fruitfulness” of definitions and concepts was established 
pragmatically by their value for scientific inquiry (see also FA, §88).  He is also right that 
immediately after giving his definition of the “Number belonging to a concept” as an extension, 
Frege writes that, since we often think of extensions “as something quite different from 
numbers,” “That this definition is correct will perhaps be hardly evident at first” (FA, §69, my 
emphasis).  Since Frege writes that the truth a definition “contains” is self-evident (CP, 302), 
  He stresses the flexibility afforded users by his formalism 
since he believes this procedure applicable to any overtly higher-order reasoning.   
                                                 
25 Burge is right that Frege takes the advantages of his Begriffsschrift to establish its “logicality.”  Burge writes that 
Frege argues, “that the only way to get a true logic is by providing a deeper analysis of judgments and inferential 
patterns than his Boolean opponents had provided” (2005, 339, my emphasis).  But Burge’s use of “true” here is 
potentially misleading.  Frege gives no indication that his own system truly or accurately codifies ontologically 
objective logical laws, which Boole’s alternative fails to do.  Rather, Frege says that his concept-script is a “fresh 
approach to the Leibnizian idea of a calculus ratiocinatur” (PW, 10), and that to the extent that it allows for a deep 
analysis of judgments and inferential patterns—and is more general than Boole’s language—it deserves to be called 
“logic.”  Frege is evaluating his logic on the basis of its capacity to clarify our grasp of judgments and informally 
accepted inferences, not on the basis of its putative expression of ontologically objective laws. 
26 Frege uses this method when proving his general principle of induction (GGZ1, §117).   
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Burge takes Frege’s account of his definition as “hardly evident at first” to demonstrate his 
nuanced understanding of “self-evidence.”  Burge’s Frege believed that although all of his 
definitions were self-evident, some were not subjectively obvious, and sought to persuade his 
reader of their truth pragmatically by demonstrating their fruitfulness.   
 In the sections following §69, Burge thus sees Frege as advancing a pragmatic 
justification for holding that his definition of number in terms of extensions is true.  But there is 
no evidence that Frege thought that the truth of his definition was “confirmed” or justified by the 
reader’s evaluation of its fruitfulness in the way that Burge implies (“…confirming the worth, 
and seemingly the correctness, of the definition” [2005, 341, my emphasis]).  The text does not 
have the structure Burge attributes to it.  Instead, having proposed his definition in §68, Frege 
worries that, given the relative obscurity of extensions of concepts (and in particular their 
relationship to numbers), his readers will fail to understand it.  They may worry, for instance, 
that if valid inferences about extensions differ from valid inferences about numbers, Frege’s 
proposal will license invalid arithmetical deductions.  So in §69, in lieu of a lengthy digression 
into the technically complex question of what extensions are,27
                                                 
27 This is not the purpose of Foundations, which, after the muted reception of Begriffsschrift,  Frege intended to 
write accessibly (COR, 102; 172).  He formally defines extensions using Basic Law V in Grundgesetze as the 
courses-of-value of first level functions.  In Foundations, he simply states “I assume it is known what the extension 
of a concept is” (§69, n1). 
 Frege aims to quell such 
anxieties by showing that defining Number in this way does not contradict any of the “basic 
assertions” about numbers upon which we informally agree.  Having bought himself this grain of 
salt—convincing his reader, that is, that his definition will not obviously license invalid 
deductions—in §70 he turns to the distinct question of why we should define numbers in this 
way.  Frege proceeds to argue that his definition is fruitful not only because it allows for the 
definition of Number and for formal proofs of arithmetical truths, but because extensions can be 
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repeatedly and gainfully employed in subsequent deductions involving complex arithmetical 
structures.28
 Thirdly, Burge claims that Frege’s recommendation that his reader familiarize himself 
with the Begriffsschrift notation shows that Frege believed that his reader’s “acceptance of [the 
truth of his basic principles might depend on] detailed mastery of the system” (2005, 344).  
Further, Burge claims Frege believed that the laws of his Begriffsschrift might, in principle, be 
flawed (344).  Neither claim is supported by the passages that Burge quotes:   
  This argument confirms the worth of the definition, sufficing to recommend its use.  
It neither gives, nor is it intended to give, justificatory support for the definition’s truth.  To 
Frege, alleging a definition fruitful is just to claim it helpful for scientific inquiry.  
I have drawn together everything that can facilitate a judgment as to whether the chains of 
inference are cohesive and the buttresses solid.  If anyone should find anything defective, he must 
be able to state precisely where, according to him, the error lies: in the Basic Laws, in the 
Definitions, in the Rules, or in the application of the Rules at a definite point.  (GGZ1, vii)  
 
I myself can estimate to some extent the resistance with which my innovations will be met, 
because I had first to overcome something similar in myself in order to make them...After one has 
reached the end [of the book], he may reread the Exposition of the Begriffsschrift as a connected 
whole...In this way, I believe, the suspicion that may at first be aroused by my innovations will 
gradually be dispelled.  The reader will recognize that my basic principles [Burge’s emphasis] at 
no point lead to consequences that he is not himself forced to acknowledge as correct. (GGZ1, xi-
xii) 
 
Burge claims that in the first passage, “the language clearly suggests that [the] defect might in 
principle lie not only in the ordering or in the proposed axioms not being logical, but even in 
proposed basic principles not being true or sound” (344).  He claims that the second passage 
shows that Frege believed a critic might initially doubt that a particular axiom or rule of the 
Begriffsschrift was true, but become convinced of its truth once she had worked through the 
book for herself and recognized that the basic principle in question does not imply any 
                                                 
28 “[Every element in the] really fruitful definitions in mathematics” is, Frege writes, “intimately, I might almost say 
organically, connected with the others,” allowing for inferences that “cannot be inspected in advance.” (FA, §88).  
He holds up the epsilon-delta definition of continuity as an example.  When one proceeds to prove topological 
theorems, one will continually return to this definition of continuity to argue in terms of a function’s limits.   
Similarly, once Frege proceeds to prove arithmetical theorems, he repeatedly returns to this definition of Number to 
argue in terms of extensions.  
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falsehoods (345).  But this interpretation neglects the context of these passages.  As has been 
well documented, Frege’s Begriffsschrift was poorly understood by those of his contemporaries 
who read it, including its few reviewers, a fact that greatly frustrated Frege (Dummett 1973, 
xxxi; Gregory Currie 1986, 79).  Just prior to the second passage Burge quotes, Frege expresses 
his opinion that both the Begriffsschrift and the Foundations have been unfairly ignored (GGZ1, 
xi).  Much of the introduction to the Grundgesetze is thus designed to ward off shallow criticism 
based on confusion.   
 This casts the passages in a very different light.  Frege addresses readers put off by his 
unfamiliar notation.  He encourages such readers to engage his ideas seriously by directing 
whatever criticisms they might have to the appropriate part of his system, rather than 
prematurely discounting his innovations on account of their novel presentation.  The language of 
the first passage does not therefore “clearly suggest” that Frege believed that his basic principles 
might be false (or that his method for codifying logic was fallible).  It only shows that he 
believed others might (erroneously) object to his system.  Frege’s hope is that in the course of 
making any objection precise—perhaps in attempting to argue that one of Frege’s basic 
principles is false—his critic would come to realize that it was he who was mistaken.  Frege 
returns to this theme at the end of his introduction: “Anyone who has different [logical] 
convictions can just try to erect a similar structure upon them, and he will, I believe, come to 
realize that it does not work, or at least that it does not work so well” (xxvi).  If his critic does not 
succeed in isolating a problem with the Begriffsschrift but is nonetheless dissatisfied, Frege 
challenges him to show a better codification of principles of demonstrative inference, rather than 
letting his vague feelings of disquiet prejudice him against the value of his system.   
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 Likewise, it is not plausible to read the “suspicion” about his “innovations” that Frege 
attributes to a reader in the second passage as a suspicion that the basic principles are false. 
Rather, it is a wondering that the unfamiliar concepts Frege uses (and the unfamiliar notation he 
has created) will be of any use.  This suspicion will be “gradually dispelled” as one realizes that 
the Begriffsschrift’s concepts are actually precise explications of the vague concepts one has 
already been using, and that deriving proofs within the formalism clarifies the inferential patterns 
upon which one has been tacitly relying.   
 Fourthly, Burge turns to the doubt Frege famously, and presciently, expresses about 
Basic Law V:  
A dispute can break out here, so far as I can see, only with regard to my fundamental law 
concerning value-ranges (V), which has not yet perhaps been expressly formulated by logicians, 
although one has it in mind, for example, when speaking of extensions of concepts.  I hold it to be 
purely logical.  At any rate the place is hereby indicated where the decision must be made. (GGZ1, 
vii)   
 
Frege’s attitude in this passage certainly seems puzzling.  If he believed his basic principles self-
evidently true, what sort of “dispute” can he be thinking of?  Burge claims that this remark 
shows that Frege was “uneasy about [Basic Law V’s] truth” (2005, 348 n21).  Since Frege 
nevertheless advanced it as an axiom, this suggests to Burge that Frege must have thought it a 
self-evident truth that he himself did not (yet) find subjectively obvious.  Nonetheless, he thought 
himself pragmatically justified in holding Basic Law V to be true because of the advantages of 
the Begriffsschrift as a whole.29
                                                 
29 This reading seems to jive with Frege’s comments about Basic Law V after Russell discovered the contradiction: 
“I have never disguised from myself its lack of the self-evidence that belongs to the other axioms and that must 
properly be demanded of a logical law…I should gladly have dispensed with this foundation if I had known of any 
substitute for it.  And even now I do not see how arithmetic can be scientifically established…unless we are 
permitted – at least conditionally – to pass from a concept to its extension” (GGZ2, 253).  Frege reports not only that 
he did not find Basic Law V self-evident (i.e., to Burge, that the axiom was not subjectively obvious), but also that 
he did not (and does not) see any way to establish logicism without it.  On Burge’s interpretation, this suggests that 
Frege was led to hold Basic Law V true (indeed, hold it to be an axiom) despite its lack of self-evidence because of 
his conviction in the truth of logicism, and his inability to see any other way of confirming logicism.   
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 But Burge’s description of Frege’s state of mind is not the only way to understand the 
“dispute” that Frege thought might arise about Basic Law V, and thus does not constitute 
compelling evidence for his interpretation.  Jeshion claims that the interpretation she and Burge 
develop is nonetheless preferable, because it is the only one to allow for a charitable account of 
Frege’s attitude.30  However, I think it is equally charitable (and plausible) to interpret him as 
uneasy not about Basic Law V’s truth, but about its role in clarifying the principles of 
demonstrative inference.  The value of other novel features of his formalism used in the rigorous 
proofs of uncontroversial truth-functional deductions (e.g. taking truth values to be objects) 
would become quickly apparent to anyone who familiarized themselves with the notation, and 
who reflected on the simplicity and elegance of the resulting proofs.  But Frege intended Basic 
Law V to simplify the proofs of mathematical theorems that were being colloquially deduced 
using a variety of inference patterns.31  He recognized that any inquirer who doubted one of 
those inference patterns, or who was unfamiliar with some of them, might fail to grasp the value 
of Basic Law V. 32
 It is also worth emphasizing that Frege presents Russell’s contradiction by providing a 
proof within Begriffsschrift that Basic Law V is false: that is, he proves its falsity on the basis of 
  Moreover, he allowed that another logician might discover a simpler way 
than he to formalize the diverse inferences used by mathematicians.  For these reasons, Frege 
viewed Basic Law V differently from his other basic laws, but did not doubt its truth.   
                                                 
30 Jeshion (2001, 970).  She claims that Philip Kitcher’s interpretation makes Frege come out as either insincere or 
self-deceptive in his attitude toward Basic Law V’s fitness as an axiom.  
31 For more on the inferences licensed by Frege’s mathematical contemporaries, see Mark Wilson (1995). 
32 Ricketts notes that Frege introduces Basic Law V by informally arguing for the second-order claim that a function 
exists which takes functions to their value ranges, and then stipulates that it can be named by the courses-of-values 
function (1997b, 200; 210-211).  A constructive mathematician might object to introducing a function in this way.  
Moreover, Frege’s contemporaries did not agree upon the legitimate basic assertions about “extensions” (as Burge 
notes, “the dispute between Frege and the iterative set theorists suggests that there was a fundamental doubt about 
the viability of the notions (respectively) of set and of extension” (2005, 348, n21).  Perhaps Frege worried that, if 
future mathematicians decided to impose restrictions upon extensions, the definition of Number in terms of 
extension for which Basic Law V allowed would no longer be fruitful.   
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his certain grasp of the other axioms in his codification (GGZ2, 256-260).  He expresses none of 
the doubt about his other basic laws that might be reasonably expected if Burge were correct, and 
Frege thought that his grasp of those laws was as fallible—and now as demonstrably in 
jeopardy—as his grasp of Basic Law V.  Rather, his attitude is consistent with thinking that 
although he has certainly succeeded in codifying some of the principles of inference in the rest of 
Begriffsschrift, he has made a mistake in the isolated case of Basic Law V.  
 Finally, Burge notes that in §90 of the Foundations Frege writes that conclusively 
establishing logicism would require explicitly formalizing gap-free proofs of all arithmetical 
truths within the Begriffsschrift.  To Burge, Frege is suggesting we would be justified in holding 
logicism true through empirical work.  Moreover, since logicism is a thesis about the justification 
of arithmetical truths (not a thesis intended to establish that arithmetical truths are true),33 Burge 
claims that if empirical work is to establish logicism the Begriffsschrift must not only be free of 
error; its deductions must also “capture an antecedent order of justificational priority” (2005, 
345) possessed by thoughts in the third realm.  In Burge’s view, Frege posits a link between our 
scientific inquiry and our knowledge of truths in the third realm.34
 However, there is no evidence in Frege’s texts that he believed that this “antecedent order 
of justificational priority” was to be cashed out in Platonist terms, nor that he thought empirical 
   His Frege thinks that we can 
be prima facie confident of our grasp of the ontologically objective truths of logic and 
mathematics on the pragmatic basis that “pure mathematical practice works” (2005, 341, original 
emphasis).   
                                                 
33 As Frege notes early on in Foundations, “After we have convinced ourselves that a boulder is immovable, by 
trying unsuccessfully to move it, there remains the further question, what is it that supports it so securely?” (§2).  
Logicism is a thesis about what supports the boulder of mathematics.  
34 In fact, Burge thinks Frege’s most original contribution to Euclideanism is exactly this recognition that pragmatic 
considerations can play a justificatory role.  According to Burge, Frege’s contextualist claim that grasping the self-
evidence of logical foundations demands reflection upon, and so familiarity with, the inferential patterns used by 
scientists both modifies and improves the traditional rationalist claim that such a grasp only requires an 
understanding of the component concepts appealed to in the expression of logical laws (341).    
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work could justify holding logicism true.  In §90, he writes that empirical work may remove 
lingering doubts about whether the proofs of some arithmetical theorems rely upon non-logical 
inferences, but I am not aware of any text where he identifies the removal of doubts with a 
“justification” for holding true.  What an individual finds doubtful is a matter of her psychology, 
but what is justified, according to Frege, are mind-independent thoughts.  Further, it is plausible 
that the antecedent order of justification that he thought the proofs expressed in Begriffsschrift 
notation would have to convincingly capture is simply that order upon which working scientists 
tacitly depend in practicing science.  A judge familiar with Frege’s notation would then be 
positioned to evaluate whether it codifies the principles of demonstrative inference without 
needing to posit a link between her practice and true thoughts in the third realm.  She would need 
only to reflect upon whether the formalism captures the patterns of inference upon which she 
already relies.   
 This concludes my argument against Burge’s attribution of B4 to Frege.  The previous 
paragraph is especially suggestive.  If Frege did not intend to provide his readers with a 
pragmatic justification for holding logic true, and if, indeed, his insistence that logic be divorced 
from psychology makes attributing any notion of “justification for holding true” to him puzzling, 
then we have reason to doubt Burge’s characterization of Frege’s epistemology of logic.  In the 
next section, I shall examine Weiner’s alternative account of Frege’s project and argue that it 
better comports with the appeals Frege makes to pragmatic considerations.   
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3. Weiner’s Frege: A Logocentric Elucidator  
 
 According to Weiner, Frege is committed to the following theses:  
(W1) Objectivity as Thinker Independence: Thoughts are “objective” in the sense 
that they are neither equivalent to nor dependent upon psychological facts about 
individual judges.35
 
 
(W2) Platonism about Thoughts draws attention to key features of inquiry: Talk 
of thoughts “existing” in a “third realm” is a rhetorical device used to mark off 
truth-apt discourse from other uses of language.36
 
 
(W3) The Begriffsschrift admits only of elucidation, not justification: By 
considering elucidations of the Begriffsschrift, inquirers may come to recognize 
that they acknowledge the truths that it codifies, but the formalism cannot be 
justified since any putative attempt to do so would assume its principles and thus 
be rendered circular.37
 
  
I have constructed these numbered theses to parallel those Burge defends.  Clearly, W3 is 
incompatible with B3 and B4, but are W1 and W2 opposed to B1 and B2?  What is to stop us 
from adopting all four theses as part of a more complete description of the significance of 
“objectivity” and “Platonism” for Frege?38  If this is possible, it may seem that we should 
interpret the point about which Burge and Weiner are clearly opposed—whether Frege offers 
justifications or only elucidations—as merely a terminological matter.39
                                                 
35 Weiner (1990, 170-175; 1995, 364).  See also Ricketts (1986).   
  I think that this would 
be a serious mistake.  It conflates distinct interpretations of Frege’s project.  In this section I shall 
justify this claim by showing how, on Weiner’s reading, unlike Burge’s, Frege does not face the 
36 I will argue below that this is the best way to understand Weiner (1990, 216-218; 1995, 373, 375-376).   
37 Weiner examines Frege’s elucidations in detail in the sixth chapter of her (1990).  See also Weiner (2005; 2008).  
38 Both Weiner (1990, 248-250) and Burge (1986, 123-131) develop objections to Dummett’s canonical reading of 
Frege as using linguistic categories to understand logical categories (where an “object” is whatever a singular term 
stands for, and other linguistic expressions are defined inductively on the basis of singular terms, corresponding to 
higher order “concepts” [1973, 54]), which might fuel the thought that their interpretations can be reconciled in 
opposition to Dummett’s.  But while Burge thinks that Frege’s logical categories are developed on the basis of his 
grasp of the ontological structure of abstract thoughts, Weiner argues that they are developed on the basis of our 
shared grasp of the norms guiding our inquiry.   
39 According to Greimann, if we define “justifications” as any method that shows us a truth, then Frege’s remarks 
are justifications, but if we define “justifications” as only those methods whose success relies upon our grasp of an 
inference, then Frege’s remarks are not justifications (2008, 406).  Cf. Richard Heck (2010, 343-344). 
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epistemological problems of justifying either his demarcation of logic or the truth of his 
codification to his readers. 
 Weiner’s interpretation belongs to a family originating with Jean van Heijenoort (1967) 
that emphasizes ways that Frege’s conception of logic as a universal language differs from our 
contemporary conception of logic as the investigation of formal calculi.40
 Since humans must use language as a medium to communicate what they are thinking to 
each other, practices which involve thinking together (such as scientific inquiry) are necessarily 
linguistic.
  She reads “judgment,” 
and the practice of judging that characterize our truth-apt scientific investigations, as Frege’s 
starting point (PW, 17-19).  In this context, Frege’s aim in constructing the Begriffsschrift is to 
create a universal language that will render perspicuous the justification for any judgment, a 
powerful feature that licenses honoring his formalism as “logic.”  His conception of logic is thus 
logocentric, originating in the linguistic and conceptual capacities we possess as judges.  Since 
according to Weiner’s Frege we have no grasp of justification that is independent of that which 
finds expression in the Begriffsschrift, Burge’s attempts to provide justifications for the 
Begriffsschrift presuppose what they are meant to demonstrate, and so, fail.  So, what does the 
epistemology of logic come to under Weiner’s interpretation of Frege’s project?   
41
                                                 
40 See especially Ricketts (1985; 1986; 1996), Warren Goldfarb (1982; 2010), James Conant (1991), Michael 
Kremer (2000), and William Taschek (2008).  
  But Frege thinks ordinary language is a poor medium for achieving scientific aims.  
The reference of terms in ordinary language is often ambiguous.  Moreover, the inferences that 
inquirers endorse (and reject) are about the subject matter being considered, not the sentences 
41 Frege thinks it conceivable that telepathic rational beings might exist who have no such need to rely on language 
when engaged in scientific inquiry (PW, 269).  Would such beings have any need for logic as Frege conceives it?  
On the one hand, Frege thinks we can make use of a Begriffsschrift—a universal concept script—to clarify the 
justificatory support for (and content of) our judgments, which we can only do imperfectly by relying on ordinary 
language.  Telepathic aliens would have no use for a Begriffsschrift in this sense.  On the other hand, to the extent 
that they are making judgments and drawing rational inferences on the basis of their prior judgments, telepathic 
aliens must be abiding by the laws of logic.  They could perhaps benefit from a logical education that helped them to 
explicitly recognize the laws of inference, and so think more clearly.  
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which they use to discuss that subject matter.  There is therefore a danger that some good 
inferences will be unobvious and some bad inferences will appear legitimate when they are 
expressed using a natural language with its own grammatical rules.  Frege intends his 
Begriffsschrift as an alternative language within which to conduct science whenever a proof is in 
question (BGS, v-vii; GGZ1, 3).42  According to Weiner, the sole principle guiding its design is 
to be maximally conducive to our scientific aims.  Frege does not conceive of logic as grounded 
upon any substantive prior ontological or epistemological theory.  The ontological categories of 
“object” and “concept” that he invokes have no independent or prior existence—i.e. a Platonic 
existence—from his logical analysis, his segmentation of the sentences we use to express 
judgments into object and concept positions.43  Instead, Weiner’s Frege’s conception of what 
“logic” is arises from the role to which he hoped his Begriffsschrift could be put.44
 What desiderata are generated by our practice of inquiry for an artificial language 
specifically designed to aid us?  Firstly, and most importantly, Frege thinks judgment aims at a 
standard that is both shared and objective.  The sense in which the standard is objective is 
exhibited by our reaction to conflicting utterances when we are in scientific contexts.  In some of 
our other linguistic practices, such as discussions of taste, we interpret conflicting utterances as 
the legitimate expression of a difference of opinion.  Features of Anne’s physiology may cause 
  To 
understand his view of logic and its epistemology, we must unpack his conception of our practice 
of judgment.  
                                                 
42 Frege is explicit that “this Begriffsschrift is an aid devised for particular scientific purposes, and should not 
therefore be condemned because it is no good for others (vi).  He does not intend the Begriffsschrift to replace 
ordinary language, which is used for a variety of purposes, many of them non-scientific.  
43 See especially Ricketts (1986, 89-90). 
44 This is part of what Ricketts (1996, 124) and Goldfarb (2010, 72) mean by calling Frege’s conception of logic 
“retail” not “wholesale.”  Frege does not begin with a philosophically developed conception of logic and claim to 
have elaborated all of its laws in his Begriffsschrift.  Rather, he begins by articulating some laws in the 
Begriffsschrift he devises, and having reflected upon the Begriffsschrift’s capacity to clarify scientific discourse, 
recommends that we call it “logic.”  (As Ricketts put it to me once in conversation, Frege offers only a “nominal,” 
not a “real,” definition of the “essence” of logic.)   
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her to legitimately and sincerely remark that the blue cheese which David has just called 
delicious is not delicious.  We think both Anne and David may correctly maintain their opposed 
positions.  But in science, we interpret conflicting utterances as the illegitimate expression of a 
contradiction.  If Anne sincerely reports that this cheese is British while David sincerely reports 
that it is not British, but Dutch, both recognize that at least one of their claims ought to be 
rejected.  Anne counts as asserting a claim that David denies.  Our belief that at most one of a 
pair of conflicting utterances in scientific contexts can be correct reveals that scientific inquiry 
has an objective norm.45  We have named the “correct” judgments of our practice of scientific 
inquiry “true,” and we take a central shared goal of scientific inquiry to be the discovery of 
shared truths.  It is the standard to which we hold our fellow scientific inquirers responsible, just 
as inquirers.  To Weiner’s Frege, this is our sole understanding of “truth.”46
 Secondly, scientific inquiry is characterized by inferential chains.  Judging is not only a 
matter of endorsing truths in isolation.  Many (indeed, most) of the truths we endorse are 
endorsed on the basis of other truths that we have recognized.  These chains of reasoning are also 
subject to a shared standard of correctness in terms of the goal of our activity: truth-
preservation.
 
47
                                                 
45 Frege distinguishes scientific dialogue from aesthetic dialogue in a number of passages (GGZ1, xviii-xix; T, 69; 
PW, 233).  For discussions of this point, see Ricketts (1986), Conant (1991, 147), and Sanford Shieh (2002, 102). 
  In this way, we credit some inferences as “justified” and reject others as 
“unjustified.”  We also take it to be part of our practice that we may demand of our fellow 
inquirers that they make clear what justification they have for a particular truth they endorse.   
46 Frege holds “true” to be indefinable (T, 60), but elucidates it by repeatedly describing judgment as “the 
recognition of the truth of a thought” (T, 62; PW 139; 185; 197).  These descriptions elucidate both “truth” and our 
practice of “judgment” at the same time.  It falls to logical laws to “unfold” the content of the word “true” (PW, 3) 
by making the principles of inference guiding our practice of judgment explicit. 
47 Often, we hold chains of reasoning to the standard of likely truth-preservation (i.e. non-demonstrative inference), 
rather than certain truth-preservation (demonstrative inference).  But Frege believes that our grasp of truth is 
constituted by our grasp of the principles of demonstrative inference (PW, 3).  In this sense, our non-demonstrative 
inferential practice is parasitic on our demonstrative inferential practice. 
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 These features give rise to a number of desiderata for an ideal language for science.  
Firstly, each expression should have an unambiguous reference, so that discussants can clearly 
grasp which claims are being discussed.  Secondly, if one inspects the sentential expression of an 
endorsed claim within the notation, its justificatory support should be entirely clear.  Thirdly, it 
should be possible to make clear the justification for any endorsed claim within the notation.   
 It is with these desiderata in mind, according to Weiner, that Frege designed his 
Begriffsschrift as a universal language for scientific inquiry, a calculus ratiocinatur (BGS, vi).  
They guide his choice of technical vocabulary.  In his later work, Frege introduces “thoughts” as 
a term for the objective content that inquirers are trying to express in language, which they grasp 
through cognitive acts; “judgment” as the recognition by an inquirer that the thought she is 
currently grasping is true; and “assertion” as the public manifestation of an inquirer’s private 
judgment (T, 62).  There is no conceptual priority to these terms, and so none are defined on the 
basis of the others (T, 60).  Rather, they form an interrelated network that explicates key features 
of our demonstrative inferential practice.  In line with the first and third desiderata, Frege aims 
for the Begriffsschrift to be universal.  It should be possible to construct an unambiguous 
representation of each candidate for judgment—each thought—in the Begriffsschrift.  In line 
with the second desideratum, Frege aims for the Begriffsschrift to make explicit the inferentially 
relevant content of each thought.  
 Frege’s heroic insight was to achieve this second goal by adopting a function/argument 
analysis (already familiar from mathematics) to evaluate the thoughts expressed by sentences.  
Inspecting a thought analyzed in this way allowed inquirers to grasp how that thought could be 
understood to instantiate different sorts of generalizations.  This process, as Frege recognized, is 
at the heart of scientists’ quantificational reasoning.   
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 Frege employs gothic letters as variables to express generality.  But the Begriffsschrift 
sentences in which Frege’s variables appear express (as Warren Goldfarb has put it [2010, 69]) 
substantive thoughts, not schematic formulae that stand in need of semantic interpretation in 
order to express thoughts and be either true or false.  Since Frege intended the Begriffsschrift to 
be universally applicable, he took variables to be unrestricted (unlike our current usage, which 
ties variables to particular domains).  However, he introduced different sorts of variables 
correlating to the different types of generality that could be expressed if one abstracted away 
from different parts of a thought.48
 For example, consider the sentence “Neville is a cat.”  Using the function/argument 
analysis, one can view this as the result of placing the proper name “Neville” in the argument 
place of the first-level function “____is a cat.”  One may now construct a general thought by 
appending a quantifier and a variable ranging over objects to the first level function one has just 
identified—for example, the generalization “∀x(x is a cat).  Or, one can construct a general 
thought by appending a quantifier and a variable ranging over functions to the object one has just 
identified—for example, the generalization “∃φ(Neville φ).”  By extension one can also 
generalize over higher order functions.  Since inquirers recognize distinct inferences that rely 
upon each type of generalization, Frege sorts the variables of Begriffsschrift according to their 
logical type (GGZ1, §8; §28-29).  
   
 Frege articulates Begriffsschrift sentences that, once one has understood the symbols of 
the notation, are evidently true and not in need of justificatory support, which he calls basic laws 
(GGZ1, §18; §20).  He demonstrates how the expression of the conditional within his two-
                                                 
48 These “parts” of a thought are themselves determined by the inferences which working scientists employ.  For 
example, take this simple inference: 7 x 2 = 14; 2=(1+1); so 7 x (1+1) = 14.  We recognize this as legitimate because 
of what we call Leibniz’s Law, that proper names can be replaced in extensional contexts salve veritate.  But it is 
only through our recognition of this inference that we can isolate the category of “proper names” at all, as those 
terms which appear in simple, non-general identities.  For further discussion of this point, see Ricketts (1986, 179).   
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dimensional notation makes the application of modus ponens, which he takes to be a self-
evidently truth-preserving inferential rule, entirely perspicuous (§14).  In contrast to Burge’s 
Frege, “self-evidence” carries little theoretical weight here.  For Weiner’s Frege, one will judge a 
rule of inference or axiom self-evident if it transparently codifies a basic principle upon which 
one relies when judging.  Since Frege never defines self-evidence and Jeshion’s explication 
doesn’t perfectly match his texts, I count this deflation of the significance of “self-evident” a 
point in Weiner’s favor.  Finally, Frege shows how the justification for various mathematical 
theorems is clear when those theorems are expressed in the Begriffsschrift.  Doing so makes 
explicit how those theorems are rationally derivable using principles of inference from self-
evident basic laws (GGZ1 §49-GGZ2 §179).  With the addition of plausible enthymematic 
premises and definitions, and perhaps further non-general basic laws belonging to particular 
special sciences, he is confident that his axiomatic approach will allow the justification for any 
scientific judgment to be perspicuously expressed within his notation.49  For Weiner, Frege’s 
confidence in the universal applicability of his notation is what licenses calling it “logic” as an 
honorific: he has created a language that he believes meets the desiderata for an ideal language 
for science.50
 We are now positioned to understand why Weiner’s attribution of W1 and W2 to Frege 
cannot be reconciled with Burge’s attribution of B1 and B2 to Frege.  On her interpretation, 
Frege’s philosophical motives for (and concerns about) his formalism sharply differ from 
contemporary concerns in the philosophy of logic.  In particular, he is not concerned to develop a 
theory of the workings of natural language, nor to defend a Platonist ontology, nor to advance a 
 
                                                 
49 See (PW, 21-32; CP, 235). Goldfarb works through an example in (2010, 82).  
50 Frege has an experimental notion of completeness (see especially PW, 38).  Although he is confident that the 
proof of any informally accepted theorem will be expressible within the Begriffsschrift, his worked examples only 
make this conclusion probable.  If he has failed to articulate a principle of inference upon which the proof of some 
accepted result depends, it would have to be added to his codification (CP, 235).  
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nuanced Euclidean epistemology.  Rather, his sole purpose is to design a tool for use by careful 
inquirers, a universal language in which proofs will be clear, a project which he calls “logical.”  
He is not engaged, either, in projects we currently consider to be a central part of the philosophy 
of logic, such as the formal semantic justification of a notation.   
 Weiner argues that engaging in some contemporary projects in philosophy of logic would 
not even have made sense from Frege’s logocentric perspective.  Her reading relieves him from 
the pressure of having failed to give—or having given plainly poor—answers to the 
epistemological problems that seem pressing on Burge’s interpretation.  Since many 
philosophical statements cannot be justified or even expressed within the Begriffsschrift, to 
Weiner’s Frege much of philosophy was only elucidatory.  Philosophical remarks do not have 
the status of scientific assertions that can justify others and which admit of and require 
justification themselves.  Instead, philosophy’s purpose is to help inquirers obtain the perspective 
necessary to use the Begriffsschrift, so that they may begin the serious work of science.  
 According to Weiner, Frege believes that we have no grasp on the notion of truth 
independently of the practice of judging, and, in particular, of scientists’ private judgments (and 
public assertions).  “Truth” is just our name for the constitutive norm of judgment.  Since we 
lack an antecedent grasp of truth, we cannot explain our practice of judging in terms of it.  Nor is 
the logician seeking to grasp “laws of truth” that exist independently of human activity (B1).  
Although Frege often calls the laws of logic the laws of truth (GGZ1, xvi; PW, 128; 145), he 
writes—in the aptly named “My Basic Logical Insights”—that the essence of logic “is not 
contained in the word ‘true’ at all but in the assertoric force with which a sentence is uttered” 
(PW, 272).  Our utterances only carry the “force” necessary to be assertions if we advance them 
as candidates for evaluation by others in our scientific community according to the shared norm 
34 
 
of “truth” that guides our practice of judging.  To be a judge—one who is able to engage in 
scientific inquiry—is for one’s utterances to aim at truth, to count as assertions.  And to be able 
to aim at truth in one’s utterances and to assert is to be a judge.51
 Weiner extends this line of thought to deflate Frege’s Platonism.  She argues that, for 
Frege, although “thoughts” are independent of cognitive processes undergone by particular 
thinkers, they are not independent of the scientific practice in which we rational thinkers engage 
(W1).  Their “objectivity” is not an ontological feature to be cashed out by Platonist 
metaphysics, but a feature of our everyday scientific practice, exhibited by our recognition of a 
distinction between scientific disputes and non-scientific differences of opinion.  This feature of 
our inferential practice must be respected by the designer of a universal language for science.  
Quoting Frege’s claim that what is objective is “what is subject to laws, what can be conceived 
and judged, what is expressible in words” (FA, §26), Weiner argues that Frege’s conception of 
objectivity is irrevocably tied to what we can express and communicate using our language 
(1995, 370).  In this passage, Frege writes that the North Sea is an objective object whose 
existence does not depend upon any choice or idea of ours.  Burge and Weiner agree that this 
implies that the North Sea would exist (unrecognized) even if we had never drawn its 
boundaries.  But while Burge draws the strong conclusion that things which exist objectively do 
so entirely independently of human activity (which fuels B1), Weiner concludes only that things 
which exist objectively do so independently of whether any human has so far expressed them, 
but not independently of the language which humans can use to express.   
  
                                                 
51 Ricketts (1996) and Kremer (2000) argue that we should understand Frege’s comment that the laws of logic are an 
“unfolding of the content of the word ‘true’” (PW, 3), and his break from the Kantian characterization of laws of 
logic as laws of thought to calling them laws of truth, in terms of Frege’s view that truth is the constitutive aim of 
judgment.  The capacity for inferential judgment is the capacity to recognize one truth on the basis of another, and 
the science of logic studies the laws which govern this capacity. 
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 In Weiner’s view, Frege’s Platonist remarks about thoughts are only meant to show that 
“the content, for logical or scientific purposes, of a sentence is neither a physical object (the 
inscription of the sentence) nor the ideas typically associated with the sentence” (1990, 218).  In 
other words, when we use ordinary language to engage in scientific inquiry together, we do not 
take ourselves to be voicing privately accessible ideas (such as how food tastes to us), but rather 
publically accessible—and evaluable—claims (W2).  Weiner’s Frege believes these claims are 
more clearly expressed in his Begriffsschrift.   
 Weiner also denies that Frege meant to espouse a Platonic theory in his philosophical 
remarks about intersubjective communication (against B2).  She gives two reasons.  One reason 
is that Frege says: “I take it as a sure sign of a mistake if logic has need of metaphysics and 
psychology – sciences that require their own logical first principles” (GGZ1, xix).  The practice 
of judgment (including intersubjective communication) that logic codifies cannot tacitly 
presuppose a Platonist metaphysics that must be grasped before it is fully justified (1995, 593).  
Rather, the putative justification of a Platonist metaphysical theory would rely upon logic.  
 Weiner’s second reason is trickier.  It concerns the fact that Frege took words he used in 
his philosophical writings, such as “function” and “concept,” to be “defective” for scientific 
purposes (COR, 141; PW, 177; 239; Weiner 1995, 376).  The problem Frege has with such 
words is that when they are used in sentences they fail to refer to entities of the correct logical 
category.  For example, when the word “concept” is used predicatively (“___is a concept”), a 
meaningful sentence of ordinary language can only be constructed if the unsaturated function is 
saturated by replacing the blank with a proper name.  But since proper names refer to things in 
the logical category of objects, the resulting sentence will always be false (Weiner 1990, 251-
252).  Frege makes no use of these defective words within the Begriffsschrift.  There is no need 
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to do so, since the notation is constructed to make the logical category to which any given 
expression refers perspicuous by inspection.  Nevertheless, he relies upon these words when 
introducing his notation in ordinary language, lamenting that his “expressions, taken literally, 
sometimes miss [his] thought” (CP 193).  Weiner concludes that Frege only intended these 
defective words to smooth his reader’s transition from ordinary language to the Begriffsschrift, 
and that they have no significant role to play once competency with the Begriffsschrift is 
achieved.52  But now, if a rigorous statement of Platonism requires mention of functions, it 
follows that no theory of Platonism can be stated within the Begriffsschrift.53
 Finally, Weiner denies that Frege’s semantic claims about the Begriffsschrift notation 
constitute a justification for it (against B3).  She agrees with Burge that Frege thought the only 
justification for the truth of the Begriffsschrift axioms, as self-evident truths, was those axioms 
themselves.  Any purported chain of reasoning that seemed to derive the axioms would already 
  Since Platonism 
must stand outside the language of justification for Weiner’s Frege, the purpose of his Platonist 
remarks can only be elucidatory (W3).   
                                                 
52 Dummett argues that Frege was wrong to think that the thoughts clumsily grasped by “___ is a concept” locutions 
could not be formally expressed within the Begriffsschrift (1973, 216-217), using an analysis that makes use of the 
somewhat  artificial second order predicate “____ is something which everything either is or is not.”  But Weiner’s 
point stands despite Dummett’s suggestion.  Frege clearly thought it necessary to introduce Begriffsschrift using 
terms that he thought could not be captured within his notation.  
53 To my knowledge, Weiner nowhere makes explicit why a statement of Platonism about thoughts would require us 
to mention functions, focusing instead on arguing that a general claim like “all functions are atemporal,” which 
Burge attributes to Frege, cannot be formulated within the Begriffsschrift (1995, 594).  One reason might be that, 
were Frege espousing a Platonist theory in his various remarks about functions, concepts, numbers and thoughts, a 
complete statement of this theory would not only require assertions about thoughts (which could be expressed within 
Begriffsschrift notation)—for example, “every thought is atemporal”—but also assertions about the ontological 
status of the relationship between thoughts and their components—for example, some general statement describing 
the relationship between a function (such as “__is atemporal”) and the thoughts in which that function appears (such 
as “every thought is atemporal”).  Although Frege wrote that thoughts, like sentences, had incomplete components 
(COR, 141-142; 163; 165), it is unclear whether or not he believed that functions were identical to the incomplete 
components of thoughts (see Mark Textor [2009] for an interesting discussion).   However, there is presumably 
some connection between functions and thoughts that we should expect a Platonic theory to articulate.  But as Frege 
says, “it is not possible to speak of [incomplete components of thoughts] without turning what is in need of 
completion into something complete and thus falsifying the real situation” (COR, 141).  Weiner’s argument that no 
general statement about functions can be expressed within the Begriffsschrift then shows that no complete statement 
of Platonism is expressible within the Begriffsschrift. 
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be tacitly relying upon them, and would hence be illegitimate.  But where Burge finds in Frege’s 
semantic claims a justification for the soundness of modus ponens as an operation on expressions 
of his logical notation, Weiner finds only elucidatory instruction designed to introduce readers to 
the application of a self-evidently valid rule in an unfamiliar language (2005, 339).54
 Unlike Burge, Weiner does not think Frege’s semantic claims are hesitant steps towards 
the sorts of justifications that have since become familiar with the development of model theory 
and proof theory.  She thinks that the notion of employing a truth predicate applying only to 
entities in a particular domain to construct arguments meant to offer logic justificatory support is 
wholly foreign to Frege’s universalist conception of logic (2005, 346-347).  Any such appeal 
would suggest that logical laws hold on the basis of some restricted domain—such as the 
linguistic domain in the case of “semantic” justifications—which would have its own laws.  This 
would undermine logic’s (and, were Frege’s logicist project to have succeeded, arithmetic’s) 
maximal generality.
   
55
                                                 
54 The details of this argument would take us far afield here.  In discussing modus ponens, Frege uses the expression 
“is the True,” which Burge takes to be a truth predicate allowing Frege to construct soundness arguments.  Weiner 
argues that this expression is not, nor can it be turned into, a truth predicate holding of all true thoughts; rather, it is a 
predicate holding of a single object, the True (see Weiner 2005, section 3).  Instead, she reads Frege as trying to 
bring out the self-evidence of modus ponens to his reader by giving an informal explanation of modus tollens.    
  Weiner’s Frege believes that “truth” is just as defective a word as 
“concept.”  Although it is crucial for elucidating the Begriffsschrift (in particular, for naming 
what its rules of inference preserve [1990, 260]), it is likewise apt to confuse since its ascription 
adds nothing to the sense of the sentences in which it appears, and it is not a predicate of 
thoughts (2005, 350-351; CP, 354; T, 59-60).  Once again, Frege never uses the defective word 
“true” in his Begriffsschrift.  It occurs only in transitional remarks designed to clarify the 
Begriffsschrift notation (1990, 261). For Weiner, Frege’s elucidatory remarks are intended only 
to help his reader better grasp his ideas so that they may make use of his innovations in 
55 Weiner (2005, 347) develops a reading of Frege (CN, 336-340) that makes analogous points about how foreign 
the idea of justifying logic by appeal to a special science that governed the restricted realm of thoughts would be to 
him.  
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subsequent inquiry: “the aim of elucidation is to have a particular psychological effect.  The aim 
of gapless proofs from primitive laws of truth is to provide justification” (2008, 434).   
 The striking differences between Weiner’s and Burge’s interpretations of Frege’s project 
show why it would be a mistake to interpret her focus on “elucidation” as a mere terminological 
variant of his “justification.”  For Weiner’s Frege, the Begriffsschrift is intended to be the 
universal language of justification.  Formalizing a judgment within the Begriffsschrift makes its 
justification plain.  But the truth of the basic principles of Begriffsschrift cannot be justified by 
appeal to other truths.  I am persuaded by Weiner that Frege did not think his semantic claims 
constituted a bottom-up justification of the Begriffsschrift’s basic inference rules (against B3).  
My argument in section two against the pragmatic top-down justification that Burge attributes to 
Frege (B4) complements Weiner’s reading.  As Frege conceives of his project, there is neither a 
need to provide nor a possibility of providing a justification to his readers for why they should 
hold the Begriffsschrift true.  There is only a need to elucidate its self-evidence when teaching it 
to them, and to appeal to pragmatic considerations to drive home to them its usefulness for their 
inquiries.  
 Moreover, on the reading that I am recommending, Frege neither needs nor gives a 
precise demarcation of logic.  Since he does not appeal to “self-evidence” as a general criterion 
by which one may determine whether a given truth is logical, there is no worry that his mention 
of self-evidence marks a fall into psychologism.  These claims may seem puzzling.  One might 
think that if Frege’s logicist claim is to have any bite, he ought to have a substantive account of 
what makes a truth a logical truth.  Furthermore, one might think that to evaluate the success of 
his Begriffsschrift as a codification of logic, one needs first to have a substantive account of what 
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logic is in order to compare the Begriffsschrift to it.  But both of these objections mistake Frege’s 
project.  Let us take them in turn. 
 Frege created the Begriffsschrift to serve as a precise language in which to establish 
logicism.  He proposes that scientists make use of this language when they need to better 
understand a disputed proof (BGS, v-vi), a feature that gained prominence in his thought after 
the discovery of the contradiction shattered his faith in logicism.56
 Secondly, Frege thinks that a reader’s evaluation of the Begriffsschrift is a matter of her 
grasping its usefulness, not a matter of judging whether it accurately demarcates which truths are 
“logical.”  In Frege’s view, neither he nor his reader have an independent conception of “logic” 
against which the Begriffsschrift can be compared.  Richard Heck has plausibly argued that 
Frege knew that there were undecidable sentences (2010, 348).
  Calling the basic laws of his 
language “self-evident” is just to say that a competent judge who understands them will 
recognize them as true and basic.  His logicist claim is that it is possible within the 
Begriffsschrift to construct a gap-free proof for any arithmetical theorem using only the 
language’s basic principles.  So Frege does not need a general criterion by which to determine 
whether a given truth is a logical truth.  He only needs to show that a gap-free proof for any 
arithmetical theorem can be derived on the basis of the basic laws that he has identified.  
57
                                                 
56 In “What may I regard as the result of my work?” Frege writes, “It is almost all bound up with the concept-script” 
(PW, 184).  
  So he could not, for example, 
have thought that all truths expressible using only the topic-universal vocabulary of the 
Begriffsschrift (which is one account of what makes a truth “logical”) were derivable within the 
Begriffsschrift.  Instead, Frege thought the only standard against which to evaluate a purported 
57 For example, it is either true that all objects are value-ranges, or that there is an object which is not a value-range; 
but neither claim is derivable within the Begriffsschrift.  See also (GGZ1, §10), where Frege states that the claim 
that The True is the extension of the concept under which only The True falls is not derivable, but nevertheless 
stipulates that it is true.  
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codification of logic is experimental completeness (PW, 38).  He is extremely confident that the 
Begriffsschrift suffices for his immediate purposes of establishing logicism.  He thinks a gap-free 
proof of any accepted arithmetical theorem can be derived within his notation.  He is also fairly 
confident that, with suitable expansions of its vocabulary, his notation can be employed to 
express the proof of any scientific claim (BGS, vi).  But, he acknowledges that other rules of 
inference might have to be introduced into the language in order give formal gap-free proofs for 
some scientific truths (PW, 363).  This shows again that Frege did not intend his Begriffsschrift 
to be the final word on logical truth, and that he did not intend its evaluation to be a matter of 
judging whether every truth worth calling “logical” had been codified by his Begriffsschrift.  
 However, there is a question closely related to the demarcation problem which Frege 
does engage: what accounts for the special status of logic with respect to our investigations?  I 
have argued that Frege provides no account of how logical truths may be distinguished from 
non-logical truths.  Maximal generality is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for logicality.  
So, why does logic normatively govern all rational inquiry?  Understanding Frege’s subtle 
answer to this question is the goal of the next section.  I will argue that Frege’s discussion of 
logical aliens exposes his constitutive view of the relationship between logic and cognition.  
Further, I will argue that Burge’s reading cannot accommodate Frege’s constitutive view.   
 
4.  Madness and Logical Aliens 
 One of Frege’s aims in the preface of Grundgesetze is to combat a psychologistic 
conception of logic.58
                                                 
58 Frege blames the prevailing psychological attitude for the critical neglect of his logicist program (GGZ1, xi).  The 
empirical investigations of psychological logicians into how humans think serve, Frege believes, to make logic seem 
irrelevant to the mathematical and non-psychological question of what constitutes the foundations of arithmetic.  
  He insists that logicians who fail to sharply distinguish their work from 
psychology—“psychological logicians”—mischaracterize both the normative force of and the 
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class of judges obligated by logical prescriptions.  If, as psychological logicians believe, logical 
laws are empirically discoverable generalizations of the way that humans think, then they issue 
in conditional prescriptions relevant for human judges (and those who wish to judge humanly).  
Roughly: if one wishes to judge as the majority of humans do, then one must abide by the laws of 
logic.  Such laws have a normative force over human judgment much as grammatical laws have 
a normative force over a human language: if one wishes to speak English as the majority of 
English speakers think it is correct to do, then one must abide by the laws of English grammar.  
Frege objects that this position fails to adequately distinguish the real topic of logic—the laws of 
what is objectively true—from what most humans hold true.59
 In contrast to the psychological logician, Frege insists that logical laws do not ground 
conditional obligations when judging to comport with a mean, a mean that is based on contingent 
generalizations, but rather ground unconditional obligations upon all judges to meet the 
objective, unchanging standard of truth: “the laws of [logic]…are boundary stones set in an 
eternal foundation, which our thought can overflow, but never displace” (GGZ1, xvi).  Frege 
holds that judgment is the advance from grasping a thought to recognizing it true (T, 62).  To 
judge correctly is thus to recognize of truths that they are true.  Insofar as scientific laws express 
  The grammatical laws of a 
language change over time with the shifting intuitions of its speakers.  Similarly, were our brain 
chemistry to undergo a radical change so that most humans began to freely contradict 
themselves, then under psychologism the “logical” law of non-contradiction would have to be 
replaced by a law of contradiction (c.f. PW, 148).   
                                                 
59 In Frege’s view, although the connection between logic and objective truth is usually “admitted at the outset” of a 
logical inquiry, the human, psychological matter of holding true often wends its way back into subsequent 
discussion (GGZ1, xv).  He is not only opposed to logicians who explicitly commit themselves to psychologism, 
(which is fortunate, since few would accept Frege’s characterization of psychologism, and he might accordingly be 
thought to have erected a straw man), but also to any logician who fails to resist the “corrupting influence” of 
psychology in her work. 
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general truths, judges are obliged to judge in accordance with them.  Such prescriptions do not 
merely obligate human judges, or judges who wish to judge humanly, but all judges.  Among 
scientific laws, logical laws deserve the name “laws of thought” not in virtue of a special 
relationship to empirical psychology, but because they have a maximally general scope in 
rational inquiry.  Logical laws hold universally for every act of judgment, not merely for 
judgments in a particular special science, such as geometry or physics (GGZ1, xv). 
 Nevertheless, Frege’s subsequent discussion of logical aliens (beings who deny a logical 
law) reveals that he thinks there is a crucial aspect of logical laws which is not shared by other 
scientific laws.  He thinks that they enjoy a privileged, and what I shall call constitutive, 
relationship to cognition.60
 Those critics who discuss Frege’s logical aliens rarely note that he identifies two distinct 
types of alien, and none, in my view, adequately attend to this fact’s significance.  A disastrous 
consequence of underdescribing Frege’s text here is that it makes his constitutive view seem 
  I think that Frege’s recognition of this relationship explains why he 
writes not that logical aliens are merely wrong for denying a logical law, but that they are mad.  
(Notice that we experience no temptation to call a person who denies a law of physics mad, 
rather than wrong or, perhaps, foolish).  On the basis of my articulation, I will argue that Burge’s 
pragmatic Euclidean interpretation of Frege cannot satisfactorily accommodate his constitutive 
view.  Furthermore, and in line with Weiner’s logocentric reading, Frege’s constitutive view 
explains why he was content to rely upon elucidating the self-evidence of the Begriffsschrift to 
other rational inquirers, since it exposes that he believed such inquirers tacitly endorse logic by 
engaging in demonstrative reasoning.  
                                                 
60 The word “constitutive” is used by a number of commentators when discussing Frege’s conception of logic, 
including James Conant (1991, 148), Burge (1992, 316), John MacFarlane (2002, 37), and William Taschek (2008, 
384).  But when we begin to unpack these scholars’ substantive disputes, it becomes clear that they do not share the 
same ambition in attributing a constitutive view to Frege.  One goal of this section is to provide a sharp articulation 
of the constitutive view to which I think Frege’s texts show him to be committed.  
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unsophisticated, which in turn encourages (on the basis of charity) thinking it peripheral to his 
conception of logic.  But I think that, on the contrary, the distinction Frege makes between alien 
species (and, in particular, the fact that Frege only calls members of the second alien species 
mad) demonstrates the subtlety and contemporary interest of Frege’s position.  Moreover, 
Frege’s discussion of logical aliens shows that he thinks any viable conception of logic must 
appreciate its constitutive role in inquiry (which, notably, he thinks that a psychological 
conception fails to do).  If I succeed in arguing that interpreting Frege as a pragmatic Euclidean 
is incompatible with attributing a constitutive view to him, it will be a decisive blow against 
Burge’s reading.   
 Frege first instructs us to imagine discovering beings who make judgments which 
contradict one of our logical laws.  This is the first species of logical aliens.  Suppose the law in 
question is the simplified version of Basic Law I: 
[1]    
      
In modern notation, this is (A→A).61
[2]   
  The contradictory judgment made by this first species of 
logical alien will therefore be, for some thought B: 
    
                                                 
61 Basic Law I is actually:  
 
This denotes the judgment, for thoughts A and B, “it is not the case that A is denied, B is affirmed and A is affirmed” 
(GGZ1, §18), which we would write in modern notation as “(A→(B→A))”.  However, in the case where A and B 
denote the same thought, by Frege’s rule of the amalgamation of identical subcomponents, this axiom entails the 
simpler formula [1] above, and which he writes “is a particular case of [the first axiom, and] which will be 
understood together with [it] without explicit notice” (GGZ1, §18).  Here, to make the exposition of Frege’s 
argument as clear as possible, I have chosen to focus on the simpler case, but the argument would go through with 
the more general axiom—or, indeed, any of Frege’s other basic laws.   
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In modern notation, this is ~(B→B), which is equivalent to ~B&B.  Perhaps we witness the aliens 
concluding B as the result of Monday’s investigation, and denying B as the result of Tuesday’s 
investigation.  Balking, we accuse them of contradiction, and show them that they have 
committed themselves to [2]; but instead of conceding their error and withdrawing one of their 
judgments, they hold steadfastly to both. 
 What should we say about such creatures?  To the psychological logician, logical laws 
are abstracted from instances of human thinking.  Our current sample of humans do not typically 
contradict themselves—and, once they have been alerted to the fact in the rare cases where they 
do, they quickly withdraw their contradictory assertion—which justifies taking [1] to be a logical 
law.  But this tells us nothing about what other beings do.  All we may conclude from the alien’s 
judgment [2], then, is that [1] is not a logical law for them. 
 Frege disagrees.  He writes that we ought to conclude that the first species of aliens “do 
not as we do immediately recognize certain truths, but have to rely perhaps on the longer path of 
induction” (GGZ1, xvi).  His mention of induction may initially seem to discredit my choice of 
Basic Law, given that [1] has no quantifiers.  But Frege understands all of his axioms to express 
general truths: A in [1] ranges over all objects.62
                                                 
62 The horizontal function takes all those objects which are not the True to the False, and takes the True to itself.  
  Whereas we are able to “immediately” 
recognize that [1] is true, Frege suggests that the aliens’ judgment [2] is evidence that they have 
not (yet) done so.  Attributing inductive reasoning to the aliens intelligibly explains this delay.  
The aliens will only endorse [1] as a general truth after explicitly considering a sufficient 
number of thoughts for them to consider it inductively established.  If they have yet to carry out 
this empirical work, they may reasonably (though, as we know, wrongly) judge [2].  Doubtless, 
they will soon get into difficulties thinking about claims related to B.  In time, we can show the 
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inductive aliens that they have ample evidence for [1], and that violating it has consistently 
gotten them into trouble.  We are entitled to judge these aliens cautious, but not crazy.  
 I think we can make analogous points about various logically limited inquirers, such as 
those of us who are prone to logical mistakes.  Frege finds it quite intelligible that an inquirer 
may sincerely make a judgment that she fails to realize contradicts a logical law, as when “our 
thought…overflow[s]” the laws of logic (GGZ1, xvi).  Upon encountering such a person, we 
may try to explain her mistake to her through logical instruction and endeavor to improve her 
reasoning ability.  Extremely limited inquirers may need sustained instruction, but we are only 
entitled to judge those who have chronic difficulty avoiding inferential errors stupid, not crazy.63  
Similarly, Frege can make sense of bold reasoners who quickly endorse inferences from which 
we temporarily refrain, locally eccentric and locally foolish reasoners who systematically 
endorse invalid inferences in esoteric or difficult fields respectively (while making few such 
errors elsewhere), and formally inept reasoners who fail introductory logic classes but obtain 
college degrees.64
 However, Frege asks us to imagine a second species of alien that he finds more 
problematic: “what if beings were even found whose laws of thought directly contradicted our 
own and therefore frequently led to contrary results in practice as well?” (GGZ1, xvi).  It is 
worth getting clearer here about the case Frege has in mind.  Members of the first alien species 
intelligibly have a limited, inductive form of our reasoning.  This makes them capable of failing 
to recognize their logical errors as errors, even after we have brought them to their attention.  In 
 
                                                 
63 It is worth noting that psychological logicians could likewise interpret these as cases of cautiousness, foolishness, 
etc.  But Frege differs from them in thinking that so interpreting the aliens (rather than judging that, for example, [1] 
is not a logical law for them) is the only intelligible option.   
64 Had Frege been aware of subsequent formal developments, I believe he could likewise have made sense of those 
competing logicians (i.e. intuitionists subscribing to Heyting’s calculus) whose alternate (but not contradictory) 
inferential practices could be coherently explained as issuing from a guiding principle (such as constructivism).  
Another example is Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane’s (2010) argument for a restriction on using modus ponens 
in cases of conditional obligation.  
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contrast, we are asked to imagine that members of this second species reason in accordance with 
a law that contradicts one of our own.  When we try to draw their attention to their errors, they 
insist it is we who are mistaken.  Moreover, the entire alien community appears consistent in 
their anti-logical verbalizations.  They exhibit none of the corrective behavior to which a 
member of our community would be subjected if they were to judge against a logical law.  This 
community agreement grounds a logically alien “practice” of inquiry, the putative conclusions of 
which stand in contradiction to our own judgments.   
 Let us focus once again upon Basic Law I.  Suppose its negation is among the second 
alien species’ laws of thought.  These aliens not only contradict themselves, but appear to do so 
deliberately, stringing together sequences of contradictory judgments in ways that seem 
meaningful to the other aliens, but which strike us as patently absurd.  They not only endorse [2] 
in a particular case, but act as though it is axiomatic for every judgeable content B.  Let us 
stipulate that they refuse all of our attempts to correct them (perhaps they sometimes seem to be 
trying to “correct” us) and thus call their overt and reflective denial of our logical law [1] 
“resolute.”  Is this second case intelligible? 
 The psychological logician, Frege suggests, would take the resolute alien’s behavior in 
her stride.  She will conclude that [2] is a logical law that is valid for the aliens, while our logical 
law [1] is valid for us.  Frege is damning about this response, because it exposes that the logical 
laws recognized by psychological logicians are “valid” only relative to a population.  Truth, in 
contrast, is a standard that is “objective and independent of those who judge” (GGZ1, xvii).  
Truth holds fast for every judge.  This is the standard which, in Frege’s view, is logic’s proper 
aim.65
                                                 
65 A number of commentators have pointed out that nothing Frege says here convincingly refutes psychologism 
(Ricketts 1986b, 69; Shieh 2002, 102).  The psychological logician may simply insist, for instance, that a “truth” 
  Without such a shared standard, there is no principled way to distinguish the resolution-
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demanding contradictory attitudes that characterize scientific disputes from the merely differing 
opinions that underlie disputes about taste.  If you deny my assertion that this powder is copper 
sulphate, it would always remain an open possibility that our laws of thought differ, much as our 
taste buds do, and that we have both judged correctly in accordance with our distinct laws of 
thought.  This powder might be copper sulphate for me, but not for you.  Instead, doing justice to 
the distinction we commonly recognize between contradictory judgments and differing opinions 
requires accepting that “anyone who has once recognized a [logical law] has thereby also 
recognized a law that prescribes how judgments should be made, wherever, whenever, and by 
whomever they may be made” (GGZ1, xvii).66
 How should we understand this diagnosis?  James Conant suggests that Frege chooses 
“madness” as a way of meeting the psychological logician halfway, that “the closest Frege can 
come to…[understanding] an antithetical form of reason (deeply illogical thought) is the 
philosophically innocuous idea of a degenerate form of reason (merely lunatic thought)” (1991, 
149).  On Conant’s reading, the madness exhibited by logical aliens is of a “hitherto unknown 
kind” because we have yet to encounter beings who resolutely deny, to stay with our example, 
Basic Law I.  Were we to do so, we could straightforwardly classify them on a continuum with 
other lunatic thinkers, whose powers of reason are similarly impaired.  A perfect capacity for 
  In Frege’s view, our response to members of the 
second alien species who purport to reason in a way that contradicts our logical laws should be 
unyielding: “I would say: here we have a hitherto unknown kind of madness” (GGZ1, xvi).   
                                                                                                                                                             
about the world just is what counts for us as a truth about the world, which in turn depends (in some way to be filled 
out) upon the constitution of our minds, and which she has set about clarifying in her inquiry into logic.  In later 
chapters, I shall return to this theme in exploring how the rise of behaviorism in psychology complicates the division 
between Frege’s conception of logic and that of his psychological opponents.     
66 The committed psychological logician will not find this argument compelling.  If she thinks she has empirically 
discovered logical laws that hold for all members of a given population, then her logic will still be a useful standard 
for arbitration between members of that population who are engaged in inquiry together.  She will insist that to two 
beings who share laws of thought (including, presumably, all humans), this powder is either copper sulphate for 
both, or for neither.  This attitude amounts to a refusal to draw any sharp distinction between contradictory 
judgments of truth and differing opinions of taste. 
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logical inference is necessary for perfect thought, but a being displaying some capacity for 
logical inference is intelligible as having a degenerate, “mad” form of thought.   
 However, I think that Conant’s account fails to do justice to the sophistication of Frege’s 
thinking.  In my view, Frege thinks that the resolve of the second alien species ought to 
undermine our initial judgment of their capacity for reason.  They do not exhibit a deformed 
form of reason.  They lack any form of reason.  We are judging beings.  They are non-judging 
organisms.  Whatever cognitive activity their physiology allows for does not count as the 
grasping of thoughts, whatever verbalizations they make do not count as assertions that particular 
thoughts are true, and whatever series of noises they eject at each other do not count as chains of 
reasoning.   
 So calling resolute aliens “mad”  is only the first part of Frege’s story.  Having initially 
supposed them rational (perhaps on the basis of our apparently successful early attempts to 
communicate), their subsequent behavior refutes our charitable hypothesis that they are fellow 
judges.  So long as we abide by our earlier belief and think that we were communicating with the 
aliens, we will be inclined to judge the aliens “mad” on the basis of their now baffling behavior; 
but as we soberly reflect upon the situation, we will recognize that we were no more 
communicating with them than we do with our pets.67
 Conant’s reading results from conflating the two alien species that Frege distinguishes.  
Frege certainly thinks that we may discover beings who exhibit a limited capacity for logical 
inference.  But, such beings belong to the first category of logical alien, not the second category 
   
                                                 
67 We might compare Descartes’ claim that we can infer from the speech of madmen, but not from the squawks of 
parrots, that thoughts are being grasped, because although the speech of the mad “does not follow reason” it is 
“relevant to particular topics” (1998, 43).  But our judgment of whether or not a being meets Descartes’ standard of 
her speech being “relevant to particular topics” is really a function of our attempts to communicate with her.  The 
person whose pronouncements we come to judge to have no bearing upon our conversation is—like the parrot—not 
grasping thoughts, and so is non-rational.  (Much as non-human, non-rational animals can be said to “think” about 
their environment if we interpret their behavior as a series of appropriate responses to the world, Frege may admit 
that resolute aliens who appear able to negotiate their environment can be said to “think,” if metaphorically.)  
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whom we are forced to judge mad.  If we take the time to instruct a logically limited judge, her 
reasoning may or may not improve.  But the crucial point is that all of these impaired reasoners 
exhibit behavior which is sufficient to make them intelligible as fellow judges who are 
attempting—just as we are—to recognize true thoughts.  All of these judges, simply as judges, 
can be brought not only to endorse particular formulations of the logical laws, but to recognize 
that the logical laws express the norms of the very practice in which they, and we, are engaged.   
 Distinguishing the two species of logical aliens serves to make Frege’s constitutive view 
far more plausible than it may seem from other recent accounts.  William Taschek, for example, 
writes that Frege believes all judges must “acknowledge” the laws of logic, but declines to 
“explicate with any precision what exactly this acknowledgement consists in,” on the grounds 
that doing so would be “very tricky” (2008, 384).  But Taschek does note that acknowledgment 
must “involve one’s possessing a capacity to recognize—when being sincere and reflective, and 
possibly with appropriate prompting—logical mistakes in one’s own judgmental and inferential 
practice and that of others” (384).  We can now deepen and clarify this remark.  The “appropriate 
prompting” is not merely a flat-footed demand that one’s interlocutor must just see her mistake 
once it is pointed out because a particular logical law is self-evidently true.  Rather, Frege 
recognizes that sensitive and creative attempts may be necessary to understand the root of one’s 
interlocutor’s mistake, from a variety of intelligible possibilities. His constitutive view only 
denies cognition to those beings who, like the second alien species, systematically and 
unrepentantly violate our inferential patterns, who repeatedly contradict our conclusions, and 
who thereby prevent us from thinking them members of our inferential practice.  In real cases, 
we may of course vacillate in our judgment as to whether the quirky aliens we have just met are 
deformed and like the first alien species, or resolute and like the second.  But this vacillation in 
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our judgment of others’ reasoning capacities does not affect the point that, for Frege, there is a 
sharp conceptual distinction between judges (however deformed) and non-judges.68
 The constitutive role that Frege awards logic makes ineliminable reference to our practice 
of inquiry as the practice of rational inquiry:  
  
CON: The ability to reason demonstratively as a member of our inferential 
practice is a constitutive, necessary condition for being a judge. 
 
Frege writes that the  
 
impossibility of our rejecting [the law of identity] does not prevent us from supposing that there 
are beings who do reject it; but it does prevent us from supposing that these beings are right in 
doing so; it also prevents us from doubting whether we or they are right. (GGZ1, xvii)   
 
His point is that reflecting on logic’s constitutive relation to judgment tells us nothing about the 
kinds of things other beings might seem to claim about our logic.  Other beings might utter 
sentences which appear to be rejections of a logical law.  Nevertheless, Frege thinks that once we 
have understood the close relationship between logic and judgment, we must judge such beings 
as wrong for doing so.  The details of our judgment will differ depending upon the case.  If we 
judge that the aliens are like members of the first species, fallible judges whom we can correct, 
we will judge that they mistakenly hold true the negation of the logical law.  If we instead judge 
that they are like members of the second species, we will judge that they lack the cognitive 
sophistication to count as judging or holding true any thought whatsoever. 
 Beings can fail to be perfect judges by exhibiting logically limited inferential behavior; 
indeed, few of us are perfect judges.  To count as exhibiting our inferential behavior is thus to 
possess an inclination to generally (though not always) make valid inferences, to be disposed 
                                                 
68 Similarly, nothing about Frege’s constitutive view rules out the possibility of devious aliens.  Aliens who initially 
appear to be like the second species, but who later rescind their deviant activity—perhaps revealing that they had 
been joking with us all along—may well be forgiven and welcomed back into the fold of judges.  Nevertheless, we 
have a prima facie reason, subject to future disconfirmation, to doubt that a being who resolutely violates the 
inferential pattern codified by one of our laws of logic is a thinker. 
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(though not always) to endorse instances of the laws of logic, and to sometimes (though not 
always) correct fellow judges who fail to meet these standards of inquiry on particular occasions.   
 One might object that this constitutive view cannot be Frege’s because of his famous 
conclusion to the discussion of logical aliens:  
Leaving aside logic, one can say: we are forced to make judgments by our nature and external 
circumstances, and if we make judgments, we cannot reject this law—of identity, for example; we 
must recognize it if we are not to throw our thought into confusion and in the end renounce 
judgment altogether.  I do not wish to either dispute or endorse this view and only remark that 
what we have here is not a logical implication. (GGZ1, xvii)   
 
If Frege subscribes to CON, why does he not endorse the view that “we must recognize [the law 
of identity] if we are not to throw our thought into confusion and in the end renounce judgment 
altogether”?  Barbara Massey goes so far as to suggest that Frege only thinks that our logical 
laws are so central to our thinking that were we to meet logical aliens, we would dismiss them as 
mad, not that the aliens would lack cognition (1991, 110).   
 But, I think that this reading misses that the context of this passage is to reject 
psychologism.  Having just noted the futility of trying to justify a logical law (since all 
inferential justification relies upon logic and so the purported justification would be circular—
resulting only in questions of how further logical laws are to be justified), in this passage Frege is 
considering (and distancing himself from) the way a psychological logician might attempt to 
justify a logical law.  He speculates that the psychological logician might think two results of her 
empirical investigation pertinent: firstly, humans must make judgments in order to survive; 
secondly, the laws of logic are basic to how we judge.  Taken together, Frege supposes that the 
psychological logician will believe these results give humans sufficient reason—pragmatic 
perhaps, but sufficient nonetheless—to judge the laws of logic true.  But Frege once again 
objects to the psychological logician’s emphasis on human psychology—on the fact that humans 
must make judgments, on how we judge.  He refrains from endorsing or disputing these two 
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claims, conceived as psychological results to be empirically established.  After all, Frege has 
done no empirical research into human thinking, and believes such work (were it to be 
completed) strictly irrelevant to logic as he conceives of it.  This is his point: the psychological 
logicians’ purported justification “is not a logical implication,” i.e., cannot justify that the logical 
laws are true, but is merely a psychological implication, i.e., can only justify why humans may 
hold logical laws true.  His constitutive view means that he is indeed committed to the claim that 
“we must recognize [the law of identity] if we are not to throw our thought into confusion.”  But 
he believes that this is true because the laws of logic have a constitutive role in judgment, and 
does not ground that claim; hence it cannot justify our judging logical laws true. 
 Why does Frege believe that logic has this special, constitutive relationship to cognition?  
What distinguishes resolute violations of logical inferential patterns from resolute violations of 
inferential patterns in a special science, and what justifies a diagnosis of madness in the former 
case as opposed to mere foolishness or quackery in the latter?  I think that we can reconstruct the 
answer from a passage in Foundations of Arithmetic:  
For the purposes of conceptual thought we can always assume the contrary of some one or other of 
the geometrical axioms, without involving ourselves in any self-contradictions when we proceed 
to our deductions, despite the conflict between our assumptions and our intuition…Can the same 
be said of the fundamental propositions of the science of number?  Here, we have only to try 
denying any one of them, and complete confusion ensues.  Even to think at all seems no longer 
possible.  The basis of arithmetic lies deeper, it seems, than that of any of the empirical sciences, 
and even than that of geometry.  The truths of arithmetic govern all that is numerable.  This is the 
widest domain of all; for to it belongs not only the actual, not only the intuitable, but everything 
thinkable.  Should not the laws of number, then, be very intimately connected with the laws of 
thought? (FA, §14, my emphasis) 
 
This passage is further evidence of Frege’s constitutive view.69
                                                 
69 I thus disagree with ∅ystein Linnebo’s suggestion that Frege was given to immature hyperbole in the Foundations 
(2003, 3).  In his mature work, Linnebo suggests that Frege had learned to disavow any attempt to tie logic to what 
seemed unthinkable to humans as irredeemably psychological.  But Frege’s rejection of the psychological logicians’ 
putative justification for logical laws does not tell against the claim that he held a constitutive view about logic’s 
relation to cognition throughout his career. 
  He infers that  since denying a 
“fundamental proposition” of arithmetic throws us into such confusion that “to think at all seems 
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no longer possible,” arithmetic is “very intimately connected” with the “laws of thought,” i.e. the 
logical laws.  So, he is claiming that one can no more deny an arithmetical law than one can deny 
a logical law without thereby abnegating one’s status as a thinker, from which it immediately 
follows that Frege thinks denying a logical law abnegates one’s status as a thinker.70
 To see how Frege is viewing these matters, let us first consider the geometrical case he 
raises.  Frege, following Kant, views the axioms of Euclidean geometry as expressing the limits 
of our intuition of space.  In other words, he thinks that it is a fact about the cognitive 
constitution of humans that all of our spatial experiences can be represented within a Euclidean 
framework.  Even our most imaginative fantasies (if they involve spatially extended entities) are 
subject to Euclidean geometry.  Nevertheless, Frege’s mathematical contemporaries had 
demonstrated that they could “leave the ground of intuition entirely behind” (FA, §14), and 
meaningfully reason about non-Euclidean geometries.  To Frege, such geometers are intelligibly 
engaging in non-contradictory hypothetical reasoning because their activity can be represented 
within the Begriffsschrift.  They endorse conditionals whose antecedents are the conjunction of 
Euclid’s axioms minus the parallel postulate, and whose consequents are (contrary to intuitable 
fact) theorems of non-Euclidean spaces.  Their chains of reasoning about these conditionals are 
logically certified inferences.  Moreover, enough familiar Euclidean theorems are provable on 
the basis of this restricted conjunction of axioms for the resulting structure to be intelligibly 
recognizable as a “space.”
  But this 
passage also reveals that the reason for his constitutive view is tied up with the maximal 
generality of logico-arithmetical laws.  This justification needs to be unpacked.     
71
                                                 
70 It should be clear that the failure of Frege’s logicist project does not rob his constitutive view of contemporary 
application.  One can hold that logical laws are constitutive of thought, even if arithmetical laws are not.  
   
71 In 1854, Bernhard Riemann had modeled a non-Euclidean space by interpreting lines drawn on the curved surface 
of a sphere as straight.  For Frege, although our intuition of this model (like all of our intuition) is Euclidean (as we 
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 Frege believes that the same is not true for arithmetic.  One reason might be that, unlike 
the geometrical case, the set of arithmetical axioms is too paltry to withstand a deletion and still 
ground counterfactual results that intelligibly concern an arithmetic as opposed to a mere 
series.72
 Suppose that the basic arithmetical proposition we deny is 1+2=3, and that we know from 
scientific investigation that there is exactly one F, exactly two Gs, and that no F is a G.  Having 
denied 1+2=3, we conclude that there are not three F-or-Gs.  However, Frege’s conception of the 
generality involved in our discoveries about the objects that are F (or G) is quantificational.  Our 
grasp of generality is exhibited by our characteristic endorsement of inference patterns that 
abstract from specific, discrete instances: if we discover in the world that a is F, then we are 
entitled to infer that not every object is not F, or equivalently that there is an F.   
  But I think that a different reason explains why Frege identifies “self-contradiction” as 
the distinctive problem with any attempt to reason having hypothetically denied an arithmetical 
proposition.   
 To judge “there is exactly one F” is to judge that there is only a single object, a, that is F.  
To judge “there are exactly two Gs” is to judge there are objects b and c such that both b and c 
are G, and b≠c.  Together with the claim that no F is a G, we judge that there are exactly these 
non-identical objects that are F-or-G: a, b, and c.  But now, having earlier concluded that there 
are not three F-or-Gs, we find that our arithmetical statement about the number of F-or-Gs and 
                                                                                                                                                             
temporarily suppose, contrary to what we intuit, that the curved lines on the sphere we see are straight), it serves to 
make the idea of a non-Euclidean space intelligible.   
72 I owe this point to Tom Ricketts.  Frege knew that arithmetic could be axiomatized in second order logic, by using 
Leibniz’s Law to define equality, using a 1-1 successor operator upon 0 to inductively define the numbers, and 
inductively defining a multiplication and an addition operation upon the numbers.  The numbers are a discrete 
infinite series.  But if we were to leave out one of these requirements—dropping the axiom that 0 is not a successor, 
for instance, and so allowing finite cyclic models—the resulting structure cannot be manipulated in the ways that 
characterize our use of arithmetic (for example, it could not be used to model the activity of adding things to a pile, 
since, at some point, one would not end up with a quantitatively larger number of things).  Although we may not 
contradict ourselves by choosing to define operators in this way, our subsequent reasoning using them does not 
obviously count as arithmetical.  
55 
 
our quantificational statement about the objects which are F-or-G have come apart from one 
another.  Denying an arithmetical proposition thus contradicts the equivalence between our 
arithmetical statements and our quantificational statements.73
 But, why does Frege think that this sort of contradiction throws all of our thought into 
confusion, rather than merely causing a local problem for our explicit thoughts about numbers of 
things?  I think that the answer to this is tied to Frege’s purpose in designing the Begriffsschrift, 
namely, to create a language in which any instance of valid scientific reasoning can be clarified.  
Frege believes that formalization of a theorem within Begriffsschrift will make explicit any 
hidden premises upon which scientists rely for its proof.  But formalizing deductions within 
Begriffsschrift exposes the extent to which scientists implicitly depend upon quantificational 
inference when reasoning.  Since the quantificational generality that undergirds quantificational 
inference presupposes the existence of discrete objects being generalized over, to meet his goal 
of designing a language in which scientific reasoning can be clarified, Frege is forced to 
recognize discrete objects.  He accordingly builds discreteness into his conception of 
“objecthood,” and adopts Leibniz’s Law as the basic identity criterion for objects (FA, §65).  He 
requires first-level concepts to be well-defined functions for all objects, and licenses second-
order quantificational generalizations by appealing to the identity of the value-ranges that go 
proxy for those concepts under Basic Law V.  This process can in principle be repeated higher up 
the hierarchy of concepts, serving in turn to ground higher-order generalizations.  But this entire 
quantificational hierarchy comes crashing down if one denies an arithmetical proposition, 
   
                                                 
73 In conversation, Steve Awodey has pointed out that Frege’s logicism provides a more straightforward reason for 
the difference between arithmetic and geometry.  Since Frege thinks that each arithmetical truth has a purely logical 
proof, denying one would immediately result in logical contradiction.  But at this point in Foundations, Frege has 
yet to demonstrate logicism.  He must therefore be appealing to an independent intuition that he thinks his readers 
ought to have.  So, while Awodey is correct that Frege would have believed the intimate relationship between logic 
and arithmetic to be ultimately explained  by logicism, I contend that here he is thinking of the connection between 
arithmetical and quantificational statements that he takes to be evident.  
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because in losing our ability to count objects as distinct numerical identities we lose our grip on 
their discreteness.74
  A more straightforward problem arises in the logical case.  When modeled (like the non-
Euclidean geometer) within the Begriffsschrift, one who attempts to hypothetically reason 
having denied a logical law is aiming to make rational inferences on the basis of a series of 
conditionals, the antecedents of which are the conjunction of the negation of some Begriffsschrift 
axiom A with all of the other axioms, and the consequents of which are substantive theorems.  
But the Begriffsschrift axioms codify the most general norms of our practice of judgment.  To 
count as judging anything at all we must hold the axioms true.  So the deviant who constructs a 
conditional whose antecedent is the negation of A immediately contradicts herself.
  Since formalizing deductions in the Begriffsschrift exposes that 
quantificational inferences suffuse scientific inquiry, all of our thought is thrown into confusion 
if we cannot rely upon arithmetic as the stable foundation of the quantificational hierarchy.  
Completing hypothetical deductions having denied an arithmetical truth is impossible because 
we have lost the capacity to clearly articulate the thoughts that we wish to grasp, and 
subsequently judge true.  
75
                                                 
74 Since aspects of a single continuous object may appear different to us, we cannot rely upon our ability to 
distinguish differences (a capacity we have that is presumably independent of our grasp of number) to establish the 
discreteness of objects.     
  Whatever 
her chosen consequent, the resulting conditional will be vacuously true.  Since logic does not 
discriminate between the conditionals she may thus construct, her attempt to string together 
vacuous utterances is itself empty and does not constitute an inference.   
75 Frege does admit that a sentence which expresses an instance of the negation of a logical law expresses a genuine 
thought, since, although it cannot be asserted without immediate contradiction, it is a component part of thoughts 
which may be legitimately asserted within the notation (CP, 405).  An instance of [1] gives a simple example: 
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 The reason that we can engage in further inquiry with the quack who insistently makes 
wild inferences about physics is that, so long as we avoid the topic of physics and its 
subsidiaries, she is recognizable as a member of our inferring community.  We find her 
intelligible as a “physics-defective” judge.  But logic counts every other topic as a subsidiary, 
meaning that we cannot engage in any further inquiry with a person who resolutely denies a 
logical law; such a person is unintelligible as a judge.   
 We can now see that Frege’s constitutive view is the product of holding firstly that 
logical truths are maximally general, and secondly, that scientific laws are such that they must be 
recognized by inquirers if those inquirers are to count as engaging in whatever domain of inquiry 
those laws govern.  Since Frege believes that logic is the maximally general science, its laws 
express the constitutive norms of our practice of inquiry.  Any competent judge must recognize 
them as true.  
 Where does Frege’s constitutive view fit into Burge’s pragmatic Euclidean reading?  
Recall that the crux of Burge’s interpretation is maintaining that the Begriffsschrift is a fallible 
codification of the independently existing, objective laws of logic.  Frege’s constitutive view 
makes engaging in our inferential behavior a necessary condition for being a judge.  But to cash 
out what it means to “engage in our inferential behavior” we must reference a set of norms to 
which those who count as engaged in our practice are properly sensitive.  So Burge faces a 
choice: are the relevant norms those that Frege captures in the Begriffsschrift or those stemming 
from the ontologically objective laws of logic?     
 Under Burge’s account of self-evidence, although Frege hopes that his codification 
expresses the self-evident laws of logic, he accepts that some laws of Begriffsschrift (particularly 
the worrisome Basic Law V) may be rationally deniable—not only because they may not be 
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obvious to an inquirer who finds the concepts they invoke unfamiliar, but because they may not 
even be true.  It cannot, then, be that endorsing the norms grounded in this codification of logic 
is a constitutively necessary criterion for thought.  Indeed, Burge considers it a strength of his 
interpretation that his Frege would not uncharitably denounce critics of Begriffsschrift as non-
thinkers who have failed to grasp that his codification is self-evident. Rather, Burge’s Frege 
would seriously engage his critical interlocutors and, were they proven correct, work with them 
toward the shared goal of developing a codification of the actually self-evident, ontologically 
objective laws of logic.   
 Hence, under Burge’s interpretation, Frege’s constitutive view is a claim about the norms 
which are grounded in the objective logical laws.  These are the laws which cannot be sincerely 
denied by a fully rational thinker and which all thinkers must display some grasp of in their 
inferential practice.  In fact, Burge thinks Frege’s constitutive view enters his epistemology by 
providing another sort of justification.  In addition to our pragmatic justification for holding the 
laws expressed in the Begriffsschrift true, we now have a justification “entitling” us to hold the 
objective laws of logic themselves true:  
[Frege holds that] acknowledgment of certain laws of truth is necessary for having reason and for 
engaging in non-degenerate thinking and judging.  One is rationally entitled to judge the primitive 
laws of logic to be true because the nature of reason—and even non degenerate judgment—is 
partly constituted by the prescription that one acknowledge at least the simple and basic laws of 
truth.  To put it crudely, reason and judgment—indeed mind—are partly defined in terms of 
acknowledging the basic laws of truth. (2005, 315-316) 
 
Burge goes on to say that “the laws of truth are independent of judging subjects” and that they 
are not “constitutively dependent on…practice” (316).  This is a consequence of B1. How, then, 
do we know that we are displaying some grasp of those laws in our practice?  What justifies 
thinking that what we hold to be laws of truth are laws of truth?   
 Once again, Burge turns to pragmatism to answer both of these questions on Frege’s 
behalf.  According to him, Frege thinks that reflecting upon our inferential practice not only 
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uncovers objective laws of logic, but pragmatically justifies us to hold that the laws we thus 
uncover are objective truths.  But the problem with this account is that whatever certification we 
can attain for our codification of logic by reflecting upon our inferential practice must be fallible, 
and so our confidence in the truth of our codification necessarily falls short of certainty.  In other 
words, we can never be sure that we have a grasp of the objective laws of logic.  This has the 
effect of forever alienating us from the correctness of our own inferential practice. 
 To see this, suppose we all agree that a given codification deeply captures the norms of 
our inferential practice.  Suppose we also agree that our practice seems good (it seems to allow 
us to establish truths, it seems to allow us to negotiate the world, and so on).  Nevertheless, on 
Burge’s view our judgment that the codification expresses the ontologically objective laws of 
logic is fallible.  Suppose the codification seems undeniable.  We take putative objections to call 
the rationality of the critic into question, not the codification.  Although it may seems plausible 
that we have now captured some of the constitutive laws of thought in the formalism, our 
imagination is similarly dubitable.  We could be badly mistaken.   
 Since Burge thinks that practice-independent laws of logic bear the constitutive 
relationship to cognition, the fact that we cannot be certain that we are displaying a grasp of 
these laws in our practice means that we cannot even be certain that we are judges.  Our 
subjective impressions that we are indeed judging carry no infallible justification that we are 
grasping ontologically objective laws.  However extreme our confidence in the truth of laws that 
are particularly basic to our inferential practice—such as the law that every object is self-
identical—our confidence is justified only by our fallible judgment in the efficacy of our 
inferential practice in uncovering truths.  To Burge’s Frege, objective laws of logic are to what 
we tentatively judge our inferential practice to be subject.   
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 Frege’s unflinching attitude toward the second species of logical alien brings the flaw in 
Burge’s reading into sharp focus.  If we were to meet beings who unrepentantly rejected some 
norm of our inferential practice, while appearing to jabber away at each other quite happily, 
Frege tells us that we should not be shaken.  We are prevented, he says, from supposing that they 
are right in rejecting our law, and also prevented from doubting whether we or they are right 
(GGZ1, xxvii).  We are entitled, that is, to immediately judge the aliens wrong, and should 
experience no doubt that we might be wrong.  On Burge’s interpretation, this attitude is 
inexplicable and unjustified.  Upon encountering the second species of alien, the best Burge’s 
Frege can do is to stubbornly insist that we shall hold their practice to be wrong because the laws 
that we are following seem right to us.  But it nevertheless remains an open possibility that the 
aliens are right about the ontologically objective laws of logic, and that we are very badly 
mistaken.  Since the correctness of our codification of logic is fallibly certified (but not 
guaranteed) by our pragmatic evaluation that our scientific inquiries are generally successful, we 
cannot close off this skeptical possibility.  We are left foot-stamping: it becomes an undefended 
assumption that we are rational beings who are equipped with an ability to accurately grasp the 
objective laws of logic, while the aliens are mad (even though, on this picture, it seems hard to 
deny that those aliens may have arrived at a parallel verdict about our own sanity).  Recall that 
Burge correctly notes that Frege was singularly unconcerned by skepticism, valorizing his 
attitude as part of the “advanced spirit of the age” (2005, 340).  But the point is that Burge’s 
interpretation makes it thoroughly mysterious why Frege was not concerned by skepticism, given 
that  his discussion of logical aliens so strongly brings out the skeptical threat to his view, and, 
indeed, invites it.  Given their apparently functioning deviant practice, how do we know that it is 
we, and not the aliens, who have grasped the logical laws?   
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 I think that the root of Burge’s mistake is the thought that we have a grasp of truth that is 
independent of our demonstrative inferential practice.  This makes it intelligible to question 
whether the principles guiding our own inferential practice could in fact be false.  But on my 
reading, Frege thinks our sole understanding of truth comes through our engagement in our 
inferential practice, as our name for our goal as judges.  Frege writes that “the laws of logic are 
nothing other than an unfolding of the content of the word true” (PW, 3, my emphasis).  Our 
ability to infer demonstratively, displayed by our recognition of the laws of logic, constitutes our 
grasp of truth.  The Fregean logician—who, as Burge recognizes, develops her codification by 
focusing on the patterns of inference in which we reflectively engage—is concerned to explicitly 
identify and codify the norms governing our practice, not to quest for practice-independent 
objective laws of truth of whose grasp she can never be certain.  We do well to recall Frege’s 
admonition: “what logic is really concerned with is not contained in the word ‘true’ at all but in 
the assertoric force with which a sentence is uttered” (PW, 252).  So the Fregean logician’s 
concern is to clarify how some of our utterances come to carry the weight of assertion, how our 
practice of inquiry structures thoughts so that one may contradict another, and why some 
thoughts imply others.   
 On my reading, Frege’s constitutive view comes into the foreground.  A person’s 
membership in our inferential practice, demonstrated by her recognition that the laws of 
Begriffsschrift are self-evidently true (since they make explicit norms of the practice of which 
she is, ex hypothesi, a member), constitute her having access to thought, and having the status of 
“judge.”  There is no unanswerable doubt about the “correctness” of our inferential practice to an 
external and inaccessible standard of truth.  Rather, the shared standard for the correctness of our 
inferential judgments is established by that very practice, as we reach a reflective equilibrium 
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about which judgments and rules we shall endorse.  This makes Frege’s unhesitating attitude to 
the second alien species not only explicable, but justified.  Radical skepticism about our 
knowledge of logic finds no purchase.  We exhibit our certain knowledge of the laws of logic—
our grasp of the principles of inference—simply by engaging in our inferential practice.    
 
5. Sullivan’s Rejoinder 
 Peter Sullivan has recently objected to the sort of interpretation that I have been 
defending in this chapter.  His own view interestingly incorporates insights from both Weiner 
and Burge.  Sullivan accepts, with Weiner, that Frege would not have found semantic arguments 
that depended upon the meanings of marks within a particular symbolism capable of grounding 
the normative authority of logic for all thought (2004, 740).  Such arguments could only 
establish that if one were to employ the concepts expressed within this symbolism, then (to the 
extent that one is a judge) one ought to abide by the logical principles that are expressed in the 
symbolism in terms of those concepts.   They cannot establish Frege’s further constitutive claim 
that if one is a judge at all, one must grasp the concept of truth and abide by logical laws.76
                                                 
76 Despite this grasp of Frege’s universalist conception of logic, Sullivan agrees with Burge that Frege offers 
genuine semantic arguments for the truth of Begriffsschrift laws (720).  In Sullivan’s view, Frege’s universalist 
conception of logic does not preclude a metaperspective from which we can grasp semantic arguments about 
particular codifications of logic, but (unlike other conceptions) does not require that we answer the metaperspectival 
question of whether our codification of logic can be applied to whichever case presently interests us before we may 
legitimately forge ahead and apply logic to it (726).  As I argue below, I think that Sullivan’s suggestion mistakes 
Frege’s account of objectivity.    
  
Nevertheless, Sullivan denies that Frege’s conception of logic makes essential reference to our 
demonstrative inferential practice.  Furthermore, Sullivan reads Frege as offering his reader an 
“epistemological justification” for holding non-inferentially known truths—e.g. logical laws of 
the Begriffsschrift—true.  In this final section, after exposing why Sullivan’s attribution of  an 
“epistemological justification” to Frege—much like Burge’s “pragmatic” justification—
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mischaracterizes Frege’s intent in developing the Begriffsschrift, I will argue that Sullivan is 
wrong to think that making ineliminable reference to our demonstrative inferential practice is in 
tension with Frege’s conception of logic.  This critical work is helpful because it enables us to 
draw out how twentieth-century developments about how to understand our linguistic practice 
make Frege’s unyielding attitude toward logical deviants crude.   
 Sullivan’s attribution of an epistemological justification to Frege is informed by his 
reading of the following passage: 
Now the grounds which justify the recognition of a truth often reside in other truths which have 
already been recognized.  But if there are any truths recognized by us at all, this cannot be the only 
form that justification takes.  There must be judgments whose justification rests on something else, 
if they stand in need of justification at all.   
 
And this is where epistemology comes in. (PW, 3) 
 
After noting that Frege does not give any indication here of how epistemology is to “come in,” 
Sullivan perceptively exposes a number of puzzles about the sort of work Frege might think 
epistemology can do.  Firstly, it cannot be that an epistemological truth is the ground of the 
purportedly non-inferentially justified truth, for then it would actually be inferentially justified 
on the basis of epistemology. We would also be left wondering about the justification of the 
epistemological truth itself.  Furthermore, since Frege writes that logical laws neither need nor 
admit of proof (FA, §3), what rational contribution to the justification of logic can epistemology 
provide?   
 One might think that it is just here that Frege problematically turns to “self-evidence.”  
Epistemology comes in by identifying certain truths as “self-evident”; the epistemologically 
informed inquirer thus recognizes the laws of logic as instances of truths whose truth is apparent 
once they have been understood.  But Sullivan (like Burge) is keen to defend Frege from the 
charge of psychologism, and so wishes to avoid a naïve attribution about the role of self-
evidence to him.  The problem Sullivan has with this naïve account as an interpretation of Frege 
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is that Frege writes so little about (and never defines) self-evidence, which would be surprising if 
it was to play such a central role in his overall epistemology.  “Self-evidence” would seem only 
to name a problem plaguing Frege’s foundationalism, rather than providing us with the 
conceptual resources to resolve it.  Beyond interpreting Frege, the problem with this account as 
an account is that it is difficult to articulate within a foundationalist epistemology a substantive 
notion of self-evidence that is distinct from, and does not reduce to, obviousness.77
 Instead—and again like Burge—Sullivan appeals to a new sort of justification to explain 
how epistemology “comes in” to justify logic.  Epistemology does not give a psychological and 
essentially causal account of why those judges with human minds judge logical laws true.  Nor 
does it reveal other, distinctively epistemological truths about the nature of knowledge (whatever 
the psychological framework of the judge) that stand as the rational ground for logical laws.  
Instead, epistemology provides us with a reason to hold that logical laws are true.
   
78
                                                 
77 Two influential critiques of foundationalism are W. V. Quine’s (1951) attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction 
and Wilfrid Sellars’ dismissal of the myth of the given (1956). Richard Rorty writes that Quine “helped destroy the 
rationalist form of foundationalism” while Sellars destroyed “the empiricist form of foundationalism” (1997, 5).   
  Sullivan’s 
idea is that if the epistemologically informed inquirer reflects upon her codification of logic and 
appreciates “the adequacy of that exposition to its guiding norm of truth,” she will be positioned 
to recognize not only that she is a rational being who has access to the logical source of 
knowledge—the ability to recognize of analytic a priori truths that they are true—but that this 
codification looks to her to be an “exposition [of] the nature of thought laid out” (741).  Her 
theory of knowledge thus gives her reason to hold that her codification of logic is indeed 
objectively true, a complete laying out of the nature of inferential justification.   
78 Sullivan writes, “[epistemology] comments on the whole chain [of inferential justification]—as it were, from 
above” (737).  His talk of the new justification coming “from above” closely parallels Burge’s account of the 
pragmatic justification for Begriffsschrift, which was meant in the first instance to apply to the codification as a 
whole and then derivatively to each individual self-evident axiom.  
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 But we have already seen the problem with attributing this sort of justification to Frege.  
Our epistemological theories, just like our scientific theories, are fallible.  Any judgment we 
make about the extent to which our codification lays out the nature of thought is one more 
fallible part of our theory, which cannot therefore make us certain that we are grasping objective 
logical truth.  Yet Frege clearly believes that we do have a certain grasp of logical laws as self-
evidently true.  Sullivan’s account of how epistemology “comes in” cannot, then, be what Frege 
had in mind.  
 In my view, Frege does not think that epistemology “comes in” by giving us a reason or a 
justification for anything.  He makes no such suggestion in the quote upon which Sullivan builds 
his interpretation.  Rather, in Frege’s view, the epistemologically informed inquirer is one who 
grasps that there are truths that all judges must know simply in virtue of being judges.  For every 
judge, qua judge, grasps objective truth as the goal of their demonstrative inferential practice, 
and manifests their respect for the laws of logic (which, again, merely unfold the content of the 
word “true” [PW, 3]) in making inferences.  Sullivan is correct that Frege gives no substantive 
account of “self-evidence,” and provides no test for discerning whether a particular truth is self-
evidently true.  But this lacuna is unsurprising given that Frege’s aim in developing 
Begriffsschrift is neither to establish the foundations of knowledge nor to reveal and argue for 
the truth of previously unrecognized truths.  Rather, he merely aims to improve and clarify the 
inferential practice in which he supposes that his audience already (though perhaps imperfectly) 
engages.  Frege does not think that knowing about the nature of knowledge will justify our 
knowledge of logical truths, but only that it will contextualize the constitutive role that logic has 
to our practice of inquiry. 
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 However, Sullivan also raises an interesting (though confused) objection to any 
interpretation of Frege’s conception of logic, such as my own, which makes ineliminable 
reference to our demonstrative inferential practice: 
Grasp of the kind of norm [that] truth is excludes any…essential reference to “linguistic practice”, 
as much as, and in the same way as, it excludes reference to human psychological processes. 
(footnote) That Frege endlessly complains against the second while hardly mentioning the first is 
indicative only of the kind of misunderstanding he encountered amongst his contemporaries. (717) 
 
Sullivan’s anxiety is that emphasizing our inferential practice allows contingent claims about us 
to intrude into logic, resulting with a conception of logic—call it sociologism—that cannot 
account for our grasp of “the kind of norm truth is.”  Since the purported arguments against 
sociologism are merely mutatis mutandis variations of Frege’s tireless arguments against 
psychologism, Sullivan concludes that the sociological conception of logic cannot be Frege’s, 
despite Frege’s “hardly mentioning” the problem of making essential reference to our linguistic 
practice in discussing truth. 
 To evaluate this criticism, we must get clearer about two questions.  Firstly, does 
sociologism share whatever feature of psychologism it is that Frege believes prevents the 
psychological logician from capturing the kind of norm that truth is?  Secondly, does the 
interpretation that I have been defending commit Frege to sociologism?   
 In section four we saw that Frege argues that since psychological logicians view logical 
laws as empirically discoverable generalizations about what most human judges hold true, their 
logical laws only issue in conditional prescriptions for those who wish to judge in accordance 
with the majority of human judges.  Were human brain chemistry to undergo a radical alteration, 
the psychological law of non-contradiction might have to be replaced by a law of contradiction.  
In contrast, Frege insists that genuine logical laws issue in unconditional prescriptions for all 
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judges, because they unfold the content of the word true, which is the constitutive goal of the 
practice of judgment.   
 The objectionable sociologism worrying Sullivan, then, would be to view logical laws as 
empirically discoverable generalizations about what most judges who engage in our linguistic 
practice hold true.  Is the sociological logician forced to accept that her logical laws only issue in 
conditional prescriptions for those judges who wish to engage in our practice of judgment, and 
that, if our inferential practice undergoes a surprising shift so that people begin freely 
contradicting themselves, our “sociological” logical laws would alter?  So described, this 
position certainly seems foreign to Frege, and in particular unable to capture his insistence that 
the logical laws are “eternal boundary stones” for our thought.     
 To begin defusing this objection, it will help to pick up Sullivan’s remark that Frege 
“hardly mentions” the evident problems of making essential reference to our practice in 
developing a conception of logic.  This implies that Frege does make some mention of these 
problems—but where?  Although Sullivan does not say, a related objection from Burge (2005, 
309) suggests that he may be thinking of a passage where Frege criticizes Achelis’ claim that  
[discovering] the norms which hold in general for thinking and acting…[requires] an empirico-
critical determination of the objective principles of our psycho-physical organization which are 
valid at all times for the great consciousness of mankind. (quoted in PW, 146-147)   
 
In rehearsing his argument against the psychologism evidenced by Achelis’ view, Frege writes in 
terms that might seem broad enough to constitute a criticism of Sullivan’s imagined sociologism.  
In particular, Frege says that were logical norms “norms only because we seldom deviate from 
them, if it [were] normal to judge in accordance with our laws of logic as it is normal to walk 
upright,” then since what we “normally” do can change (just as our ancestors did not walk 
upright), we should have to ask (absurdly, in his view) whether logic can change.  It is not 
difficult to hear this as an objection not only to psychological logicians who hold that we 
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“seldom deviate” from logical laws because of our brain chemistry, but also to sociological 
logicians who hold that we “seldom deviate” from logical laws because we have learned to 
engage in certain patterns of inferential behavior with each other.   
 Yet I think that this would be to take Frege’s objection out of its context and to mistake 
its force.  Frege’s objection to psychological logicians like Achelis is that they think that logical 
laws derive their authority from how we actually think and judge.  Sullivan assumes that to 
emphasize the role of our inferential practice in a conception of logic is likewise to insist that 
logical laws derive their authority from our actual inferential behavior.  This sort of sociologism 
would indeed face a parallel objection to psychologism.  Its proponents would owe us an account 
of why logical laws do not shift with changes in our inferential practice.  But on my reading, this 
is not how our inferential practice enters into Frege’s conception of logic, and so Sullivan’s 
attack fells a straw man.  What Sullivan misses is that, for Frege, the only independent standard 
of objectivity that a purported codification of logic must meet—the only independent standard of 
objectivity that there is—are the patterns of inference that we reflectively endorse as exhibited in 
our inferential practice.  Frege does not think, as the sociological logician does, that logical laws 
are objectively true (and derive their authority over our thought) because they are implicit in our 
inferential behavior.  Rather, he thinks that logical laws are implicit in our inferential behavior 
(and have authority over our thought) because they are objectively true—that is, because they 
unfold the shared, objective norm that is the constitutive goal of our demonstrative inferential 
practice.  In Frege’s view, if for some reason our behavior systematically changed so that we 
began to freely contradict ourselves, logical laws would not shift to match our new behavior.  
Our core logical laws are in reflective equilibrium and would stand firm in their eternal 
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foundation.  Depending on the extent of our inferential malady, it is we who would have become 
insane.79
  To put the point another way, Sullivan is correct to insist that objective truth is a 
primitive notion for Frege’s universalist conception of logic (737), but is wrong to think that 
Frege believes our practice of demonstrative inference is only good insofar as it is in accordance 
with this objective standard.  Rather, Frege thinks that we have no grasp upon objective truth 
outside of or apart from success within our inferential practice of judgment, which Frege insists 
is not merely our practice of judgment—one genus of a larger species—but is rather the practice 
of judgment.
  
80
                                                 
79 Frege introduces his criticism of Achelis by insisting that we “be wary of the view that it is the business of logic to 
investigate how we actually think and judge when we are in agreement with the laws of truth,” because in doing so 
we “should have constantly to have one eye on the one thing and one eye on the other,” and eventually “be seduced 
into asking questions with no clear meaning” (146).  The question which the psychological logician must face is: 
might all beings with a brain chemistry like ours judge this logical law true, and yet it be false?  The question has 
“no clear meaning” because in seriously asking it the psychological logician reveals that she has a tenuous grasp of 
truth and does not understand what makes a law “logical.”  The question which Sullivan’s sociological logician must 
face is: might all beings engaged in our inferential practice judge this logical law true, and yet it be false?  This 
question also lacks a clear meaning, and the sociological logician who seriously asks it demonstrates that she has 
failed to grasp that truth, as the constitutive goal of judgment, is not something judges could mistakenly attribute to 
basic principles of their inferential practice.  In contrast, Frege recognizes that logicians do not need to have their 
eyes on two things at once—which results in the temptation to ask these questionable questions—but rather only 
have their eyes on our demonstrative inferential behavior, which is the manifestation of our grasp of the objective 
truth which is the goal of our practice—the practice—of judging.  
  We demonstrate our grasp of objective truth by engaging in the practice of 
judgment, and it acts as a firm standard for all judges. 
80 Sullivan is strangely blind to this point.  He recoils from Ricketts’ claim that, to Frege, “the distinction between 
objective and subjective exhibited in our linguistic practice needs no securing and admits of no deeper explanation” 
(1986, 72) by questioning the “incongruous” mention of “our linguistic practice” (715).  Why, Sullivan wonders, 
does Ricketts think that the distinction between objective and subjective needs no “securing” and yet gets it from our 
inferential practice (as evidenced, according to Sullivan, by Ricketts’ assertion that our linguistic practice “funds” 
Frege’s conception of logic)?  Sullivan grants that we may say that “truth is a norm governing a [linguistic] 
practice,” but only if we also accept that, since participating in a practice and acknowledging its constitutive norm 
are one and the same, neither can be understood in terms of the other (717).  But this was exactly Ricketts’ point.  
Since Frege thinks that objective truth cannot be understood  except in terms of our inferential practice, the logician 
only has our inferential practice to go on in trying to codify the laws of objective truth that inform our practice.  
Frege’s conception of logic is “funded” by our linguistic practice, not in the only senses that Sullivan, in retaining 
the fiction of an independent standard for objective truth, can understand  of one thing “grounding, supporting, or 
justifying” (717) a distinct thing (i.e., that engaging in our linguistic practice is the ground of our grasp of objective 
truth), but by a helpful redescription of itself in terms of its constitutive goal (i.e. engaging in our linguistic practice 
is to grasp objective truth). 
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 In conclusion, on my interpretation, Frege is not committed to the sociological logician’s 
view of objectivity, under which we think ourselves justified in taking ourselves to have grasped 
objective truth in our codification of logic because that codification seems to capture the current 
norms that guide our demonstrative inferential practice.  Rather, our grasp of objective truth is 
manifest in our inferential practice, and our aim in developing a codification of logic is to 
elucidate the norms which govern our practice.   
 Nevertheless, in drawing out the role that our practice does play in Frege’s conception of 
objectivity, Sullivan’s objection serves to put pressure upon Frege’s unflinching attitude toward 
logical aliens, and the immutability of our practice of judging.  For the second species of aliens 
whom Frege dismissed as mad belonged to a community who initially appeared to us to be 
engaged in a practice (GGZ1, xvi).  Mightn’t their practice—which they seem to meaningfully 
engage in with each other—exhibit their grasp of a different constitutive goal to our own?  
Alternatively, might there be a common structure to part of our mutually incompatible practices, 
meaning that the aliens have some grasp of objectivity and some capacity for cognition after all?  
What justifies us in reckoning the aliens mad or non-rational, as opposed to concluding merely 
that we have yet to find a method of communicating with them?  Mightn’t the aliens’ behavior 
suggest new patterns of inference to us and cause unprecedented shifts in our own practice of 
judgment?  In the wake of the linguistic turn, and the new attention paid to translation of 
languages and communication between language users, Frege’s views seem crude.  In the 
following two chapters, I shall investigate two more recent attempts to capture the relationship 
between logic and cognition in the work of Quine and Davidson.  
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Quine’s Naturalist Conception of Logic: Excising Skepticism from Epistemology 
Language is a social art.  In acquiring it we have to depend entirely 
on intersubjectively available cues as to what to say and when. 
 
 These opening sentences of W.V. Quine’s Word and Object signal its central concerns.  
Quine aims to understand the nature of language—its acquisition and its use.  The conclusions he 
draws are not limited to semantics.  They extend to metaphysics and epistemology.  In fact, 
because of Quine’s influential, sometimes maligned, and often misunderstood brand of 
naturalism, “epistemology merges with psychology, as well as with linguistics” (EN, 90).  In this 
chapter, in dialogue with Quine’s critics, my aim is to argue for naturalism’s attraction and 
power by scrutinizing Quine’s conception of logic and, in particular, his account of the 
relationship between logic and cognition. 
 Naturalism is not a thesis within a branch of philosophy, but rather a conception of proper 
philosophical activity.  In one formulation, Quine writes that it “means banishing the dream of a 
first philosophy and pursuing philosophy rather as part of one’s system of the world, continuous 
with the rest of science” (RHP, 430).  But to espouse naturalism is not to adopt a crass 
scientism.1
 To some readers, the aforementioned description might suggest that a machete is a more 
apropos metaphor for naturalism, and naturalists are sometimes cast by their opponents as 
decimating the philosophical landscape.
  Instead, naturalism acts as a methodological paring knife.  It cuts away a swathe of 
problems by exposing that their presuppositions are confused and carves out territory in which 
subsequent philosophical activity can be gainfully pursued.   
2
                                                 
1 Charges of scientism have been leveled against Quine by a number of philosophers who detect only prejudice in 
the view.  See e.g. Hilary Putnam (1998,  425), and Thomas Sorrell (1991).  
  Nevertheless, I think that, rightly understood, 
2 Most recently, see Joseph Margolis (2003, 5-8). 
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naturalism is a nuanced position.  The labyrinthine exploration of it that I undertake will allow us 
to grasp its subtlety, enabling us to critically evaluate it. 
 In the next section, I extract Quine’s view of the relationship between logic and cognition 
from his account of radical translation.  I argue that although he adopts Frege’s insight that the 
logician’s task is to codify the principles of our demonstrative inferential practice, his conception 
of logic bears no trace of Frege’s constitutive view.  This absence raises questions about how 
Quine thinks inquirers are able to identify each other, and whether he can account for the 
normative character of our practice of inquiry.  To address them, we must elaborate the 
naturalism that Quine tends to encapsulate in slogans.  My method for doing so will be to show 
how appealing to naturalism allows the Quinean to excise a variety of skeptical challenges.  
Hence, in section two, I argue against Barry Stroud that naturalists can avoid skepticism about 
the external world.  In section three, by contrasting Quine’s philosophy of language with Rudolf 
Carnap’s, I argue that Quine defuses a skeptical challenge about the possibility of 
communication.  In section four, I defend Quine from Gary Ebbs’ charge that he cannot account 
for our dispute-resolving practices and show that he also eliminates a skeptical threat about how 
our words ought to be used.  Having exhibited the naturalist’s ability to remove these skeptical 
attacks from philosophy, I return to the questions that I raise in the first section and reconstruct 
Quine’s account of the objectivity of our inquiry.   
 
1.  Naturalism, Logic, and Cognition: The Denial of a Pre-Logical Mentality 
Pre-logicality is a trait injected by bad translators.  (CLT, 387) 
 Quine develops his theory of radical translation in the second chapter of Word and 
Object.  He imagines a field linguist trying to translate the utterances of a group of natives.  The 
situation is “radical” because the native language is unlike any with which the linguist is 
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familiar.  Deprived of assumptions about its likely grammar (through comparison with other 
languages in its family), she is forced to rely solely upon her observations.  In particular, she 
must attend to what sounds the natives make and in what contexts they make them.3  Her project 
will rely upon minimal (though falsifiable) assumptions about the natives’ sensory capacities.  
She begins to speculate which of the “forces” she sees “impinging on the native’s surfaces” 
cause the natives to make particular noises (WO, 28).4  When similar circumstances arise in the 
future, she can test whether she is correct by emulating native sounds she thinks appropriate and 
evaluating the natives’ reactions.  If the natives seem to endorse her utterance, she has some 
confirming evidence for her hypothesis; if they react with confusion, she has some disconfirming 
evidence.5
 Some surprises in the natives’ behavior—including their speech behavior—are tolerable 
(and are even to be expected).  The linguist may, for example, discover that the natives delight in 
feasting on the meat of an animal which she holds sacred, calling it “delicious” according to her 
  The provisionally confirmed hypotheses collected in this fashion mark the first 
tentative steps of translation, for now she can correlate the utterances she would make in those 
circumstances to native noises.   
                                                 
3 For simplicity, I focus here upon the verbal.  If the linguist suspects that the natives also communicate using non-
verbal behavior—as we do when, for example, we raise a finger to our lips to indicate the desire for our interlocutor 
to be silent—then she may add a sign language appendix to her translation manual.  Similar extensions are possible 
if the translator suspects still more esoteric methods of communication.  If we switch the case from natives to aliens, 
an array of unusual methods based upon alien sensory apparatuses becomes possible (for example, an olfactory 
system that relies upon systematic pheromone emission).  If our own senses, or scientific instruments, can reliably 
detect how the aliens are stimulated, then we can create a workable translation manual even in this more extreme 
case.  See Neil Tennant (1999) for an extended discussion of radical alien translation.  
4 Quine insists that although the linguist may take the native to be talking about things in the world, she ought to 
focus upon the native’s sensory stimulations as the relevant locus for her investigation (WO, 31).  His reason is that 
the translator is in a position to assess, on the basis of her behavioral observations, the natives’ sensory stimulations 
“by making allowances for the speaker’s orientation and the relative disposition of objects.”  In contrast, native 
behavior does not reveal the natives’ private (and possibly quite different) ontology.  In chapter four, I will discuss 
Quine’s later modification of this position under pressure from Davidson’s arguments.  
5 The linguist’s translations of endorsement and reprobation in the native tongue are themselves working 
hypotheses.  Quine suggests that if the linguist regularly hears two words in response to her attempts to use the 
native language then she has good reason to translate these as “Yes” and “No,” determining which is which on the 
basis of her own attempts at using these words in response to some of the native’s utterances (WO, 29-30).  
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manual.  The fact that she would never contemplate eating the animal, much less approving of 
the taste of its flesh, does not call into question her translation of the native word as “delicious.”  
Rather, she and the natives have a religious disagreement.  Although this may well cause 
problems for future interactions between the linguist and the natives, it does not constitute a 
translation problem.   
 However, some surprises in native speech behavior are intolerable.  Among these, 
according to Quine, are disagreements about simple logical truths.  If the linguist discovers that 
translating her interlocutors according to her current manual would have them affirming 
contradictions, Quine tells us that she should throw it out, rather than be tempted to ascribe a 
“prelogical mentality” to them (WO, 58).6
 This attitude recalls Frege’s rejection of logical aliens.  Frege’s ground for dismissal is 
that beings who affirm contradictions fail to meet the constitutive standard for the attribution of 
cognition: recognition of the logical laws as immutable, eternal “boundary stones” for thought.  
Frege might count Quine’s advice to seek a new translation manual a friendly amendment to his 
view.  Suppose we are tempted to judge that the aliens whom we have met are like the second 
species that I discussed in chapter one.  Despite their apparent ability to negotiate the world and 
their seeming to engage in some sort of linguistic practice, their resolve in uttering strings of 
contradictions to each other is in danger of undermining our attribution of cognition to them.  At 
first, we thought them mad, but now we wonder whether they are, after all, non-rational brutes.  
  Disagreeing about logic is thus unlike disagreeing 
about religion.  It constitutes a translation problem and requires us to search for a new manual.      
                                                 
6 This phrase is due to the pioneering anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, who, witnessing native behavior he found 
inexplicable, posited that the natives had a “prelogical mentality” (1924).  
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Before we write them off, Frege may concede, we should question whether they are really 
asserting contradictions or if the error lies with our attempt to translate them.7
 But in contrast to Frege, Quine’s objection to the linguist ascribing a prelogical mentality 
is not that in so doing she represents a putative thinker affirming things that no genuine thinker 
could intelligibly affirm, but simply that she represents the native as affirming something she 
finds obviously false.  Logic has no monopoly on obviousness: just as it is not credible to 
translate people consistently calling red objects “blue,” or as denying that it is raining during a 
torrential downpour, so it is not credible to translate people as affirming simple contradictions.
   
8
 So, unlike Frege, Quine does not think logic has a privileged, constitutive relationship to 
cognition.  In Quine’s view, our justified beliefs are not grounded upon an immutable logical 
foundation, but rather form an interconnected web: “our statements about the physical world face 
the tribunal of sense experience not individually but as a corporate body” (TDE, 41).  Confronted 
with recalcitrant data, it is easy to give up beliefs toward our web’s periphery.  It is more 
difficult, and so rarer, to reject the obvious beliefs near the center (both logical and physical).  
Nevertheless, as we continue to revise our theories for negotiating and predicting the world, any 
of our beliefs—even those we currently think obvious—may come up for judgment.  
  
 Lying underneath the apparent similarity of Frege’s attitude to logical aliens and Quine’s 
to prelogical mindedness are two distinct conceptions of logic.  Frege’s constitutive view casts 
the logician as searching for the prerequisites of rationality.  Deprived of this explanation of 
                                                 
7 Our judgment will depend upon how far their linguistic practice aids them in negotiating the world.  If they jabber 
at length to each other while seeming to have built great cities, designed works of art, developed electronic 
equipment, and so on, we may judge that we need a new translation manual.  If they only occasionally squawk at 
each other, and engage only in the primitive behavior that we recognize in non-human animals (such as seeking food 
when hungry), we may judge them non-rational.  
8 Nor are only logical statements privileged by being “stimulus-analytic” for us, eliciting our assent regardless of 
how we are currently being stimulated (WO, 55).  Empirical statements, such as “there are black cats,” also have this 
property.  
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logic’s importance, what role does Quine think logic has vis-à-vis rational inquiry, and how does 
he characterize the logician’s task?   
 To resolve a dispute about a contested hypothesis, scientists rely upon their shared 
understanding of its testable consequences.  By running experiments, they discover which 
consequences obtain, and, accordingly, endorse or reject the hypothesis in question.  In Quine’s 
view, the naturalist logician aims to codify the principles of inference that underwrite this 
procedure.  Attending to our beliefs about which claims imply which others allows her to offer a 
formal explication of the relation of “implication” to which disputants are making tacit appeal.  
This refines our grasp of scientific practice (WO, 226; PL, 100).  The logician ought to strive for 
her codification of logic to be canonical.  If she succeeds, that is, it will be possible to regiment 
any current theory using her notation (a fact that simplifies the structure and clarifies the 
concepts of the conceptual scheme of science [WO, 161]).  Just as we sometimes paraphrase 
ambiguous sentences to clarify what we intended to communicate in cases of confusion, so, too, 
we may paraphrase our theories in the artificial notation to clarify their inferential commitments 
in cases of dispute.9  Moreover, since regimenting our theories exposes their ontological 
commitments, the canonical notation can assist us in “limning…the most general traits of 
reality,” according to our current theories (161).10
                                                 
9 According to Quine, these paraphrasing techniques differ only in degree (WO, 159).  The logician’s artificial 
notation is phrased within ordinary language and is not distinct from it.  In section three, we will see Carnap’s 
contrasting view that formal calculi are distinct from natural language (and each other). 
  
10 In Quine’s view, ontological questions belong to science, not metaphysics: “what distinguishes the ontological 
philosopher’s concern [from the concerns of scientists] is only breadth of categories…[I]t is scrutiny of…uncritical 
acceptance of the realm of physical objects itself, or of classes, etc., that devolves upon ontology” (WO, 275)  
Guided by logic, the ontological philosopher’s maxim  is that, “to be is to be the value of a variable” (OWTI, 15).  
For a good discussion of Quine’s views here, see Joseph Ullian (2004, 270-272).   
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 The canonicity of logic goes some way toward accounting for its importance for inquiry.  
Inquirers aim to develop theories, and canonicity makes regimentability a condition of 
theoryhood.  We will not count something that cannot be regimented into our notation a theory.11
 Moreover, the fact that our canonical logic explicates our implication relation explains its 
importance when translating other inquirers.  Quine believes that the translation of one’s 
interlocutor’s logic—like the rest of one’s interlocutor’s language—is indeterminate (R, 314; 
319).  In the case of radical translation, there is no manual-independent fact of the matter about 
the logical form of the native language.  Nevertheless, Quine says that one of the linguist’s early 
goals is to ascertain onto which of the native noises she can map our truth-functional operators.  
One reason is that these operators allow her to recursively parse native utterances.  Without 
them, she would search in vain for a manual capable of translating any of the infinite well-
formed expressions of the native language with expressions of her own.
   
12
                                                 
11 In Philosophy of Logic, Quine describes the canonical logic to which he thinks all current rational inquiry is 
accountable: the first order predicate calculus (including identity).  This logic is weaker than the systems preferred 
by his immediate logical predecessors.  Unlike Frege’s Begriffsschrift, set theoretic membership is excluded.  
Unlike Bertrand Russell’s type-theoretic system, second- and higher-order logical quantification are excluded.  But 
Quine takes his canonical logic to have a decisive advantage over these other candidates in admitting complete proof 
procedures for validity and inconsistency (PL, 90-91).  George Boolos questions why this advantage should count as 
decisive, as opposed to, for example, decidability.  His paper is reprinted and extensively discussed in Shapiro 
(1996).  Intuitionistic logic is dismissed by Quine as lacking “the familiarity, the convenience, the simplicity and the 
beauty of our logic” (PL, 87). 
  A second reason is 
that we cannot so much as begin translating until we have provisionally taken some native noises 
to be assent and dissent, and a key part of our evidence for doing so will be the natives’ reactions 
to the noises we translate as the truth-functional operators (e.g. the natives should “assent” to all 
utterances formed by attaching the “negation” noise to utterances from which they “dissent”).  
12 No finite list of paired utterances can suffice as a manual of translation between languages with infinite well-
formed expressions.  But, one might object, what if the native language has only finitely many well-formed 
expressions?  Although I cannot address this worry in any detail here, I do not think we can count a finite system of 
sounds a language unless we also admit that animals use language.  A Quinean might be led to admit that animals do 
use language for certain investigations, but this admission obfuscates our current goal of exploring the relationship 
between logic and cognition.  In the next chapter, I will argue that Davidson’s conception of this relationship forces 
him to conclude that anything worth calling a language must have infinite expressions. 
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For these reasons, Quine describes radical translation with this much of the native tongue fixed 
(though subject, like the rest of the linguist’s efforts, to future disconfirmation).   
 In contrast, translating quantifiers requires isolating predicates with quantifiable 
positions—and fixing which entities can occupy them—in the native language.  Quine argues 
that this can be accomplished in a number of incompatible ways that will nevertheless be 
consistent with all the data of native speech dispositions (WO, 60-61).  Yet, we have an excellent 
pragmatic reason to translate the natives as using our canonical logic (and as predicating 
properties of entities in our ontology).  Since logic makes explicit the implication relation to 
which we are committed, this translation provides us with a perspicuous framework within which 
to overcome disputes with the natives, and so, generally promotes smooth dialogue between us.  
(This pragmatic reason for attributing our canonical logic also holds in our everyday translations 
of each other). 
 So pragmatic considerations guide the linguist and the naturalist logician.  The naturalist 
aspires for her codification of logic to be useful to ongoing empirical inquiry, not to lay out the 
constitutive prerequisites of thinking.  Quine writes that it is “a possibility in principle” that 
“another culture, another species, [could] take a radically different line of scientific development, 
guided by norms that differ sharply from ours…[and] predict as successfully and thrive as well 
as we” (R2, 181).  These norms include the prescriptions that issue from our logical laws.  We 
cannot know a priori that other inquirers’ theories have quantificational structure, nor can we 
infer that other inquirers’ canonical logic is the first order predicate calculus with identity.  But 
we have good reason to adopt a canonical logic to clarify our inquiry and to translate others as 
adopting it, too.   
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 In fact, Quine thinks that our own line of scientific development might result in an 
alteration of the laws of logic.  I think that critics have sometimes masked this striking feature of 
Quine’s conception of logic by conflating it with his skepticism about modal claims.13
 To see this, consider that Quine’s sole doubt about his canonical notation stemmed from 
quantum mechanics (PL, 85-86; 100).  Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle entails that 
magnitudes of quantum particles cannot be jointly ascertained.  Measuring the location of a 
quantum particle makes its velocity indeterminate, while measuring its velocity makes its 
location indeterminate.  This indeterminacy is part of our best current physical theory of the 
world, not an epistemic failing in us.  When certain laws of classical logic are applied to 
propositions involved in reasoning about quantum mechanics, claims become admissible that 
according to our own theory, paradoxically, cannot be established.
  Quine’s 
point is not merely that the claim “it is impossible for us to reject a logical law” relies upon a 
scientifically indefensible notion of impossibility.  Nor is it that future logicians might develop 
alternative codifications of logic that are superior to our own on the grounds of simplicity or 
clarity (a point with which Frege would agree).  Rather, Quine thinks that our future scientific 
theories may require us to change our logical laws.   
14  To avoid the proliferation 
of unanswerable questions based upon indeterminable claims, some logicians developed new, 
non-classical calculi to model quantum reasoning.15
                                                 
13 Stroud, for example, writes of Quine in one breath that “[t]here is no metaphysically guaranteed eternal 
unrevisability or impossibility, even though many of our present beliefs, including the truth-functional tautologies, 
might never in fact be given up during the rest of the history of human life” (1975, 95, my emphasis).  
   
14 One example is the distribution of conjunctions over disjunctions.  The schema “[p . (q v r)] ≡ [(p . q) v (p . r)]” is 
a theorem of classical logic.  But if “p” is “the particle is moving to the left,” “q” is “the particle is in the interval 
[0,1],” and “r” is “-q,” then “p . (q v r)” is equivalent to “p . (q v –q)” and so to “p,” while “(p . q) v (p . r)” is 
unknowable since Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle means that neither p and q nor p and r can be jointly 
ascertained.   See Jan Hilgevoord and Jos Uffink (2011).  
15 See Garrett Birkhoff and John von Neumann (1936) and Putnam (1974).   
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 Although Quine came to dismiss such “quantum logics” because of their lack of 
familiarity and conservativeness, the case illustrates the sort of considerations that might compel 
naturalist logicians.  Suppose scientists find that they are unable to model their reasoning about a 
subject in terms of their canonical logic.  Then, if logicians devise an alternative codification of 
the principles of inference which explicates these new patterns of reasoning, and into which the 
scientists can regiment their new theories (in addition to theories capable of explaining all of the 
phenomena that theories regimented in the old canonical logic could explain), the alternative 
codification should be canonized.16
 The claim that our logical and scientific theories develop in tandem means that Quine, 
unlike Frege, is willing to accept that thinking, talking, reasoning aliens might exist who 
resolutely deny our logic.  They may successfully create theories about the world that we are 
unable to regiment using our canonical notation, and their language may be currently 
untranslatable to us because we cannot project our logic onto their speech.  Doubtless, we would 
be baffled by their alien mindedness.  Nevertheless, if over time we came to understand their 
“radically different line of scientific development” (R2, 181), and the implication relation of 
their canonical logic (however different from our own), we might be able to reject our logic in 
  This rational rejection of one or more of our logical laws 
would be the result of the development of successful scientific theories (so judged by their 
predictive power) expressible only in a logical system inconsistent with our own.  In this way, 
logic and scientific theories develop in tandem.  Regimentability into canonical logic is a 
condition for theoryhood; but a widely endorsed, predictive, yet currently unregimentable 
explanatory account of some phenomenon may result in a new canonization.  
                                                 
16 Hartry Field (2008) argues that a multi-valued logic, weaker than classical logic, averts the semantic paradoxes.  
All current scientific theories can be regimented in terms of this logic.  Were a Quinean to take Field’s treatment of 
the paradoxes as preferable to Quine’s own disavowal of them as untranslatable foreign language (PL, 45), we 
should have another case of considerations that would lead her to revise her canonical logic.  
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favor of theirs and translate them in the future.  Today’s logical aliens may be tomorrow’s 
scientific collaborators.   
 There is a famous passage that might be thought to discredit the interpretation of Quine I 
have been pursuing:  
[Consider] the familiar remark that even the most audacious system-builder is bound by the law of 
contradiction.  How is he really bound?  If he were to accept contradiction, he would so re-adjust 
his logical laws as to insure distinctions of some sort; for the classical laws yield all sentences as 
consequences of any contradiction.  But then we would proceed to reconstrue his heroically novel 
logic as a non-contradictory logic, perhaps even as familiar logic, in perverse notation. (WO, 59) 
 
Numerous critics have taken Quine’s point to be that, try as one might, one cannot help but be 
bound by the classical logical constants if one is to construct a theory (e.g. Alan Berger, 1990).  
On this reading, Quine is developing a powerful argument that the law of contradiction is 
rationally incontrovertible, since one cannot deny it and still construct predictive theories.  But 
what Quine actually says is that we—i.e. classical logicians—would reconstrue the alien logic in 
our own terms.  By this, Quine means that when devising our manual of translation for non-
classical logicians, we would use our canonical logic to describe their deviant theories so that we 
can begin to communicate.  Given that our canonical logic explicates the implication relation 
guiding our practice of inquiry, beginning translation by locating native language onto which our 
logical structure can be read is an excellent rule for translation.  Yet, given the indeterminacy of 
translation, to begin translating in this way is still a pragmatic convention of ours, and does not 
reveal an “essential” truth about the role of classical logic in the alien tongue, or the centrality of 
classical logic to all languages, or all theories.  Rather, it only shows that classical logic is 
currently central in our web of belief and currently indispensible for our translation projects.  
Quine writes that in radical translation,  
‘Save logical truth’…is a rule which, compatibly with all stimulus meanings and other verbal 
dispositions, could be obeyed or flouted.  But it is not capricious.  The very want to determinacy 
puts a premium on adhering to this strong and simple rule as partial determinant. (R, 318, my 
emphasis) 
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 We can now state Quine’s naturalist conception of the relationship between logic and 
cognition:  
NAT:   A person must exhibit speech behavior that can be translated as  
  reasoning in conformity with the laws of our canonical logic if  
  we are to engage in inquiry together.   
 
Like Frege, Quine takes the logician’s goal to be arriving at an explicit account of the principles 
of demonstrative inference that regulate rational inquiry.  He also agrees with Frege that the 
principles of inference are our principles of inference; the logician’s codification is not 
accountable to a standard that is independent of our demonstrative practice.  But unlike Frege, 
Quine lacks a constitutive view of the relationship between logic and cognition.  Although he 
agrees with Frege that the logician’s codification must certify those arguments informally 
recognized as valid and no others, Quine takes seriously the possibility that what we informally 
recognize as valid may change with ongoing scientific development.  I argued in chapter one that 
Frege thought his basic logical laws express general truths of rational inquiry that are in 
reflective equilibrium; but in Quine’s view, once the naturalist logician accepts that her 
codification is just a snapshot of the principles of inference currently accepted in her community, 
she has no basis for judging any part of her codification eternally fixed.  
 This naturalist account of the relationship between logic and cognition faces a number of 
questions.  If there are no constitutive norms that must be recognized if one is to be a rational 
inquirer, then how does one know which norms other inquirers recognize?  If our norms differ 
from our interlocutor, are we able to agree and disagree or do we merely talk past each other?  In 
fact, what conception does the naturalist even have of “norms” and “normativity”?  Is it 
sufficient to model our practice of inquiry?  And, if we accept a broadly Fregean account of the 
intimate relationship between logic and truth, then, having accepted that even the core laws of 
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our canonical logic can be rationally revised, must naturalists accept a form of sociologism 
where objective truth changes with the patterns of reasoning our canonical logic enshrines?   
 Many of Quine’s critics have charged that he lacks adequate responses to some or all of 
these questions.  But such critics fail to appreciate the responses Quine’s naturalist conception of 
philosophy makes available.  To show how Quine can address his critics, in the next three 
sections I want to examine naturalism more carefully.  My method will be to expose how 
appealing to naturalism allows Quine to quell different skeptical objections.  Once we have 
acknowledged naturalism’s strengths, we will be positioned to critically evaluate its triumphs 
and failures. 
 
2.  Barry Stroud and Skepticism about the External World 
 We can develop our understanding of naturalism by considering how, and why, Quine 
thinks that appealing to it can defuse the problem of skepticism about the external world.  
Traditional skeptical arguments purport to show that we lack knowledge—or, alternatively, 
justified beliefs—about the world.  But in Quine’s view, traditional “theory of 
knowledge…blushes for its name” (RA, 321, my emphasis), since much of its terminology fails 
to pass scientific muster: “for scientific or philosophical purposes the best we can do is give up 
the notion of knowledge as a bad job and make do rather with its separate ingredients” (Q, 109).  
My goal in this section is to argue that, by making do with naturalized epistemic ingredients, 
Quine removes the presuppositions of traditional skeptical arguments.  To do so, I will engage 
Stroud’s criticisms of Quine and argue that he mistakes the power of naturalism.  This will allow 
me to begin fleshing out the significance of Quine’s slogans that being a naturalist means 
rejecting “first philosophy” (RHP, 430) and accepting that there is no “cosmic exile” (WO, 275).  
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Further, it will let me explore the ramifications of doing naturalized epistemology with Quine 
upon the deck of Neurath’s metaphorical boat (SO, 16).   
 Let us begin with a working account of what it is to naturalize epistemology.  Quine 
characterizes naturalists as accepting that philosophy is continuous with natural science (RHP, 
430).  In consequence, naturalists believe that there are no supra-scientific methods available to 
philosophical inquirers that would license a distinctively “philosophical” critique of scientific 
methodology or of scientific theories of reality.  Instead, our ongoing scientific practice is a self-
correcting, comprehensive endeavor, committed to employing the best ways that we have 
managed to discover to learn about the world, so judged “best” by the unsurpassed predictive and 
explanatory power of the theories scientific inquirers have been able to develop.  When 
naturalists turn to epistemology, they acknowledge that empirical psychologists and linguists 
share their domain of investigation.  Each set of inquirers strive to better understand the human 
mind’s capacity for believing, thinking, knowing, and expressing by carefully attending to the 
available evidence and constructing theories which can account for observed phenomena.  Their 
investigations differ only in degree, not in kind.17
 Like their traditional counterparts, Quine tells us that naturalized epistemologists seek the 
“rationale of reification” (TI, 3), an explanation of how we manage to gain knowledge of things 
in the world on the basis of our sense experience.  But he characterizes them as “liberated” by 
the recognition that they rely on their background understanding of the world to construct their 
more sophisticated theories of it (RR, 3).  This background understanding is no less a theory than 
its sophisticated progeny.  Naturalized epistemologists thus view the ordinary things that we 
commonly take to populate the world—chairs, trees, apples, etc.—on a continuum with the 
  
                                                 
17 Quine rebukes non-naturalized epistemologists for engaging in theoretical “make-believe” by imposing 
conceptual structure onto epistemology, rather than discovering structure by critically attending to the results of 
ongoing empirical experimentation (EN, 75).   
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entities that we have posited, comparatively recently, to account for the data garnered by our 
scientific investigations (electrons, dark matter, genes, and so on).  We may better recall the 
experimental history leading to these exotic posits, but ordinary things are, likewise, posits of 
ours whose origins are “shrouded in prehistory” (WO, 22).   
 Moreover, we inquirers number among these ordinary posits.  When we turn our gaze 
upon ourselves, our theories tell us that “we” are physical organisms.  Beginning “in mediis 
rebus,” in the midst of her background theory, the naturalized epistemologist’s task is to 
reconcile this theoretical account of what we are with our conscious experience of ourselves and 
of the knowledge we have of the world (RPR, 460).18
 The “currently accepted” qualifier is important.  It indicates that Quine’s commitment to 
physicalism—and even to empiricism—is subordinate to naturalism.  Current scientists are 
empiricists (holding that we only access the world using our sense organs) and physicalists 
(holding that the world to be explained by our theories is entirely physical).  But since the results 
of future scientific inquiry may necessitate non-physical theories (Quine remarks that some 
accounts of quantum physics are virtually mentalistic), and since we could evolve a (verifiable) 
capacity to access the world which did not rely on our senses, orthodox physicalism or 
empiricism could be abandoned (PT, 20-21).  Quine’s commitment to naturalism, though, would 
remain.  Naturalistic philosophy would seek to evaluate the commitments of our new science, 
and naturalized epistemologists would take a revised stance that we are warranted in believing 
  The (currently accepted) scientific view is 
that organisms like us obtain all the evidence relevant to our theories of reality via our senses, 
and so, naturalized epistemologists hold that we are warranted in believing theories which are 
able to explain and predict our sensory experience.   
                                                 
18 See Burton Dreben (1994) for a discussion of the Quinean starting point.   
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those theories that explain and predict our total sensory and extra-sensory experience of the 
physical and non-physical world. 
 Although Stroud is a sympathetic critic of philosophical naturalism, he argues not only 
that naturalized epistemology fails to address traditional skepticism about the external world, but 
that it gives rise to a new skeptical argument.  The apparent strength of the position against 
skeptical attacks, he claims, is its removal of the avowedly “philosophical” ground upon which 
the skeptic presents her challenge that we lack justified beliefs.  He quotes Quine:  
I am not accusing the skeptic of begging the question; he is quite within his rights in assuming 
science in order to refute science; this, if carried out, would be a straightforward argument by 
reductio ad absurdum.  I am only making the point that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts. 
(NNK, 258) 
  
But Stroud argues that the skeptic can carry out Quine’s imagined reductio.  According to 
Stroud, by assuming the veracity of our scientific theory, the skeptic can show that we lack 
knowledge of the external world since our scientific theory tells us that it is underdetermined by 
the available data: 
The reductio ad absurdum would presumably run something like this.  Either science is true and 
gives us knowledge or it does not.  If it is not true, nothing we believe about the physical world 
amounts to knowledge.  But if it does give us knowledge, we can see from what it tells us about 
the meagre impacts at our sensory surfaces during perception that we can never tell whether the 
external world really is the way we perceive it to be.  But if that is so, we can know nothing about 
the external world.  So once again nothing we believe about the physical world amounts to 
knowledge. (1984, 228)  
 
Stroud’s point is that the skeptic need not assert that she has a superior theory to the scientist, but 
only note that  
none of the competing ‘hypotheses’ about what is true beyond the data can be known to be 
true…[in fact,] we can have no more reason for believing any one of them rather than others on 
the basis of the only sensory data we can ever have. (1984, 233)  
  
Quine had written that doubting scientific realism on the basis of skeptical reflection was 
“overreacting” (RS, 475).  But Stroud thinks this is glib.  The traditional skeptic does not doubt 
that our scientific theories are the best that we have for pragmatic reasons.  Rather, she is 
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disturbed by the realization that no scientific theory we can develop amounts to knowledge.  On 
Stroud’s analysis, Quine misses the point of traditional skepticism, and naturalized epistemology 
is a change of subject rather than an “enlightened” development of epistemology.  
 But it is Stroud who fails to appreciate that Quine is not providing a blanket response to 
all epistemological challenges that we may call “skeptical.”  Rather, he diagnoses each skeptical 
challenge naturalistically, finding some to be answerable and others unintelligible.  It is this 
nuanced attitude that underwrites his charge of “overreacting,” and other passages where he 
gives the skeptic such short shrift:  
My answer to skepticism is that reality itself, the term ‘reality’, the term ‘real’, is a scientific term 
on a par with ‘table’ ‘chair’ ‘electron’ ‘neutrino’ ‘class’, that all these are part of our scientific 
apparatus, our terminology, so that the only sense I can make of skepticism is the kind of sense 
that maybe our theory is wrong, that in the future the checkpoints aren’t going to bear it out, 
checkpoints in observation, in experiment. (EDQD, 152) 
 
This response would also strike Stroud as petulant.  How can Quine profess not to understand 
the skeptic’s anxiety, which is obviously not captured by noting that our theory could be wrong?   
 Quine is not being deliberately obtuse.  First, he tries to respectfully address the skeptic 
as a fellow inquirer, engaging a form of skepticism I shall call constructive skepticism.  He 
encourages the constructive skeptic to describe the case worrying her in more detail so that she 
may bring it to the highest tribunal countenanced by naturalists: the scientific tribunal.  There, 
she may advance it as an alternative hypothesis to scientific realism.  At this tribunal, the 
currently endorsed principles of theoretical construction hold sway (simplicity, modesty, 
conservatism, etc.19
                                                 
19 Quine sketches these and other desiderata for scientific hypotheses in the sixth chapter of WB. 
), and Quine is confident that scientific realism will win out.  The reductio 
Quine was actually imagining in the quote Stroud extracts was the (in Quine’s view unlikely) 
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possibility that a constructive skeptic could describe a theory which is simpler, more modest, and 
more conservative than scientific realism, which nevertheless enjoyed its explanatory power.20
 In contrast, Quine would view Stroud’s reductio as a legitimate expression of fallibilism.  
He agrees with Stroud’s skeptic—an inquirer I shall call the pessimistic skeptic—that we may 
come to judge our theory inaccurate.  Although scientific realism is presently esteemed as our 
best theory for predicting sensory experience, reflecting upon the history of science suggests it is 
highly likely that parts of it are mistaken.  We have reason to expect our scientific progression 
(along with the sloughing off of theoretical blunders and excesses) to continue indefinitely.  
Accepting that science is fallible, then, is an attitude toward the discipline that the discipline 
itself—in endorsing inductive reasoning—demands.  It is the pessimistic skeptic who withholds 
her belief in her current theory because of its potential inaccuracy who is, in Quine’s view, 
overreacting, because she has misunderstood the self-acknowledged fallibility of inquiry. 
   
 Quine is well aware that this response would seem glib to a third inquirer, who I shall call 
the radical skeptic.  The radical skeptic insists that reality might not just differ from our current 
theory, but be so different that neither we, nor any future scientists, could come to know it.  Yet 
in Quine’s view, this radical skeptic has made a semantic error.  She fails to articulate an 
intelligible case.  Quine believes, on the basis of his naturalist reflection upon language use and 
acquisition, that our words only become meaningful in the context of successful ongoing activity 
with others in the world, language being a “social art.”  But by talking about a “reality” that is in 
principle “beyond” our experience, and which exceeds our ability to develop theories, the radical 
skeptic unbuckles her words from the circumstances in which she acquires them.  The problem is 
                                                 
20 A variation is a constructive skeptic who doubts one or more of the tribunal’s standards—claiming, for example, 
that complex theories are preferable to simple ones.  In Quine’s view, the onus is upon this skeptic to make the best 
case she can for complexity.  Although he doubts that she will succeed, accepting that she may succeed is part of his 
naturalistic attitude.  The standards we use to judge theories are also potential candidates for judgment.   
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that in detaching her words from their semantic mooring, they become meaningless.21  The 
radical skeptic warrants no further attention because she cannot coherently phrase her challenge 
naturalistically.22
 Grasping this argument brings out the force of Quine’s semantic holism.  In his view, our 
scientific theories about what there truly is cannot be strictly distinguished from the 
meaningfulness of sentences in ordinary language.
   
23
naturalism looks only to natural science…for an account of what there is.…to ask what reality is 
really like, however, apart from human categories, is self-stultifying.  It is like asking how long 
the Nile really is, apart from parochial matters of miles or meters. (SN, 405) 
   The radical skeptic’s challenge is premised 
upon “reality” being meaningfully applicable outside the bounds of possible scientific inquiry, 
but: 
 
In Quine’s view, “real” is a predicate of our language that applies to those entities our current 
theory demands.  We refine our grasp of what is “real” through scientific activity.  Analyzed 
naturalistically, the radical skeptic’s challenge becomes “why am I warranted in believing that 
reality (which is a term of my theory that I use to refer to whatever I am warranted in believing) 
is as my current theory tells me (or future theory will tell me) it is?”  This rephrasing 
demonstrates that in seriously asking the question she is misusing the word “reality.” 
  Stroud might object that this defense turns on a claim about the meaning of “reality.”  He 
thinks that it is “one of the merits of Quine’s views about language that they do not support such 
                                                 
21 Quine writes, “Our words have no meaning beyond what they acquire through our learning of them, and all our 
learning of them goes back directly or indirectly to the association of utterances with concurrent sensory 
stimulation...the existence of external objects is itself just one among the tenets of our scientific theory, albeit a 
primordial one, and it is sustained to the degree that the theory as a whole conforms to observational data.  The very 
meaning of the existence thesis lies no deeper” (FHQP, 206-207).   
22 In another formulation of naturalism, Quine writes that it means accepting that “it is within science, and not some 
prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described” (TTPT, 21, my emphasis). 
23 Quine writes, “We learn truth conditions of some sentences relative to other sentences.  We learn thus to use the 
component words to form new sentences whose relative truth conditions are derivable.  Which of these 
dependencies of truth value are due to meaning, or language, and which belong rather to a substantive theory that is 
widely shared, is in my view a wholly unclear question.  It is no mere vagueness of terminology that makes 
language and theory indistinguishable in this connection” (R, 310).    
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dubious argumentation,” because, in rejecting “the philosophical use of synonymy or 
analyticity,” “[Quine is] in no position to appeal to what is or is not included in the meaning of a 
particular term” (1984, 227).  But this objection mistakes the defense.  Although Quine’s 
argument for the indeterminacy of translation precludes him talking about the meaning of a term 
or a sentence in our language, it does not preclude reflection on the meaningfulness of (parts of) 
our discourse.  In Word and Object and later writings, Quine gives a detailed theory of how we 
develop our capacity for language.24  By reflecting on our linguistic practice in this way, he 
naturalizes the ingredients of traditional epistemology and disarms its problems.  The naturalized 
epistemologist’s response to radical skepticism does not turn upon a priori conceptual analysis 
of the term “reality,” but on a theory of how the ingredient “reality” functions in our language.25  
Quine argues that our understanding of the word “reality” comes from within our scientific 
practice as the name of the goal of our fallible, revisable, theoretical constructions.  We acquire 
competency in its use as we earn membership into the community of inquirers.  The word 
“reality,” like any scientific term, is meaningless outside the scientific practice that makes 
scientific terms meaningful.26
                                                 
24 I will have more to say about Quine’s theory of language in section three, and about the indeterminacy of 
translation and the inscrutability of reference in section four.   
 
25 Stroud might retort that in appealing to one more part of his naturalist theory, Quine is relying upon something he 
believes which may thus be doubted by the radical skeptical (1984, 247).  But Quine’s naturalist machinery kicks in 
once again.  To the naturalist, constructive doubts combined with competing hypotheses are perfectly legitimate, and 
hence the onus is upon Stroud to give an alternate theory of language—more explanatory, conservative, and modest 
than Quine’s—which explains how and why humans should have, oddly, developed the word “reality” to refer to 
something that is forever beyond human experience.  If Stroud has no such theory but is merely pointing out, 
pessimistically, that Quine’s could be wrong, Quine will happily admit to fallibilism about his theory of language.  If 
Stroud complains, radically, that Quine nevertheless lacks any reason to believe that his current theory of language 
(or any future refinement thereof) is accurate, Quine will rebuke Stroud for imagining “accuracy” to be a standard 
for evaluating our theories that is external to those theories.   
26 If we liked, we could of course stipulate a new use for the word “reality.”  To borrow Wittgenstein’s terminology, 
the word might be employed as part of a language game in which we never know how things really are.  But this 
language game has nothing to do with the language game of inquiry, and if the radical skeptic is phrasing her 
challenge using this word, she may justly be ignored by inquirers (though perhaps not by those non-naturalized 
philosophers who wish to play her game).  
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 A parallel response is available to Quine if the radical skeptic ascends to the formal 
mode.  Objecting that my various beliefs about reality may all be false presupposes a standard 
independent of all my beliefs, against which they can be compared and found wrong.  But Quine 
denies the existence of any such standard, because there is no external standpoint that we could 
occupy to apply it.27  We talk of “truth,” and of aiming to only believe “truths,” to describe the 
purpose of our inferential practice from within that practice.28
 But although this explains how the naturalist can defuse traditional skepticism, Stroud 
also claims that a new form of skepticism affects naturalized epistemology on its own terms.  He 
begins by examining how a naturalist inquirer will judge whether her interlocutor’s theory is 
justified.  The naturalist’s theory will include an account of what evidence the world makes 
available to her interlocutor, and, by making a second appeal to her theory for an account of what 
the world is like, she will be able to evaluate the extent to which her interlocutor’s judgments are 
correct, and how far her interlocutor’s theory is grounded in her evidence.  But Stroud complains 
that the naturalist cannot follow this procedure to justify her own beliefs.  Since she would have 
to appeal to her own theory twice—once for an account of reality, and once for an account of 
how reality is revealing itself to her—she would be deprived of any “independent information 
  So, Quine can freely admit that 
our scientific testing procedures—even those as basic as observation—are fallible, and so, may 
mislead us, without committing himself to skepticism.  This is what he means by writing that 
“the Humean predicament is the human predicament” (EN, 72); although we lack certainty about 
the nature of the world, we can nevertheless successfully develop theories about it (and, 
moreover, develop theories about our very ability to successfully develop theories about it). 
                                                 
27 This Quinean response to Stroud parallels the response I gave in chapter one, on Frege’s behalf, to Peter Sullivan.  
By maintaining that our inferential practice’s standards of evaluation are the only standards of evaluation for our 
beliefs, Frege and Quine inoculate their views from objections that rely upon purported practice-independent 
evaluative standards. 
28 I will return to Quine’s conception of truth, particularly as it compares to Davidson’s, in chapter four. 
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about [the] world that [she] could use as a test or check” (1984, 244) for her beliefs, and so, 
would be incapable of providing any justification of those beliefs.   
 According to Stroud, this amounts to a new skeptical argument: 
I could not see my efforts [at justification] as providing me with an explanation that itself is 
something I know or have reason to believe, as opposed to a more complicated story I fully accept 
and find myself disposed to tell myself from time to time.” (247) 
 
Yet  “justification,” like “truth” and “reality,” is an epistemic ingredient that Quine treats 
naturalistically.  Stroud’s new skeptical argument does not affect naturalized epistemology on its 
own terms because, for Quine, once we have recognized that there are no standards of evaluation 
external to our practice of inquiry, we ought to grasp that the only justification that inquirers can 
have for their beliefs are others in their webs.  This should not launch naturalists into skeptical 
doubt that they forever lack “reason” for their beliefs.  Rather, it should encourage them to revise 
the outmoded philosophical terminology of reasons and justification to better comport with 
scientific practice.  True beliefs are not eternally justified or unjustified, reasonable or 
unreasonable; they are more or less justified and more or less reasonable, at historical 
moments.29
 In Quine’s view, once we reorient ourselves naturalistically, we see that there is no room 
for Stroud’s lingering “philosophical” concern that we enter into a vicious circle when appealing 
to science to explain our knowledge if we have yet to justify our knowledge of science (EN, 75-
76).  Rather, we grasp that science and epistemology reciprocally contain each other (RG, 684).  
The naturalist uses her best current theory to establish the foundation of her epistemology 
  The “reasonability” of our theory as a whole is to be judged in terms of the extent to 
which it meets the standards of the scientific tribunal, because its standards are the best we have 
so far discovered for epistemic justification. 
                                                 
29 After proposing this treatment for “justification” under the entry of “knowledge” in his “intermittently 
philosophical dictionary,” Quine writes: “Here we see the familiar and widely applicable rectification of vagueness: 
disclaim the vague positive and cleave to the precise comparative” (Q, 109).  Rather than adopting the artificial 
“more or less known,” Quine is content for the word “knowledge” itself to—ironically—go by the board.  
97 
 
(holding that she knows what she knows on the basis of her senses) and reconstructs her 
ontology using evidence acquired via her senses. 
 To illustrate this point, Quine frequently turns to Neurath’s metaphor (e.g. SO, 16; NK, 
127; R2, 178): our epistemic theory is like a boat.  We cannot dismantle it in dry-dock and 
reconstruct it to conform to our preferred design, because we are already at sea.  Naturalized 
philosophers are those enlightened souls who recognize that they stand on the deck with 
scientists.  The crew can work together to repair damaged parts of the boat (and even improve its 
overall design), but only while keeping it seaworthy, else they risk drowning in a sea of 
incoherence.  Empiricism is a structurally central, though conceivably removable, plank of the 
boat; naturalism is not a plank at all, but the shared attitude of the crew. 
 In this section, I have argued that by naturalizing epistemology Quine excises skeptical 
arguments about the external world.  He does so by emphasizing the roles that our language and 
our evolving scientific theory play in distinguishing meaningful possibilities from unintelligible 
gibberish.  “Reality” and “truth” are internal standards to scientific practice.  There is no position 
of “cosmic exile” to occupy that would allow us to evaluate the extent to which our theories meet 
putative external standards.  In fact, since naturalists deny the existence of external standards, the 
internal/external contrast that I am employing breaks down.  There is only the sideways 
evaluation of our beliefs from a position within our scientific theory.  We judge ourselves 
“justified” according to our scientific standards for theory construction, which are themselves 
fallible and revisable.  In the next section, I shall examine Quine’s naturalized conception of 
language in more detail to show that it excises another skeptical challenge from philosophy.  
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3. Rudolf Carnap and Skepticism about Successful Communication 
 
[T]he notion of there being a fixed, explicable, and as yet unexplained meaning in the speaker’s 
mind is gratuitous. (WO, 160) 
 
 Quine dedicates Word and Object to Rudolf Carnap, his “Teacher and Friend.”  In this 
section, I will argue that a skeptical threat facing Carnap’s project in The Logical Syntax of 
Language is excised by Quine’s naturalist approach to language use and acquisition.  From 
Quine’s perspective, Carnap unintentionally invites skepticism about communication by failing 
to give up first philosophy from his otherwise laudable empiricism.  Instead of looking 
naturalistically at how scientists use language, and then codifying their practice, Carnap imposes 
structure upon the formal languages he designs for science under the name of “explication.”   
 The underlying motivation for Carnap’s syntactic project is the promotion of 
communication.  Early in his career, Carnap was frustrated by the impasses that occurred when 
disputants failed to agree upon the fundamental terms of their disputes, and so, how to resolve 
them.  Such impasses inhibit communal endeavors.  Carnap tried to adopt his current 
interlocutor’s chosen vocabulary, switching vocabularies between conversations as necessary; 
but this approach seemed disingenuous to others.30
 Carnap details a syntactic general method for constructing formal languages.  A 
consequence relation can be clearly defined for each language, fixing which of its expressions 
imply which others (LSL, 168).
  The Logical Syntax of Language is Carnap’s 
defense of his practice.   
31
                                                 
30 Carnap writes, “I [became] aware that in talks with my various friends I had used different philosophical 
languages, adapting myself to their ways of thinking and speaking.  With one friend I might talk in a language that 
could be characterized as realistic or even as materialistic…with another friend, I might adapt myself to his idealistic 
kind of language…I was surprised to find that this variety in my way of speaking appeared to some as objectionable 
and even inconsistent” (IA, 17).  See the final chapter of Michael Friedman (1999) for an illuminating account of the 
evolution of Carnap’s attempts to approach disputes evenhandedly.   
  Carnap’s idea is that participants in a recalcitrant dispute can 
31 To fill in a few details, formation rules specify which strings of symbols count as expressions of the language, and 
transformation rules specify which expressions of the language are consequences of others.  
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agree to defer their disagreement until each has endorsed the consequence relation given in a 
syntactically identified formal language.  After their syntactic digression, if disputants endorse 
the same formal language, then they can return to their original dispute, each confident that they 
know what the other will count as a good argument.  They may appeal to the formal language as 
needed, investing its meaningless marks with meanings via an “interpretation,” and determining 
to their mutual satisfaction whether to endorse or reject any disputed claim on the basis of its 
testable consequences (LSL, 227-233; FLM, 37).32
An explication replaces the imprecise explicandum by a more precise explicatum.  Therefore, 
whenever greater precision in communication is desired, it will be advisable to use the explicatum 
instead of the explicandum. (SLM, 935, my emphasis) 
  Where disputed terminology is vague, 
inquirers can use the natural language they share to informally describe the features that interest 
them (the explicandum), and then define a corresponding expression in their chosen formal 
language which preserves those features (the explicatum):  
 
Since picking a formal language makes explicit the consequence relation to which inquirers will 
hold each other accountable, it also promotes “precision in communication.”  Using Carnap’s 
machinery is meant to reassure inquirers that their dispute is, in principle, resolvable.  There is a 
mutually binding standard for their arguments, against which they count as agreeing or 
disagreeing about precise claims rather than merely talking past each other.  
 In contrast, disputants who endorse different formal languages are only engaged in 
pseudo-dispute.  Their putative “disagreement” seemed recalcitrant because they do not 
recognize the same arguments as binding.  Their discussion lacks a shared standard against 
which they count as disagreeing.  If they wish to continue collaborating, one must persuade the 
                                                 
32 Once a formal language is interpreted, logical vocabulary can be distinguished from physical vocabulary, and 
consequences the inquirers agree to be logical can be distinguished from those they take to be physical (LSL, 177; 
181).  
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other to endorse her preferred consequence relation.  Carnap is unreceptive to interlocutors who 
refuse this method:  
If one partner in a philosophical discussion cannot or will not give a translation of his thesis into 
the formal mode, or if he will not state to which language-system his thesis refers, then the other 
will be well-advised to refuse the debate, because the thesis of his opponent is incomplete, and 
discussion would lead to nothing but empty wrangling. (PLS, 80-81)   
 
Since the purpose of his syntactic method is to promote communication, those who decline it are 
justly refused.33
 Carnap thinks that the persuasion between collaborators about which consequence 
relation to endorse is purely pragmatic, which is the sense of his slogan, “In logic, there are no 
morals” (original emphasis, LSL, 52).  Arguments that inquirers form “internally” within a 
language derive their force from the language’s mutually agreed upon consequence relation.  
From within, one inquirer can show another wrong.  But arguments formed “externally” lack the 
force to bind disputants.
   
34  There is no precise application for “right” or “wrong” prior to 
agreement about formal language.  So in choosing a formal language, inquirers rely solely on its 
perceived adequacy to their current endeavor and may only try to persuade others of its 
expediency.  If two inquirers persist in holding different languages to be satisfactory—in 
Carnap’s most developed example, classical and constructive mathematicians—then a 
metaphilosophical attitude of tolerance between them is appropriate: “it is not our business to set 
up prohibitions, but to arrive at conventions” (LSL, 53).  In this way, disputants who refuse to 
speak the same language are to part ways amicably.35
                                                 
33 It perhaps goes without saying that many metaphysicians were unhappy being refused or “tolerated” by the logical 
positivists, rather than engaged—voicing a frustration of the merely tolerated everywhere (see e.g. Gustav 
Bergmann, 1954, 64-65; Philipp Frank, 1963, 159-164). 
  
34 Carnap argues that the complexity of natural languages thwarts the formal treatment necessary to clarify their 
consequence relations (LSL, 2; TLS, 50).  Since it cannot be assumed that speakers of the same natural language 
understand consequence identically, arguments about formal language choice that are phrased in natural language 
are external and only have the potential to compel pragmatically.  
35 By making the set of truths—and in particular, the set of logical truths—that each inquirer endorses a function of 
her pragmatic choice of formal language, rather than taking all inquirers to be constitutively committed to a single, 
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 I have been arguing that Carnap’s motive is to promote communication.  But the 
skeptical challenge that I have in mind questions whether those using his machinery can know 
that they are communicating.  What sort of guarantee do disputants have that they are not talking 
past each other once they have pragmatically chosen a formal language?36
 We can consider Carnap’s reply to a related objection from E.W. Beth to reconstruct the 
response that he would give this skeptic.  Beth charges Carnap with having made an illicit 
assumption about his reader.  He argues that one must tacitly assume one’s intuitive 
interpretation of mathematics to understand Carnap’s syntactic description of the meaningless 
marks of different calculi, and in particular those marks which allow for the construction of 
arithmetic within the calculus (once interpreted).  Carnap’s illicit assumption is thinking his 
  Carnap says that 
inquirers can resolve internal disputes by “interpreting” the meaningless marks of their formal 
language and determining the testable consequences of disputed claims.  But how do inquirers 
know that they are interpreting the formal language in the same way? 
                                                                                                                                                             
universal logic that “unfolds” the concept of truth, Carnap’s logical pluralism is an important step away from 
Frege’s universalism.  The tolerance of a Carnapian might even extend to the second species of logical aliens.  She 
may find logically alien inferences baffling, and lack any pragmatic reason to adopt their seemingly contradictory 
formal language; this need not be a reason to deny them cognition, as opposed to tolerating their puzzling practice 
from a safe distance.   
36 This question is pressing on the interpretation that I am pursuing, but Friedman has offered a different 
characterization of the aim of Carnap’s syntactic method:   
 
Carnap is not worried about determining, in actual cases, which disputes are genuine and which 
are not.  He is already perfectly clear about this: philosophical disputes are characteristically 
fruitless, whereas scientific questions…patently are rationally negotiable.  Carnap’s problem is not 
to discriminate the fruitless disputes from the fruitful ones but to offer those enmeshed in the 
former—philosophers—a way out.  This is what the construction and investigation of a variety of 
formal languages is for (1999, 214 n29, original emphasis).   
 
According to Friedman, Carnap acknowledges that his syntactic method will only help “scientifically minded, 
nonmetaphysical” philosophers to communicate (213).  He does not need to provide such inquirers a skeptic-proof 
guarantee that they are communicating once they employ his syntactic method, because they will have no interest in 
such philosophical questions.  In my view, Friedman’s interpretation undercuts the force of Carnap’s refusal to 
engage those who reject his syntactic method.  Carnap’s advice that inquirers avoid “empty wrangling” looks less 
like a well-intentioned recommendation to avoid obscurantists who refuse to clarify the terms being debated, and 
more like a prejudice against philosophy.  But even if the argument that I develop here does not undermine Carnap’s 
aim, I believe it demonstrates that, unlike Quine, he is forced into a position that is susceptible to criticism by 
“metaphysically minded” philosophers.  
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readers will understand the calculi as he intends them to, in accordance with the interpretation 
that seems intuitive to him.37  But Beth argues that if the model of arithmetic the reader finds 
intuitive is non-standard, she will be unable to understand or use Carnap’s syntactic method.  On 
page 113 of Carnap’s book, Beth claims, she will judge the definition of “analytical in II” 
inadmissible and “will no longer be able to follow [his] argument” (1963, 481).38
 Carnap replies by urging Beth to carefully distinguish “models” from “interpretations.”  
He defines a model as an assignment of extensions to all the primitive vocabulary in a language 
and an interpretation as an assignment of meanings to all the signs of the language.
   
39
I always presupposed…that a fixed interpretation of ML, which is shared by all participants, is 
given.  This interpretation is usually not formulated explicitly; but since ML uses English words, it 
is assumed that these words are understood in their ordinary senses.  The necessity of this 
presupposition of a common interpreted metalanguage seems to me obvious.  (BCS, 929-930, my 
emphasis) 
  Any 
reader with a non-standard model of arithmetic must also have a deviant interpretation of our 
numbers.  But for Beth’s objection to go through, such a reader must also interpret the 
metalanguage (ML) in which The Logical Syntax of Language is written (and in particular its 
claims about numbers) in accordance with her deviant interpretation.  Hence, Beth surprises 
Carnap, who writes: 
 
                                                 
37 Beth insists that “it is completely consistent with current word usage to denote [a reader’s] way of understanding 
Carnap’s discussion as an interpretation” (1963, 483) and, furthermore, shows that such usage fits Carnap’s own 
usage of “interpretation” as a translation (LSL, 228).  Beth thinks that each reader interprets Syntax by “translating” 
it into her own intuitive understanding of the topics it discusses.   
38 I am omitting the technical details of Beth’s argument and how it relates to the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem.  For 
critical discussion, see Thomas Ricketts and Warren Goldfarb (1992), Ebbs (1997), and Michael Friedman (1999).     
39 Carnap writes: “an interpretation should not be identified with a model, as is sometimes done.  It is true that an 
interpretation can be given by the specification of a model.  But there is not a one-one correspondence between 
interpretations and models; two different (i.e., not logically equivalent) descriptions of the same model represent two 
different interpretations” (MCS, 902, original emphasis). 
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Carnap reduces Beth’s objection to an “obvious presupposition.”  Of course, someone might 
misunderstand his syntactic project, but so might someone misunderstand any book or 
conversation, if they use a deviant interpretation of natural language.40
 Carnap’s acceptance of  the “necessity” of a “shared,” “fixed interpretation of ML” as a 
“presupposition” of his project fuels a more serious objection.  Although we might identify non-
standard mathematicians in our midst by making our set-theoretic assumptions explicit and 
discovering that theirs differ from ours, there is no reason to think that every difference between 
inquirers’ interpretations will reveal itself in some difference between their dispositions to affirm 
or deny particular sentences.  Moreover, any language in the infinite hierarchy to which inquirers 
using the syntactic method might appeal to reassure themselves that they are interpreting 
expressions in the same way is also subject to questioning, which seems to trap them within an 
infinite regress.
  
41
 To see why, suppose on Monday two physicists, Amy and Ahmed, have a seemingly 
intractable disagreement.  They both read Carnap’s book and pick Language II as the most 
expedient calculus for their goals.
  In my view, Beth’s objection exposes that Carnap is committed to thinking his 
project only promotes communication and cannot guarantee it, an epistemic gap that a skeptic 
can exploit to question whether we ever do, rather than seem, to communicate.  
42
                                                 
40 Carnap gives the example of a reader who understands “no occurrence of x” to mean “at least one occurrence of 
x,” an error which would quickly lead to difficulties (BCS, 930).    
  They now return to their disagreement, carefully explicate 
its terms, run tests to determine which consequences obtain, and resolve their dispute.  Pleased at 
a hard day’s work, they continue their collaborative investigation.  But on Friday, Ahmed uses a 
word that was part of the explicandum of one of the terms of their earlier disagreement in a way 
41 Although both Ricketts and Goldfarb (1992) and Ebbs (1997) reconstruct the force of the Beth objection as an 
infinite regress, I differ from them in thinking that it exposes a difference between the responses Quine and Carnap 
are able to give the skeptic.  
42 Carnap writes that physics can be formulated using a language of the form of II—i.e., one whose transformation 
rules codify the classical logical laws (LSL, 150).  
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that Amy finds baffling.  Experimenting with each other’s linguistic dispositions to various test 
sentences, they discover a subtle difference in their ML-interpretation of the word that they had 
each unwittingly carried over into their conversations using the explicatum.  The difference is 
serious enough to undermine their confidence in the “resolution” of their prior dispute.  Although 
each thought that when using the explicated word during the week they had been successfully 
communicating, they both now realize that they had not been communicating after all.  Each 
failed to understand the thoughts that the other was intending to express, and so, they were 
neither agreeing nor disagreeing.43
 Carnap would accept that Amy and Ahmed have not been communicating all week, but 
he would encourage the physicists not to be unduly alarmed by this hiccup.  There is an 
“inevitable vagueness” to ordinary language (BCS, 930).  Having identified the subtle difference 
in their usage of the problematic word, they can now disambiguate it.  They can then explicate 
each disambiguation, and go on collaborating.
   
44
 But now, suppose that Amy and Ahmed are led by this event to seriously question their 
tacit assumption that they share an interpretation of ML.  This particular disagreement was 
brought to light by the happenstance of Ahmed’s using a word in a way to which Amy objected.  
Now they realize that a dormant disagreement could underlie any part of their language.  
However confident they are that they are communicating, and however productive their mutual 
projects, it is possible that a discovery tomorrow will reveal their speech dispositions to have 
been only accidentally coordinated.  It is even intelligible that such accidental coordination 
  
                                                 
43 Carnap took understanding the thoughts others express to be one of the purposes of linguistic communication: 
“Throughout my life I have been fascinated by the phenomenon of language.  How amazing and how gratifying it is 
that we are capable of communicating with one another by spoken sounds or written marks, to describe facts or 
express thoughts and feelings, to influence the actions of others” (IA, 67, my emphasis).   
44 This advice presumes that Amy and Ahmed did not depend upon the problematic word when arriving at their 
understanding of the consequence relation of their formal language.  If they did, their different usage may reveal that 
they actually want to endorse different formal languages.  In this case, Carnap would advise Amy and Ahmed to 
begin pragmatically defending their choice of formal language until one concedes, or else to part ways.   
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happens globally.  Amy and Ahmed realize that they could syntactically investigate their ML 
using a meta-metalanguage (MML) and run empirical tests to ascertain each other’s speech 
dispositions to particular cases; but since they may interpret MML differently, this will not be 
definitive.  Desolate, Amy and Ahmed conclude that they will forever lack certain knowledge 
that they are communicating, as opposed to merely seeming to.45
 Ebbs has argued that Carnap might respond to this objection by insisting that inquirers 
achieve the clearest purchase possible on their inquiry’s argumentative structure by explicitly 
choosing a formal language (1997, 124-125).  Syntactic investigation is the best method 
available for inquirers to certify that they are agreeing.  Although it is necessary to presuppose 
that inquirers share a fixed interpretation of the ML to begin syntactic investigation, the meaning 
of “agreement” is only fixed once this investigation has been completed.  Amy and Ahmed 
should recognize the consequence relation of their chosen formal language as the baseline of 
their communication.   
 
 Ebbs also contends that Carnap would think it a “confusion” to talk of an “implicit 
interpretation of the metalanguages of pure semantics” (1997, 123)—but, as evinced by the 
above quote from his response to Beth, Carnap himself acknowledges that a “fixed interpretation 
of ML” is a “necessary presupposition” for applying his syntactic method.  In a move resembling 
Quine’s to the radical skeptic, Ebbs would have Carnap denying Amy and Ahmed the ground 
upon which to phrase their challenge: “there is no higher or firmer perspective from which to 
question whether investigators ‘really’ share the metalanguages whose expressions they find 
clear [than those shared metalanguages]” (124).   
                                                 
45 We may well counsel Amy and Ahmed to be optimistic.  After all, they have had only one disagreement thus far, 
the supposed accidental coordination would be an astonishing fluke, and so on.  But Amy and Ahmed need not find 
any of these considerations compelling.  If communication names the purported ability to express one’s private 
thoughts to another mind using the medium of language, then one may intelligibly doubt that it ever succeeds.  
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 But the analogy between Carnap and Quine fails.  Without any promise of certainty that 
they are communicating, Amy and Ahmed may skeptically refuse to take Carnap’s optimism 
seriously.  Since it is part of Carnap’s view that genuine communication between inquirers 
requires them to share an interpretation of their language, so that each can grasp what the other 
intends to express, he is forced to acknowledge Amy’s and Ahmed’s failure to communicate as 
an intelligible possibility, rendering their skeptical doubt cogent.  
 In contrast, by naturalizing the ingredients of epistemology, Quine renders various radical 
skeptical positions—including Amy’s and Ahmed’s doubts—unintelligible.46  He develops his 
account of language acquisition and use to further his argument against the analytic/synthetic 
distinction.47
                                                 
46 On the surface, Quine’s claim that we overcome skeptical doubts about ontology by “acquiescing in the home 
language” seems to parallel Carnap’s that we must assume “a fixed interpretation of ML” to apply the syntactic 
method.  But Quine’s naturalized, extensional understanding of what it is to share a home language removes the 
intensional vocabulary that Carnap’s “interpretation” leaves in the picture.  The force of Quine’s view is not just that 
there is no higher or firmer ground from which to question ontology than our home language, but that once 
naturalists properly understand what questioning ontology amounts to, they can no longer phrase radical skeptical 
doubts about it.  Under Carnap’s view, Amy and Ahmed can do so.  I will return to Quine’s ontological relativity in 
the next section. 
  Prior to Word and Object, Quine’s positive attack against the distinction focused 
upon its vagueness.  In formally constructing a language, one may (as Carnap does) label some 
truths “analytic,” but unless “analyticity” tracks a property that exists outside the language, 
Quine objects that the label is arbitrary.  Analytic truths may be informally described as those 
expressions that are synonymous with logical truths, but this just shifts the explanatory burden 
onto the relation of synonymy.  One might attempt to define “synonymy” as holding between 
47 One might object that Carnap is closer to Quine than I am suggesting since, if pressed, he would try to explain 
language use in behaviorist terms.  But Carnap’s forays into descriptive semantics, as I mention below, are crude, 
and his proposed behaviorist basis for attributing intensional attitudes is contentious.  In fact, he seems to think that 
“understanding” can be made precise by making a semantic, non-behaviorist appeal to “interpretation” (which, I 
have been arguing, relies upon a shared understanding of the language in which the interpretation is given).  In 
discussing the electric field vector “E” in Maxwell’s equations, he writes that “we understand ‘E,’ if ‘understanding’ 
of an expression, a sentence, or a theory means capability of its use for the description of known facts or the 
prediction of new facts,” once we are given “an interpretation for ‘E’…indirectly by semantical rules referring to 
elementary signs together with the formulas connecting them with ‘E’” (FLM, 68-69).  In future work, I hope to 
build on the reading of Carnapian explication I offer below to argue that Carnap is unable to provide a full 
behaviorist explication of “understanding” which avoids relying on “interpretation” and is robust enough to ground 
his account of analytic truths as those which can be determined true once they are understood (QLT, 916).    
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any expressions that possess the same “meaning,” or that express the same “proposition,” noting 
that a dictionary can be used to locate the meaning of an expression and a thesaurus to locate 
words with synonymous meanings.  But Quine responds that dictionaries do not imbue words 
with meanings.  They only report the meanings that words are taken to have by compilers.  
Likewise, thesauruses do not ground synonymy, but presuppose it.   
 For Quine, the problem is not just that “synonymy” is opaque.  The problem is that it is 
scientifically unnecessary—and so naturalistically inadmissible—to posit “meanings” to account 
for language use.  Reference is behaviorally inscrutable; it is logical theory, not language use, 
that requires precise semantic notions.  But the purely extensional notions of “truth” and 
“reference” suffice for logic, and so—given logic’s canonicity—for scientific inquiry.  Thus, 
Quine advises ejecting a slew of inter-definable, but scientifically mysterious terms from 
naturalist philosophy.  “Meanings,” “intensions,” “necessary,” “analytic,” “synthetic,” and 
“propositions” are to be removed or replaced with extensional analogues as needed.48
 To justify this purge, Quine needs to provide an adequate extensional account of 
language and to explain why our practice of using dictionaries and thesauruses does not ground a 
naturalistically admissible notion of synonymy.  For even granting that dictionaries do not imbue 
words with meanings, if language users learn from their early education (supplemented by an 
occasional glance at a dictionary or a thesaurus) that two terms can be used interchangeably, this 
    
                                                 
48 Quine justifies his career-long partiality for extensional theories on the basis that he “doubt[s] that [he has] ever 
fully understood anything that [he] could not explain in extensional language” (500).  Concepts that are defined 
extensionally, by isolating the class of objects of which they are true, can be straightforwardly manipulated in 
logical derivations.  In contrast, concepts that are defined intensionally, as “properties,” are not usually determined 
by their instances, and so, “lack…clear principle[s] of individuation” (500, original emphasis).  Allowing intensions 
has the effect of admitting vagueness into our theories, creating space for systematic confusion between inquirers 
who tacitly disagree about the “meaning” of their concepts.  Quine refuses to accept these consequences, insisting 
upon the “clarity and convenience conferred by extensionality” (498).  The sole exception is Quine’s acceptance of 
Davidson’s anomalous monism.  Quine allows the ascription to others of propositional attitudes, since their 
“applicability is outwardly observable enough for practical utility” (quoted in Dreben 2004, 291).  Nevertheless, 
Quine views the ascription of mental “entities” to others lying behind these attitudes, in anything stronger than the 
physicalistic terms of hypothetical states of their nervous system, as scientifically illegitimate (R, 296).   
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fact will be reliably reflected in their observable speech behavior.  So what prevents the 
behaviorist (and naturalistically acceptable) definition of two expressions being synonymous if 
speakers possess identical dispositions to use them in speech?   
 In Word and Object, Quine aims to meet both obligations by arguing for the 
indeterminacy of translation.  He argues that if two people are disposed to use an expression in 
the same way, it does not entail that that expression has the same meaning for them.49
 Despite first appearances, the indeterminacy of translation does not undermine language 
use.  But it does question folk wisdom about what constitutes successful communication.  We 
saw in section one that Quine’s radical translator approaches the natives’ linguistic behavior as a 
phenomenon to be explained.   One explanation of the usefulness of such behavior to the natives 
will be provided if she develops a theory of translation for it in terms of her own language.  Since 
the language is unlike any she knows, she does not bring any pre-theoretic assumptions.
  There are 
numerous equally acceptable but mutually incompatible ways to translate another’s speech 
behavior.  There is no fact of the matter about the correct translation of another’s utterance, and 
likewise, no fact of the matter about the meaning of an expression in natural language.  
Consequently—and surprisingly—“synonymy” is unnecessary to explain the success of 
translation.  
50
                                                 
49 Nor will an individual be disposed to use two expressions thought synonymous in just the same way: for example, 
if asked for a single word referring to a man who has never married, a person will be disposed to answer “bachelor” 
and not “unmarried man” (WO, 46).  
  Her 
experimental approach is naturalistically admirable.  Quine thinks philosophers of language 
should similarly leave behind their pre-theoretic assumptions.  If we consider a human language 
naturalistically, it is just a system of noises that some portion of the population register as 
50 Even her tacit hypothesis that the natives are speaking a language is revisable.  If she can find no entering wedge 
into their utterance patterns, and sustained observation reveals that the native sounds merely accompany and do not 
further native endeavors, she may find an alternative explanation for the phenomenon: the natives are not language 
users after all.   
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meaningful.  But “meaningfulness” need not be cashed out in terms of individual noises 
possessing individual meanings.  Posits like “meanings” are only legitimate if they are demanded 
by our ongoing theory, striving as it does to be economical.  We must keep in view that the basic 
phenomenon a naturalist theory of human language seeks to explain (despite the intensional 
rhetoric of working psycholinguists) is the genesis and continuation of our system of meaningful 
noises: how is it that each of us can listen to noises other speakers make and respond with noises 
of our own, in a coordinated way that furthers shared projects?51
 This marks a crucial difference between Carnap and Quine.  Quine had objected that 
Carnap’s syntactic project was either a method for establishing the logical truths in syntactically 
given languages, or a method for codifying the logical truths recognized in natural languages 
already in use (TC, 97-99).  But if the former it was question-begging, since “logic is needed for 
inferring logic from the conventions” (97).  And if the latter, Carnap needed to supplement his 
theory with an account of how the formal language a person used could be read from her 
behavior.  Yet we have seen in contrast that Carnap conceived of his project as explicative.  He 
thought speakers of a natural language could use a formal language to replace their unclear 
discussions whenever necessary.  There need not be clear correlates in natural language for the 
precise formal terms in which inquirers carry out their discussion (indeed, if their natural 
language had such precise terms, their dispute would probably have been resolvable without 
recourse to the syntactic method).
   
52
                                                 
51 Quine’s naturalist attitude to phenomena requiring explanation even extends to his self-understanding.  He is a 
phenomenon that science can explain: “Light rays strike my retinas; molecules bombard my eardrums and 
fingertips.  I strike back, emanating concentric air waves.  These waves take the form of a torrent of discourse…my 
ability to strike back in this elaborate way consists in my having assimilated a good part of the culture of my 
community…all this training consisted in turn of an impinging of physical forces, largely other people’s utterances, 
upon my surface, and of gradual changes in my own constitution consequent upon these physical forces” (SLS, 
215).   
  In endorsing a formal language, inquirers are not “inferring” 
52 Carnap writes of explications that “[t]he explicatum [might] not belong to the ordinary language originally, but 
[be] introduced as a scientific term” (SLM, 935-936).  
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logical truth by “establishing” the conventions they will adopt.  Nor are they “codifying” the 
logical truths to which they are committed in natural language, so that their speech behavior acts 
as a criterion of correctness for putative codifications.  Instead, their choice of calculus explicates 
and replaces whatever prior, vague conception of logical truth they had.53
 Quine rejects this “explicative” project as disguised first philosophy.  Although he praises 
Carnap for recognizing that one should not judge a putative explication by evaluating whether its 
explicatum captures the meaning of the explicandum but, rather, by whether its explicatum can 
be used instead of the explicandum (WO, 259), their understanding of explication, and of 
“usefulness” as a criterion for judging them importantly differs.   
  
 Quine’s paradigm for explication is the ordered pair.  Inquirers saw the value of treating 
pairs of objects as single objects in derivations, but were strictly speaking unable to do so (since 
the noun “ordered pair” failed to refer to an object, and so, an ordered pair could not occur as the 
value of a first order variable).  Although various formally legitimate definitions for the noun 
were proposed, Kazimierz Kuratowski’s was eventually adopted, not as the correct or true 
definition of “ordered pair,” but as the one most helpful for subsequent inquiry.54
 Carnap has a more liberal account of explication.  He treats replacements that purport to 
sharpen the boundaries of concepts as explications, as when he claims “piscis” as the scientific 
explication of “fish” (LFP, 6).  Such explications are useful, he argues, because concepts whose 
  Quine thus 
evaluates the usefulness of an explication in terms of its role in enabling desired derivations 
within canonical notation.   
                                                 
53 As Ricketts puts it, for Carnap “linguistic behavior is, so to speak, in itself logically amorphous” (2004, 193).  
Inquirers only fix the logic of their ordinary discourse by explicitly choosing a formal language. 
54 Kuratowski defines the ordered pair <x, y> as the set {{x}, {x,y}} (1921).  This definition has the virtue of 
remaining within the domain of the ordered pair’s elements. 
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correct application are clear in some cases but unclear in others become replaced with concepts 
whose correct applications are always clear (7).55
 That Quine’s paradigm case for explication concerns a noun (while Carnap explicates 
concepts) does not merely display Quine’s preference for the extensional.  Rather, Quine’s 
naturalism imposes a restriction upon explication.  In his view, explication is only legitimate 
when inquirers have discovered a “defective noun” (257) that they wish to use in derivations, but 
for which they have yet to develop the needed formal expression.
   
56  In this strong sense, 
scientific inquiry issues the demand for, and imposes the formal constraints upon, the naturalist 
philosopher’s explications.  But the motivation for Carnap’s proposal to explicate concepts by 
imposing conventions about their correct use is less clear, and, in some cases, doing so allows 
extraneous philosophical assumptions and distinctions—such as the core idea in Carnap’s 
syntactic method that some truths are “analytic”—to infect scientific theory.57
                                                 
55 Joseph Hanna credits Abraham Kaplan with distinguishing between internally vague terms that require us to 
“[find or construct] objects which serve the desired functions,” and so warrant Quinean explication, and externally 
vague terms which neither obviously include nor exclude certain objects, and so warrant Carnapian explication 
(1968, 35).  Hanna argues that Quine and Carnap both failed to distinguish between these two types of explication. 
  As Daniel 
Isaacson astutely observes, “Whereas Carnap sees formal syntax as constitutive of meaning, for 
Quine a formal system must be a formalization of some already meaningful discourse” (1992, 
56 Quine writes that useful nouns which fail to refer are also defective, such as “frictionless surface” (WO, 249).  He 
dismisses these “as irreferential fragment[s] of a few containing phrases” (257). 
57 Richard Creath has recently suggested that Quine’s late acceptance of “externalized analyticity” as applying to 
those “sentence[s]…[one] learn[s] to assent to…by learning one or more of [their] words” (PT, 55) constitutes an 
empirical criterion for logical truth, thus rendering legitimate Carnap’s proposal for explicating analyticity in terms 
of those sentences “true in virtue of meaning” (2004b, 59-60).  Creath’s idea is that since Quine finds some 
analytic/synthetic distinction intelligible, he can no longer object that Carnap’s preferred explication of the 
distinction is unintelligible in virtue of it having no clear explicandum in natural language.  But Quine is explicit that 
his criterion “gives no clue to the demarcation between analytic and synthetic sentences that has exercised 
philosophers, out beyond where anyone either remembers or cares how he learned the pertinent words” (PT, 55); he 
is introducing “analyticity” as a predicate applying to a subset of a speaker’s sentences—those constructed from a 
core set of words which the speaker can recall learning—in order to do some “justice to the intuitive notion of 
tautology,”  “the notion that comes into play when we protest that someone’s assertion comes down to “0=0” and is 
an empty matter of words” (55).  Quine remains convinced that “analyticity” lacks an explicandum in natural 
language.  This is the heart of his objection to the distinction.  He accepts its heuristic value (RHB, 93-94).  But its 
philosophical utility is insufficient justification for misrepresenting some truths as privileged within one’s scientific 
theory, true “in virtue of meaning,” and (in some sense) beyond repute.   
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125, original emphasis).58
 The restriction that naturalist philosophers must only follow the demands arising from 
scientific practice is the reason that Quine thinks the naturalized philosopher of language stands 
to learn from the figure of the radical translator, and, in particular, her presuppositionless 
investigation of native linguistic behavior.  Radical translation reveals which assumptions are 
needed to explain the meaningfulness of a language to its users.  Quine argues that positing “the 
meaning” of native sentences like “Gavagai” is not demanded.  All that matters is that the 
manual can be used to  further shared projects between translator and natives.  For example, 
being able to reliably garner assent when she utters “Gavagai” to natives in the presence of 
rabbits will allow them to quickly decide about the choice of prey on hunting trips.  In practice, 
the radical translator would come to favor a translation of “Gavagai” as “rabbit” for simplicity, 
and may informally express this by saying that the two words are “synonymous,” or have the 
same “meaning.”  But this translation is just her (sensible) preference as a manual-maker and has 
no claim to being the actual translation of the native word.  She could just as well have adopted a 
  Carnap, that is, takes scientific theories to eventually be semantically 
grounded by, and in, the formal languages that his syntactic method allows inquirers to construct.  
He sees no problem in “explicating” some theory by introducing formal distinctions that sharpen 
its terms.  But Quine inverts the semantic dependence, insisting that the purpose of canonical 
notation is only to clarify theories which are semantically grounded in scientific practice.  He 
only allows “explications” to refine meaningful scientific inquiry and refuses to press upon 
theories conventions, novel terms, or distinctions that they do not require.  
                                                 
58 Incidentally, I conjecture that this difference explains Carnap’s fascination with, and Quine’s total lack of interest 
in, an “international language” like Esperanto.  For Carnap, an artificial universal language was an exciting proposal 
for international scientific communication (IA, 69).  For Quine (who was always interested in learning new natural 
languages, speaking German, French, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian fluently), Esperanto represented a basic 
mistake (Q, 10).  The terms of such a language fail to explicate any precisely agreed upon explicandum (c.f. 
Carnap’s freewheeling use of “Western culture” as the explicandum for a universal European language [IA, 70]).  
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manual in which “Gavagai” was translated as “undetached rabbit-part,” since “[t]he only overall 
test for a good manual of translation [is] fluent dialogue and successful negotiation” (quoted in 
Dreben 2004, 289). 
  Quine thinks that the naturalist philosopher of language should acknowledge that these 
considerations apply generally: “radical translation begins at home” (OR, 46).  Like Amy and 
Ahmed, we typically adopt a simple homophonic translation when talking to each other.  If faced 
with disconfirming behavioral evidence, we reject our homophonic hypothesis and speculate that 
our interlocutor is using a word or some words differently.  But just as the radical translator’s 
preference for simplicity was no ground for supposing the existence of a “correct” translation of 
the natives, so too have we no ground for thinking that there is a “meaning” onto which we have 
latched in our preference for homophonic translation.  Homophonic translation is acceptable 
because it accords with the behavioral evidence we have of each other’s speech dispositions, and 
it allows us, ceteris paribus, to co-ordinate our activities in pursuit of mutually held goals; but 
other manuals could do this equally well.59
 Quine concludes that loose intensional talk is naturalistically unprincipled.  Despite 
purporting to share Quine’s behaviorist scruples when investigating languages in use (TM, 454), 
Carnap’s toy accounts of descriptive semantics are wildly optimistic about the sort of intensional 
  
                                                 
59 Quine was forced to repeatedly emphasize that the indeterminacy of translation in no way impugns interlinguistic 
dictionaries which are (legitimately) created to be as simple as possible for convenience (OR 34; PT 48-49; RJW, 
728).  Nevertheless, commentators still miss Quine’s point.  Hans Glock, for example, after emphasizing that Quine 
must view the translator’s early identification of native assent and dissent as a hypothesis, writes: 
 
if there is no fact of the matter as to whether ‘gavagai’ refers to rabbits, then, by parity of reason, 
there is no fact of the matter as to whether the native assents to or dissents from the translator’s 
‘gavagai’.  Within Quine’s framework, that would remove the possibility of translating anything. 
(2003, 180, original emphasis)   
 
But, Quine can accept that the translator’s identification of assent and dissent in the native tongue is an analytic 
hypothesis that is, strictly speaking, indeterminate while maintaining that translation is possible, since his point is 
that any successful translation manual goes beyond the observable evidence available to the behaviorist empiricist 
(R, 312).  In Quine’s view, as we saw in section one, even the translation of truth functional logic is indeterminate 
(R, 317-318).  
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features behaviorists can observe.60  From Quine’s perspective, Carnap’s claims that disputants 
can endorse “mutually understood” formal languages given their “ordinary interpretation” of 
ML, in which they can agree upon the “meaning” of inviolable “analytic” rules, is first 
philosophy laced with intensional fiction.61
 Quine’s conception of communication excises Amy’s and Ahmed’s skeptical doubt.  
Carnap’s syntactic method allowed them to worry that despite their apparent agreements and 
  Having shown intensional vocabulary extraneous to 
his naturalized theory of language, Quine denies that “successful communication” is a matter of 
successfully grasping the “thoughts” one’s interlocutor is trying to express.   Instead, he provides 
a behaviorist ersatz for communication as constituted by the lack of breakdown in our 
conversation when we engage in shared projects: “Folk wisdom has it that we communicate 
successfully because our sentences mean alike for us…we now see rather that meaning alike for 
us merely means, if anything, that we are communicating successfully” (quoted in Dreben 1992, 
305).   
                                                 
60 Carnap imagines “[a] certain lake in [the native] country, which has no name in English, is usually called ‘titisee’.  
When using this name, the people often think of plenty of fish and good meals” (FLM, 5, my emphasis).  Carnap 
leaves mysterious what entitles the behaviorist to describe the native’s thoughts. 
61 Carnap makes the claim that speakers of a natural language share a more or less fixed “ordinary” interpretation 
later in his response to Beth.  Beth had described the strict usage of natural language as uses where speakers “refer 
to a definite model of the theory to which [their] statements belong” (1963, 479).   Perceiving vagueness in this 
description, Carnap explicates it:  
 
I assume that the strict usage of ordinary language is meant to be the usage based on a fixed 
interpretation, presumably in such a way that the words are understood in their ordinary 
meanings…if my above interpretation of the term “strict usage” is correct, then Beth’s thesis says 
that it is essential for the purposes of my theory that the English words of my metalanguage ML 
are sometimes used with a fixed interpretation.  I emphatically agree; I would even say that this is 
the case not only sometimes but practically always.” (BCS, 930, my emphasis).   
 
Carnap thinks it necessary for his readers to share his “model” and “interpretation” of ML if they are to understand 
him.  But Quine’s thesis of ontological relativity entails that “it is…meaningless within the theory to say which of 
the various possible models of our theory form is our real or intended model” (OR, 54, my emphasis).  Quine does 
not say that it is difficult to identify or specify our real model, given the “inevitable vagueness and ambiguity of 
ordinary words” that Carnap himself goes on to mention in his response to Beth (BCS, 930).  Rather, it is 
meaningless to say that our theory has a “real” or “intended” model, because ontology is intelligible only with 
respect to a manual for translation.  For Quine, Beth’s notion that there is such a thing as “strict usage” of natural 
language is more intensional fiction. 
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disagreements, they were nevertheless failing to communicate in virtue of interpreting ML 
differently.  But once the physicists reorient themselves naturalistically, they ought to realize that 
the case worrying them—that they are only seeming to communicate while actually talking past 
each other—is not intelligible.  Communicating just is seeming to communicate in virtue of 
engaging in productive shared projects and being able to predict how each other will vocally 
react to stimuli in the environment.62
 But in so approaching language naturalistically, do we lose something important?  Just as 
Stroud accuses Quine of changing the subject in naturalizing epistemology, one might think that 
Quine merely changes the subject by naturalizing our theory of language.  Although Quine was 
dismayed that the intensional had become “addictive” for Carnap in his late turn to semantics 
(TDR, 56), many philosophers view Quine’s own resolute extensionalism to be an unappealing 
(and ultimately unmotivated) extremism.  Might rejecting meanings from our theory be too 
difficult a pill to swallow?  We are typically confident, for example, that we know exactly what 
our close friends mean by a pointed phrase.  Is the pared down naturalist ersatz that we are just 
better at predicting friends’ speech behavior adequate to capture our lived experience as 
language users?  Faced with the choice between either excising skepticism about communication 
with Quine or accepting Carnap’s explication that humans strive to know each other’s thoughts 
  If their shared project falters on Friday, Amy and Ahmed 
ought not conclude, with Carnap, that the hiccup reveals they have not been communicating all 
week (but can now use his syntactic method to try once again to do so).  Instead, with Quine, 
they should revise their translation manuals for each other so as to continue successfully 
communicating.  
                                                 
62 Quine compares language users to topiary bushes (WO, 8).  Despite being composed of a unique array of branches 
(i.e., despite inquirers having unique cognitive makeups and so intricately differing conceptual schemes) each has an 
identical shape (i.e., there is a parity between their dispositions to responsively utter, which constitutes the ability to 
converse). 
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while always lacking certain knowledge that they understand each other, Carnap’s view may still 
tempt.   
 One way of turning this lingering dissatisfaction into an argument is to claim that the 
naturalist approach to language is incapable of capturing some feature of our linguistic 
discourse, as Gary Ebbs has recently done.  In the next section, I will develop a response on 
Quine’s behalf to Ebbs’ objection, along these lines, that naturalism cannot account for our 
dispute-resolving practices. 
  
4.  Gary Ebbs and Skepticism About The Use of Our Words 
 
There is no fact of the matter of our interpreting any man’s ontology in one way 
or…in another.  Any man’s, that is to say, except ourselves. (TTPT, 23) 
 
 In Rule-Following and Realism, Ebbs aims “to loosen the hold of [naturalism]” by 
“develop[ing] a different way of looking at our linguistic practices” (1997, 1).  From our 
perspective as participants using language, Ebbs claims, we see that naturalism cannot account 
for our dispute-resolving practices, because it mischaracterizes the norms that govern our 
linguistic behavior.  Since we can “use [the participant perspective] to criticize and 
reject…Quine’s skepticism about meaning” (92), Ebbs characterizes Quine’s naturalism as 
“mistaken” (4).63
                                                 
63 I admire Ebbs’ book, particularly his recognition that philosophical disputes about logic, objectivity and 
intelligibility are shaped by metaphilosophical, methodological disputes.  But I believe him wrong to say that 
“[w]orries about philosophical relativism evaporate…when we see that some ways of looking at things are better 
than others, and that we can do no better than to occupy some standpoint or other, the best one we can articulate at 
the time” (90).  Ebbs seeks to replace naturalism with a “better” participant picture—“better” because it does not 
“prevent us from properly describing our linguistic practices” (65).  But in my view, no single way of looking at 
things is “best,” or “better” for all of our philosophical inquiries into language.  So I do not think that Quine’s 
naturalism is “mistaken,” but rather that some mistakenly take it to be the sole picture available.  I should like to say 
that worries about philosophical relativism evaporate when we see that some ways of looking at this thing are better 
than others, and that we may legitimately choose the best standpoint we can currently articulate for our current 
purposes.  I will return to this point, and how my methodological position contrasts with Ebbs’, in chapter four.  
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 Normativity is a divisive issue between naturalists and their opponents.  The point that 
Ebbs wants to press against Quine parallels the one that John McDowell wants to press against 
Crispin Wright’s account of rule-following (1984, 335-336).  According to McDowell, Wright’s 
conception of language fails to adequately capture normativity:  
[T]here is nothing but verbal behavior and (no doubt) feelings of constraint.  Presumably people’s 
dispositions to behavior and associated feelings match in interesting ways; but at this ground-floor 
level there is no question of shared commitments—everything normative fades out of the picture. 
(341)  
  
Since Ebbs explicitly engages Quine’s texts, I will focus upon him in this section, and argue that 
his is an instructive misreading of Quine.  Quine’s naturalist conception of our “home” language 
can adequately account for the practices that worry Ebbs.  Moreover, viewing our disputes 
naturalistically excises a third avenue of skeptical doubt.  By exposing Ebbs’ mistake, we can 
reconstruct Quine’s account of normativity and rational inquiry, despite his rejection of Frege’s 
constitutive view of the relationship between logic and cognition.  This work suggests that 
Wright could similarly rebuff McDowell. 
 Ebbs interprets Quine’s conception of language as fundamentally “idiolectical.”  We saw 
in section three that naturalism reduces “communication” between inquirers to their use of a 
system of noises to pursue shared projects.  Inquirers who have the ability to communicate with 
each other approximately share their linguistic dispositions.  The approximation precludes a 
precise definition of when two speakers “share” a language.  “We must keep in mind,” Ebbs 
concludes, that “for Quine a speaker’s ‘language’ consists in his ‘present dispositions to verbal 
behavior’ (WO, 27)” (1997, 55).  Ebbs proceeds to reconstruct Quine’s arguments making this 
idiolectical conception explicit.  
 An important example is Ebbs’ interpretation of ontological relativity.  Quine famously 
argues that the indeterminacy of translation makes reference inscrutable.  We typically translate 
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each other homophonically, taking others to be referring to the referents of our own expressions.  
But, workable translation manuals could be designed that use “proxy functions” to permute each 
of our objects and general terms onto proxies (OR, 55-58).  We would still have the capacity to 
engage in smooth dialogue with others whom we translated as systematically referring to proxies 
of our own referents.64
 However, Quine recognizes that this may render our own capacity to refer dubitable: 
  Quine concludes that there is no fact of the matter about another’s 
ontology; ontology is not absolute, but relative to a manual of translation (53).   
we seem to be maneuvering ourselves into the absurd position that there is no 
difference…between referring to rabbits and referring to rabbit parts or stages…Reference would 
seems now to become nonsense not just in radical translation but at home. (OR, 47-48) 
 
The worry is that we can apply proxy functions to our own utterances just as easily as to others’.  
Quine elsewhere notes that we each endorse disquotational instances of referential paradigms, 
sentences where we use the same sentences, adjectives, and names respectively to fill each blank  
(NTR, 134): 
 ‘_________’ is true if and only if ________.  
 ‘_________’ is true of every ______ thing and nothing else. 
 ‘_________’ names  ________ and nothing else. 
 
The obviousness of instances of these paradigms demonstrate their centrality to our web of 
belief, and clarify how “truth” and “reference” apply in our language.  But once we acknowledge 
that objects in our ontology can be mapped onto proxies specified by a proxy function, then we 
can generate a set of deviant, proxy instances of these paradigms that also preserve all of our 
speech dispositions.65
                                                 
64 Suppose our proxy function maps objects in our ontology to space-time regions n miles to their west, and we 
construct proxy predicates P* for each of our predicates P that are true of exactly the space-time region proxies that 
are n miles to the west of those objects of which our predicates are true.  Then when you use the words I use to refer 
to objects, I may translate you as referring to their space-time proxies, while nevertheless continuing to successfully 
engage in shared projects with you. 
  Now we may panic: when I use a name, do I really name the object I 
65 To continue the example from the previous footnote, one instance of the third paradigm will be: “‘rabbit’ names 
every space-time region n miles to the west of a rabbit and nothing else.” 
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think I do, or only its proxy?  I cannot be naming both, since objects are not their proxies, so a 
single name cannot name both a given object and its proxy and nothing else.  But there seems to 
be nothing in virtue of which I count as referring to an object rather than its proxy.  My belief 
that I endorse disquotational instances of the referential paradigms cannot suffice, because if my 
words do not refer as I think they do, then what seems like a disquotational instance to me may 
actually refer to a proxy.  But on the other hand, it is surely absurd that I cannot distinguish 
objects from proxies, because I must be referring to them separately when talking about them.   
 Quine suggests we overcome this panic “in practice” by “acquiescing in our mother 
tongue and taking its words at face value” (OR, 49); i.e., we take our words to have their 
disquotational referents.  But he does not intend this as pragmatic advice for resisting a genuine 
semantic problem.  Rather, he believes that there is no problem once we view matters 
naturalistically.  Naturalists acknowledge that our own ontology is not intelligible absolutely, but 
only against the backdrop of our language and our ongoing theory.  We may “acquiesce” about 
the disquotational reference of terms in our language because we use that language (and its tacit 
disquotational referents) to construct both the proxy and disquotational instances of the 
referential paradigms in which we merely mention the expressions of our language.  Our practice 
is prior to the semantic theory we develop for our practice; use is prior to mention.  So, despite 
the inscrutability of reference, speaking from within our language, we can use our words to 
successfully make assertions about the things to which we are referring.  And there is no position 
of “cosmic exile” beyond our language, or outside of our theory, which we can occupy to 
question to what our words absolutely refer (WO, 275).  
 Ebbs interprets Quine here to be making a claim about each individual’s idiolect.  Each of 
us must tacitly choose a disquotational translation manual for our own idiolect before we “can 
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use our words to state a reference scheme for our own idiolect” (1997, 58).  So Ebbs thinks that 
the shared “mother tongue” in which Quine says inquirers acquiesce is ultimately rhetorical 
flourish.  Strictly speaking, Ebbs’ Quine holds that each inquirer acquiesces in her own private 
idiolect to questions about ontology.  Furthermore, it is only from within her private idiolect that 
each inquirer can make assertions.   
 Ebbs thinks that this idiolectical conception of assertion cannot account for our dispute-
resolving practices.  He complains that “in the glare created by Quine’s behavioristic picture of 
language use all ordinary talk of meaning looks flimsy and insecure” (62).  But Ebbs insists, 
contra Quine, that philosophers of language are not scientists observing a mysterious alien 
practice.  They participate in the very practice they seek to elucidate.  Once we adopt the 
participant perspective, Ebbs thinks that “there is no good reason to accept Quine’s…thesis that 
between any two speakers there are countless radically different ‘translations’ that capture all 
that is objective to meaning” (172).  Rather, we see that the shared norms governing our practice 
are the objective ground of our talk of “meaning.”  
 To defend this claim, Ebbs compares discussions of our practice of using language to 
discussions of our practice of dancing.66
                                                 
66 This analogy is originally R.M. Hare’s (1992).  
  Suppose that some people discuss a Scottish dance, the 
eightsome reel, over dinner.  They each learnt how to dance it as children, but now cannot 
remember one of its steps.  They resolve to dance the reel together after pudding.  In one case, 
the diners reach the forgotten step and smoothly continue dancing.  They can retroactively 
describe their activity and each feel confident that this description describes how the eightsome 
reel is danced.  In another case, the diners fall out of step with each other at the key moment.  
Perhaps some of the diners now try to persuade the others that they know how the dance is 
correctly danced.  If the group is persuaded, then this case proceeds as the last.  In both cases, 
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since “the eightsome reel” had a meaning for the diners prior to their dance, their dancing counts 
as clarifying its meaning and their description is a normative characterization of how the 
eightsome reel is danced.67
 Ebbs takes the point of his story to be that “if we are to understand the dispute and its 
resolution, we cannot restrict ourselves to descriptions available to someone who is unable to 
recognize or participate in performances of the eightsome reel” (249).  For if a group of 
anthropologists unfamiliar with the eightsome reel were to witness the dancers’ dispute and 
describe their post-dinner activity and resolution, they would only be able to conclude that the 
dancers have agreed to call this activity “the eightsome reel.”  Since there is no meaning to “the 
eightsome reel” for the anthropologists prior to their observation of the dancers, their 
characterization of the dance is limited to a non-normative description of what they have 
observed.   
 
 Ebbs compares having an idiolectical conception of language to approaching the dancing 
diners like an anthropologist.  In his view, naturalists cannot give normative characterizations of 
how language is to be used, but only descriptive characterizations of how those whom they 
observe are disposed to use language.  These descriptive characterizations are really phrased in 
each naturalist’s unique idiolect, and so, constitute part of an individual’s linguistic theory of 
other speakers.  If two anthropologists arrive at different descriptions of the dancers, each is 
entitled to hold her own description correct, so long as it fits the behavior she has observed.  
Similarly, if two naturalists arrive at different descriptions of how language is used, they may 
each hold their own theory correct.  Just as the anthropologists “miss an important aspect of the 
                                                 
67 The remaining case of unresolved dispute, where the group is not persuaded about how to dance the dance, does 
not concern us here.    
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practices they observe” (308)—namely, what activity the eightsome reel is—Ebbs charges the 
naturalist with failing to recognize that  
the agreements and disagreements that we express in our everyday and scientific inquiries are 
rooted in our shared practical ability to make archetypical applications of our words, and in our 
commitment to resolve disputes about the conditions for properly applying our words by appealing 
in part to that shared practical ability. (309, my emphasis.) 
  
Ebbs concludes that philosophers of language must occupy a participant perspective if they are to 
properly account for our practice of resolving disputes together.  We do not create individual 
theories of other’s acceptable language use.  The labor of acceptable language use is rather 
divided between all speakers (308).  We hold ourselves accountable to each other, not merely to 
the data that we have each collected.    
 But this objection will not convince the naturalist.  Ebbs tells us that the diners learnt the 
eightsome reel as children.  But the naturalist should ask what justifies the diners’ tacit 
assumption that there was a single dance that they learned, which they have now correctly 
“clarified” and described.  How do the diners know that their instructors did not teach them 
different dances?  How do they know that the eightsome reel does not have variations?   
 Ebbs will reply that the normative characterization at which the dancers arrive is fallible.  
He will admit that they may be mistaken about the eightsome reel, despite their current 
agreement.  But the naturalist will now ask what “correctness” for the dancers amounts to if their 
current description can be “mistaken.”  Although the dancers can undertake further investigation 
to increase their confidence in their assumption that there is a single dance which they are 
characterizing (perhaps by talking to their old teachers or consulting independent sources which 
describe Scottish reels), they can never be certain.  And, once again, a skeptic can exploit this 
epistemic gap to doubt the diners’ putative normative characterization of the dance.  However 
confident the dancers feel that this is the eightsome reel, they do not know it is—nor even that 
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there is a single dance to be known.  Stepping back from the analogy, so long as philosophers of 
language occupy the participant perspective and assume that each word of a language possesses 
a meaning, and that through discussion with other competent language users we can arrive at 
fallible normative characterizations of these meanings, there is room to skeptically doubt that 
speakers know what their words mean.  
 By denying that our words have meanings to which our descriptions of language use are 
accountable, Quine excises these skeptical doubts.  He thinks our theoretical descriptions of 
language use are only accountable to the scientific standards to which all of our theories are 
accountable.  But it is a mistake to think that Quine thereby eliminates the linguistic obligations 
we incur when we reflect on acceptable language use in our own speech community. 
 To see why, consider again the anthropologist’s record of the post-dinner festivities.  
Having noted the diners’ agreement to call their activity “the eightsome reel,” she erects a 
standard that generates obligations for future speech behavior.  For example, if one of the 
dancers (or another anthropologist) later calls some new dance “the eightsome reel,” she may 
exhibit her record and demand a justification for the deviant usage.  The obligations about how 
to use the phrase “the eightsome reel” that are generated by her record are defeasible, but not 
wantonly so.  They may be legitimately challenged by alternative hypotheses that meet the 
scientific standards countenanced by naturalist inquirers.68
 Similarly, the theories that naturalists develop about the appropriate usage of particular 
words (defeasibly) oblige all inquirers.  Any challenges to these linguistic theories (which are 
  But an interlocutor who merely 
courts eccentricity can be justly dismissed.  
                                                 
68 For example, the anthropologist’s interlocutor may object that since she has friends who also claim to know the 
dance but dance it quite differently, the sample upon which the anthropologist constructed her theory is too small.  
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largely uncontroversial) will be evaluated at the scientific tribunal.  So Ebbs is wrong to think 
that the naturalist lacks the means to account for our practice of resolving disputes together.   
 But although Ebbs’ objection will not convince the committed naturalist that she is 
mistaken, might it convince the philosopher of language to refuse naturalism?69
 However, I began this chapter by claiming that naturalism is rightly viewed as a paring 
knife, not a machete, a metaphor intended to convey the ways naturalists’ critics often mistake 
what is and what is not eliminated by eliminating “meanings” from our theory.  Ebbs, for 
example, finds the naturalist account of our dispute-resolving practices wanting.  But he only 
does so because he mistakenly thinks that “idiolects” bear the weight of Quine’s theory.  In fact, 
Quine has a more nuanced conception of language.   
  I have been 
arguing that Quine’s naturalism has the power to excise skeptical challenges about our 
knowledge of the external world, of successful communication, and of what our words mean.  
But if it does so by carelessly wielding a machete through our core intuitions about what we 
want our theories of knowledge and language to explain, perhaps Ebbs’ reader will join him in 
believing that “properly describing” our linguistic practices requires embracing the participant 
perspective, even if doing so makes those skeptical threats intelligible (65).   
 Ebbs is right that Quine believes the relation of “sharing a language” only informally 
applicable, since no two speakers are familiar with exactly the same vocabulary, and nor are they 
disposed to use words in their vocabularies in just the same circumstances.  But this does not 
entail that each speaker’s capacity for using language reduces to her present dispositions to 
verbal behavior.  This idiolectical description of a speaker misses Quine’s recognition that 
                                                 
69 Ebbs admits in the final section of his book that “[n]o one who has ever been in the grip of Quine’s picture of 
meaning and assertion will be immediately convinced by the foregoing reasons for resisting it.  Our philosophical 
commitments and temptations, especially if they are deeply rooted and systematic, have a momentum of their own” 
(309).  So perhaps, despite his earlier declaration that he will show naturalism “mistaken,” his real goal is to 
convince non-naturalists to remain non-naturalists. 
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language is “our social art,” a fundamentally shared activity that is identifiable in a community 
of speakers and listeners whose activities are coordinated.  The idiolectical description of a 
speaker’s language that Ebbs extracts from Quine is just an idealization that Quine employs to 
simplify the presentation of his theory of language.  But Quine knows that there is no private 
language (OR, 27).  His idiolectical idealization is embedded in his intersubjective naturalist 
account of language acquisition.  
 In Quine’s view, with the guidance of parents and teachers who reward and rebuke our 
burgeoning efforts as needed, we acquire our home language socially as children.  In so doing 
we add strands to our webs of belief about how the words and sentences we begin to utter apply 
to things and facts in the world.  Since this education admits of considerable variation, any two 
children will acquire slightly different linguistic competencies, but within geographic and 
cultural boundaries are able to use their verbal dispositions to coordinate their activities, to 
“communicate” with each other, and to count as sharing a language: “we demarcate our practical 
speech community, for particular given purposes, as the community in which all dialogue that is 
concerned with those purposes runs smoothly and effectively (R, 311).70  When Quine describes 
“acquiescence in our mother tongue” as the way to resolve the appearance of paradox in 
ontological relativity, he refers to our shared home language, not, as Ebbs claims, our individual 
idiolects.  Our individual utterances are meaningful in our community because we share our 
home language.71
                                                 
70 We may later expand our linguistic competency by learning how to translate foreign languages, which Quine 
terms “alien” languages.  Quine understands the learning of a foreign language on his translational model.  
  This casts Quine’s account of assertion and our dispute-resolving practices in 
a different and more attractive light.  
71 Thus as I read Quine, our shared home language becomes a pared down, extensionalist, but nonetheless social 
correlate to Carnap’s inflated, intensional assumption that speakers share a fixed interpretation of a metalanguage, 
which deprives the skeptic of the vocabulary needed to press radical objections. 
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 The conclusion of Quine’s reflections on ontological relativity is that there is no 
perspective external to the home language from which inquirers can question their ontology.72
 The idiolectical description of our unique speech dispositions is a theoretical posit 
phrased using the home language when we decide to investigate our ability to converse.  But 
since this theoretical grasp of our unique idiolect depends upon our shared home language, it 
cannot be occupied to impugn it.  We employ our home language both when considering its 
reference and when constructing alternative possibilities about deviant reference.  So Quine 
thinks we only grasp factuality from a perspective within our home language: “factuality, like 
gravitation and electric charge, is internal to our theory of nature” (TTPT 23).
   
Within the home language, using its terms, we can study, evaluate, and continually refine the 
ontological commitments of our theories.  Since our assertions are made from within this home 
language, we are accountable to other speakers for the meaningfulness of our utterances.   
73  It follows that 
we must ultimately acquiesce in our home language to the disputes about ontology that we 
phrase in that language, not our unique idiolects.74
 Ebbs was worried, justifiably, that, under the idiolectical conception of language, 
linguistic disputes become peculiarly individualized.  If each individual is only able to assert 
from within her own idiolect, then any differences between her theory of acceptable language 
    
                                                 
72 In a recent paper, Thomas Ricketts develops a persuasive interpretation of ontological relativity which emphasizes 
the home language (2010).  Ricketts notes firstly that the disquotational instances of the referential paradigms are 
privileged because one learns them in learning the home language, as opposed to Ebbs’ claim that each speaker 
endorses instances of them for her own idiolect.  Furthermore, Ricketts argues that in any conversation where one 
uses a non-homophonic translation manual to translate another speaker, one must “respond directly” to the home 
language sentence that one understands which the non-homophonic translation replaces for the interlocutor’s 
sentence, concluding that “in these two ways…reliance on the…homophonic translation manual is inescapable for 
speakers of the home language” (14).  (Ricketts here credits Peter Hylton [2007].)     
73 It is problematic to interpret Quine’s use of “our” in this quote—as elsewhere in his writings.  In my view, Quine 
here means our shared theories of nature, not our individual theories of nature.   
74 C.f. Ricketts’ argument that Quine understands the disquotational instances of the referential paradigms to give a 
“formal mode specification” of “facts of the matter”: “the conclusion here is not that, in contrast to alien languages, 
there is a fact of the matter about reference in the home language.  Rather, because of the use of a disquotationally 
explicated reference-predicate in characterizing ‘facts of the matter,’ this notion of facts of the matter is not 
applicable to home language reference” (2010, 21). 
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use and others’ can only generate optional changes she may make to that theory if she wishes to 
improve her future efforts at communication.  Others cannot show her linguistic theory incorrect, 
but only unfruitful if used in future conversations with them.  But for Quine, each individual is 
only able to assert on the basis of having learned her home language with others.  Although no 
two speakers are identically disposed to use exactly the same expressions within the home 
language, there is no part of an individual’s idiolect that is unshared with some other speaker, for 
it is only sharing linguistic dispositions that make our words meaningful.  So, in Quine’s view, 
disputes about how home language words are to be used are not individualized.  If an individual 
cannot justify her linguistic theory in the face of challenges, it is to be judged incorrect according 
to the shared scientific standards that guide our inquiry. 
 I concluded section one with a number of questions facing Quine’s naturalist conception 
of the relationship between logic and cognition, given his rejection of Frege’s constitutive view.  
Firstly, does admitting that the laws of canonical logic can alter under pressure from our theories 
force Quine into sociologism about logic, where objective truth changes with our evolving 
patterns of reasoning?  Secondly, what norms can we know our interloctuors follow, and how do 
we know that we are agreeing or disagreeing rather than talking past one another?  Thirdly, what 
conception does the naturalist have of normativity, and is it sufficient to model inquiry?  Having 
improved our grasp of Quine’s naturalism, we are now positioned to answer these questions.   
 Quine’s understanding of the home language allows him to avoid sociologism about 
logic.  Whereas we determine which logic to canonize by observing and refining the inferential 
patterns upon which our discourse depends, the application of truth and reference is grounded 
not on observation of each other but rather in the obviousness of instances of the disquotational 
schemata to anyone who learns the home language.  So “truth” is not defined as agreement 
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according to the logical inference relation our inquiring community currently adopts  (and nor is 
“reality” defined as our current theory of reality).  Although the word “truth” is part of our 
inferential practice—only (fallibly) judged by inquirers who engage in our practice—Quine 
thinks it “transcends” our theory semantically, because the truth predicate for a language cannot 
be defined within that language, and doctrinally, because “science in even the broadest sense” of 
“informed belief” will not take a stance on the truth or falsity of every sentence within a 
language (WWD, 78).   Comprehensive knowledge of all truths is an unrealizable goal for our 
logically certified scientific inquiry, not its product.  So truth is “[a]n ideal of pure reason, yes, 
and hallowed be its name” (78).75
 Secondly, we saw in section three that Quine’s behaviorist ersatz of “communication” 
robbed any radical skeptical doubt that we might be merely talking past one another instead of 
agreeing or disagreeing.  Earlier, I noted that naturalized epistemology embraces the mutual 
containment of epistemology and science.  We find another application of this in the naturalist 
theory of language acquisition and use.  Our scientific theory of evolution explains how we 
acquired the capacity to use language together, and our ability to use language together is the 
basis of our ongoing scientific theories.  Quine argues that natural selection accounts for our 
“meeting of minds” about how to carve up our (unshared) sensory experiences, and so, also for 
our ability to acquire a shared home language (IYI, 486).  Each human organism has the capacity 
 
                                                 
75 This jolly remark might seem surprising given Quine’s response to skepticism about the external world.  For if 
truth is doctrinally transcendent, surely reality must be too.  If, like Lars Bergström, we identify the truths of reality 
with the truths of one’s current theory, the skeptic is denied concepts of “truth” or “reality” external to her theory 
with which to coherently present her challenge (1994, 430).  But, in accepting that an individual’s concepts of 
“truth” and “reality” name goals which transcend her current theory, has Quine reopened the door to Stroud’s 
skeptic?  The answer is no, because Quine can maintain that, as we are naming goals from within our theory, these 
goals are only evaluated as part of our theory.  He will naturalistically rephrase the skeptic’s doubt that our current 
theory even approximates the “reality” which is its aim as wondering whether current science, despite its simplicity 
and impressive predictive power, is badly wrong.  Quine will agree that future experiences may show that part of our 
theory is badly wrong.  Yet, once again, to doubt scientific realism on this basis alone—on science’s fallible grasp of 
its goal—is “overreacting” (RS, 475). 
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to determine perceptual similarities in its environment (PTF, 475), and the human species has 
collectively evolved to be in “intersubjective harmony,” to find similar aspects of the world 
salient.  Over time, natural selection has ensured a continued parallelism between the parts of the 
world we find perceptually similar.  This parallelism entails that fellow home language speakers 
will balk at a deviant application of a home language sentence to the world.  The naturalist 
inquirer recognizes that she is fallible about the application of words and that she may not have 
the best explanatory theory.  She demonstrates her sensitivity to this epistemic situation by 
continually refining (and accepting others’ refinements of) her theories.  In this way, our theory 
of evolution accounts for the shared principles of inference that underwrite human inquiry.   
 I believe that Quine can likewise appeal to the theory of evolution to resist a version of 
the objection that I earlier described McDowell raising against Wright.  Even having 
acknowledged Quine’s emphasis on the home language rather than individual idiolects, one 
might still think his conception of language similarly involves “nothing but verbal behavior 
and…feelings of constraint” among members of a community.  But for Quine, that is certainly 
not to say that there is “no question of shared commitments,” because, as our theory of evolution 
tells us, our parallel dispositions are not merely “interesting” but are a condition for us to have 
the capacity to use language at all.  It is our shared similarity standards of stimuli in the 
environment that allow us to talk together about the world and to commit to developing theories 
of its nature together. 
 These reflections point the way to answering the final question.  The reason that Quine 
says little about logical or epistemic norms is that he thinks that what philosophers have called 
“normativity” is elaborated in the substance of scientific theories.  Logical truths, for instance, 
oblige inquirers in exactly the sense that any scientific truth obliges inquirers; since they are true, 
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truth-seeking inquirers ought to judge them true.  What we might be tempted to call logic’s 
unique “normative force” is really just a function of logic’s generality across scientific theories.  
Similarly, “epistemic norms” are really just a way to characterize in general terms, from within 
our ongoing theory, the types of chains of reasoning we endorse.  We lose nothing by 
naturalistically expressing such “norms” in descriptive terms by elaborating our current 
methodology. 
 In particular, each individual inquirer’s openness to revision grants the naturalist a 
conception of objectivity and allows her to explain our dispute-resolving practices.  In the 
context of our theory of evolution, we see that the goal of truth is shared by all speakers of the 
home language, who—as we do—come to find the disquotational instances of the truth and 
reference paradigms obvious in learning it.  Our aim as inquirers is hence not private and 
subjective, but shared and objective.  In cases of theoretical disputes, including disputes about 
correct language use, the onus rests upon the individual who judges against the group to make 
her case before the scientific tribunal.  And in this context logic comes to the foreground, not as 
our attempt to uncover the constitutive prerequisites of thought to which we are all tacitly 
committed, but as our attempt to refine our understanding of the principles that we use to 
evaluate our theories.  It is in our interest as inquirers to choose a translation of others under 
which they reason according to our canonical logic (and so, under which they acknowledge their 
obligation to its “norms”), because doing so promotes our mutual evaluation of each other’s—
and improvements of our own—theories.  
 In conclusion, I have argued that Quine’s naturalism is far more subtle than is usually 
acknowledged.  It pares down traditional epistemological discussions by removing the 
vocabulary in which skeptical threats about the external world, successful communication, and 
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the use of our own words can be framed.  Naturalism also defines a clear philosophical program 
for logic.  It casts logic as central for clarifying our theories, as clarifying our reasons for 
adopting theories, and for making explicit our standards for testing disputed claims.  Quine 
adopts Frege’s insight that codifying the principles of inference is a matter of codifying the rules 
of our demonstrative practice, but rejects his constitutive view and constructs a holistic theory of 
justified beliefs.  Any one of our beliefs can be scrutinized and potentially found lacking, but one 
theory is not better than another according to an epistemically inaccessible, unquestionable, and 
unrevisable standard.  Naturalized philosophers recognize there are no such standards.  In 
Quine’s view, rather than chasing such ghosts, the philosophical community ought to join 
scientists in refining the only standards we have to go on—our fallible, but nevertheless currently 
effective, scientific standards. 
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Davidson’s Humanism: Truth Only Through Interpretation 
 Unlike his teacher W.V. Quine, who refined his epistemology by penning a series of 
books relating his evolving views from the ground up,1 Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig note that 
Donald Davidson’s philosophy is revealed to us through a range of papers that form a “mosaic” 
(2005, 5).  This makes Davidson peculiarly susceptible to misinterpretation.  Taken individually, 
the conclusions reached in his papers can appear unmotivated or implausible.  Nevertheless, 
Davidson’s arguments are buttressed by a conception of philosophical inquiry that is every bit as 
nuanced as Quine’s naturalism.  In this chapter, I intend to shed light on what I shall call 
Davidson’s “humanism” by exposing the core commitments grounding his epistemology.2
 Davidson’s account of radical interpretation is the focus of section one.  I isolate the 
conception of logic it reveals by bringing his claim that logic is required for interpretation 
together with his claim that interpretation is required for cognition.  I argue that the 
intersubjectivity of radical interpretation distinguishes this conception of logic from Frege’s 
constitutivism and Quine’s naturalism.  However, Davidson’s arguments for the two claims at 
the heart of his humanist conception, and for the associated thesis that there are no conceptual 
schemes, are murky.  In section two, I reconstruct Davidson’s argument against conceptual 
schemes to highlight its transcendental structure, and I defend Davidson from Simon 
Blackburn’s challenge that his views presuppose verificationism and the related objection that he 
  In 
doing so, I will argue that Davidson recovers, and transforms, the privileged relationship to 
cognition Frege awards, and Quine denies, logic.  
                                                 
1 Although Quine wrote numerous articles, he sketches his epistemology in Word and Object (1960), The Roots of 
Reference (1974), Pursuit of Truth (1990), and From Stimulus to Science (1995).   
2 Unlike Quine, Davidson never branded his conception of philosophy.  Although recent critics have sought to bring 
Quine and Davidson together under a variety of umbrellas (including naturalism [Björn Ramberg, 2001] and logical 
pragmatism [Hans Glock, 2003]), I believe doing so only obscures their important differences.  I defend my choice 
to call Davidson’s approach “humanism” in section three, and I examine the differences between Quine and 
Davidson in chapter four.   
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is unwittingly anthropocentric.  In section three, I argue that, on the contrary, Davidson’s 
principled humanism underwrites his distinctive analyses of key epistemic concepts.  By 
privileging the mutual interpretation of human inquirers as not merely our meaning-detecting, 
but our meaning-making practice, Davidson renders grasp of the intersubjective concept of truth 
a condition for cognition.  It is this humanism that motivates this philosopher of language’s 
surprising late claim that, “there is no such thing as a language” (NDE, 265).   
 
1.  Radical Interpretation and Reading Logic Into Language 
 Davidson employs radical interpretation to understand “meaning.”  His strategy is 
inspired by Alfred Tarski’s for understanding truth.  Just as Tarski seeks to illuminate truth by 
finding the desiderata of a theory of truth for a language, so Davidson wants to illuminate 
meaning by finding the desiderata of a theory of meaning for a language (TM, 158; RII, 126).  
Davidson uses the figure of the radical interpreter to elaborate the additional “empirical 
constraints” upon a theory of truth for a language in use that would license employing it as a 
theory of meaning for the language users’ utterances (RI, 194).   
 Tarski argues that a truth theory (or “T-theory”) for a language L ought to entail, for each 
sentence S of L, a sentence that instantiates the T-schema 
 ‘S’ is T if and only if p 
where “‘S’” is a structural descriptive name of “S,” “p” is a sentence in the language of the truth 
theory that is synonymous with “S,” and “T” becomes the theory’s truth predicate for L (1956, 
187-188).  If the language ML of the truth theory contains the language L, “p” can simply be 
“S.”  If ML does not contain L, then “p” must be synonymous with “S.”  In this way, Tarski 
relies upon translation—the capacity to capture the meaningfulness of sentences from one 
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language in the sentences of another—to gain purchase upon truth.  Davidson proposes inverting 
this dependence.   Since “to give truth conditions is a way of giving the meaning of a sentence” 
(TM, 160), he contends that if certain criteria are met, someone who has so constructed a T-
theory for L can systematically replace each sentence of her theory with one satisfying the 
schema 
 ‘S’ means that p 
resulting in a theory of meaning for L.  In the interesting case where ML does not contain L, the 
theory will interpret L in ML.   
 Davidson is not proposing an atomistic reduction of meaning to truth.  He does not think, 
that is, that any isolated ML-sentence instantiating the form of the T-schema will give both the 
truth conditions and the meaning of a particular L-sentence.  Nor will just any theory entailing an 
infinite set of ML-sentences possessing this form count as a theory of meaning for L.  Tarski 
showed how to develop theories which coordinated structural components of L-sentences with 
ML-expressions that translated them.  The syntax of any L-sentence could be recursively parsed 
in ML using the axioms of such theories, entailing an instance of the T-schema with a structural 
description of the L-sentence on the left-hand side and an ML-translation on the right-hand side.  
Since any L-sentence could be treated by the theory in this way, inquirers were justified in 
treating “T” as a truth predicate for L.  If we drop Tarski’s requirement that an ML-translation 
for each L-sentence be given at the outset, then the recursive structure of the T-theory remains.  
Davidson seeks to exploit this structure to show “how the meaning of a sentence depends on its 
composition” (SNL, 56).  If an ML-speaker knows that her T-theory is a theory of truth for L—
that is, if she instead assumes truth from the outset—and if it has finitely many axioms for her to 
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learn and manipulate, then she can employ those axioms to recursively parse out the 
meaningfulness of particular L-sentences and interpret L-speakers.3
 However, it is easy to construct theories that satisfy the syntactic requirements of 
convention T (such as having a recursive structure), but which codify irrelevant semantic content 
about L.  These deviant T-theories cannot be plausibly used as theories of meaning for L.
   
4
  Davidson models radical interpretation on Quine’s radical translation.  Like the radical 
translator, the radical interpreter is utterly unfamiliar with the language spoken in a native 
community, and so, must try to break into it solely on the basis of her observations.  Yet while 
the radical translator’s goal is a manual that will allow her and the natives to engage in fluent 
dialogue, where “fluency” is understood behavioristically as the lack of conversational 
breakdown between translator and native, the radical interpreter is attempting, more ambitiously, 
  To 
block these counterexamples, Davidson argues that one wishing to use a T-theory as a theory of 
meaning for some language in use must know additional facts about how it was constructed from 
the available evidence.  It is here that radical interpretation comes in.  According to Davidson, 
since the radical interpreter is in a position to judge that her T-theory “can be projected to 
unobserved and counterfactual cases” (RF, 36), she is entitled to use it as a theory of meaning for 
the language users she observes. 
                                                 
3 The holism underwriting this conception of interpretation—that an interpreter’s theory does not enumerate isolated 
sentences of L that she understands, but must be structured so as to allow her to interpret vast swathes of L at once—
is the sense of Davidson’s modification of Frege’s context principle that “only in the context of the language does a 
sentence (and therefore a word) have meaning” (TM, 159). 
4 J. A. Foster argues that deviant T-theories undermine Davidson’s program (1976, 13-14).  For example, a T-theory 
for English might entail the sentence “‘The check is in the post’ is T iff the check is in the post and snow is white.”  
Since snow is, in fact, white, the biconditional will return the correct truth conditions for the contingent English 
sentence “the check is in the post,” and hence, the theory entailing this sentence might pass as a T-theory and the 
“T” it defines might be a legitimate truth predicate for English.  But this sentence plainly fails to give the meaning of 
“the check is in the post.”  Foster concludes that “T-theorizing fails to be genuinely interpretative for all languages 
where the full significance of the elements, gauged by their contributions to what is stated by the sentences which 
contain them, exceeds their truth-relevant significance, gauged by what they contribute to the truth or falsity of these 
sentences” (my emphasis, 15).  Davidson takes Foster’s challenge head on by using radical interpretation to 
investigate what it is for a theory to be “interpretative.” 
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to understand what the natives mean by their words.  Davidson is not resuscitating the idea that 
there is a univocal meaning for each sentence that the interpreter seeks to discover, which he 
takes Quine to have correctly eradicated.5
 Davidson puts this point by saying that, strictly speaking, translation requires three 
languages, while interpretation requires only one (RI, 187).  The aim of radical translation is the 
creation, in a metalanguage, of a translation manual which expresses systematic relations 
between sentences of the object (native) language and the subject (translator) language.
  Rather, his interpreter is trying to justifiably attribute 
the intention to mean something to the natives—a consideration that is peripheral and, strictly 
speaking, unnecessary, to Quine’s translator.    
6  But the 
sole concern of radical interpretation is what natives mean by uttering object language sentences.  
So, the radical interpreter’s project is just an extreme version of our everyday interpretation of 
what other speakers mean when they utter this sentence in this context.7
                                                 
5 Davidson writes, “I don’t for a moment imagine…uniqueness would emerge [in interpretation].  But I do think that 
reasonable empirical constraints on the interpretation of T-sentences, plus the formal constraints, will leave enough 
invariant as between theories to allow us to say that a theory of truth captures the essential role of each sentence [in 
the language]” (RWR, 224).  
  Davidson’s claim is 
only that the radical interpreter’s method of constructing a T-theory for L suffices for her to 
know what speakers of L mean; he is not committed to her being able to express that knowledge 
in any particular language (RF, 37).   
6 In principle, these three languages can be distinct.  A person fluent only in the metalanguage can nevertheless use 
the radical translator’s manual to mechanically translate the statements of the translator and the natives, without 
having any idea about the meaningful content of their discussion.   
7 I think Davidson’s oft-quoted claim that “all understanding of the speech of another involves radical 
interpretation” is incautious (RI, 184).  He does not think that we must tacitly or explicitly construct T-theories of 
each other to communicate (see RII, 127).  This means critics who object that Davidson exemplifies philosophers’ 
tendency to erect theories where description is all that is wanted, such as Steven Mulhall (1987) and Richard Rorty 
(2000), attack a straw man.  Rather, Davidson thinks that understanding others “involves” radical interpretation 
because we can justify our confidence in our everyday capacity to understand each other by reflecting on the 
conditions for successful interpretation that radical interpretation make explicit.  It is a mistake (made by, e.g., 
Michael Root [1986]) to think that Davidson’s program turns on the controversial claim that radical interpretation 
“in the field” is possible.  Instead, it turns on what he claims the radical species of interpretation can show us about 
the centrality of a shared concept of truth to everyday interpretation.   
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 The radical interpreter begins her investigation by fallibly listing the contexts in which 
natives appear to hold true particular utterances, since an attitude of sincerity can (again, fallibly) 
be discerned prior to knowing what utterances are about (RI, 191-192).  Of particular interest 
will be what Quine calls “observation sentences,” those sentences about which, on the basis of 
wide community agreement, it is possible to give a simple, plausible description of the 
circumstances in which natives hold them true.  However, the meaning of the utterances are 
conflated with the natives’ beliefs in these held-true attitudes.  For example, suppose the natives 
reliably hold true “gavagai” in the presence of rabbits.  One day, a hare hops into view and the 
natives yell out “gavagai!”  The radical interpreter is now faced with a choice.  Either her initial 
hypothesis that “gavagai” is reckoned true by the natives if and only if they are in the presence of 
rabbits is faulty, and ought to be replaced in her list by a statement that “gavagai” is reckoned 
true if and only if they are in the presence of rabbits or hares, or her initial hypothesis about the 
meaning of “gavagai” was correct, but the natives erroneously believe that hares are rabbits.  
How is she to decide between these possibilities?  Was she wrong about the meaning of the 
native word “gavagai,” or do the natives have a false belief about the world?  
 Davidson argues a charitable attitude is necessary to overcome this problem:  
[We] solve the problem of the interdependence of belief and meaning by holding belief constant as 
far as possible while solving for meaning.  This is accomplished by assigning truth conditions to 
alien sentences that make native speakers right when plausibly possible, according, of course, to 
our own view of what is right. (RI, 193) 
 
So, Davidson would counsel the radical interpreter to suppose “gavagai” true in the presence of 
rabbits or hares.  Beginning with her observation sentences, she should proceed to “optimize 
agreement” between her own beliefs and those of the natives (OVICS, 197).  She seeks to 
replace each statement in her list with the form 
 The natives hold true “p” if and only if q 
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where “p” is a structural description of the native utterance and “q” is a description of features of 
the world, with a statement of the form:   
 “p” is true in the native language if and only if r 
where “r” is either “q,” or a rephrasing of the observation expressed by “q” in terms of her own 
theory.8  Equipped with her new list, the radical interpreter’s final goal is to isolate the 
component expressions of the native utterances (words) and analyze them (in terms of the 
features of the world to which they relate) in order to generate a theory that, for any native 
utterance, allows her to deduce a sentence from her list (which have the logical form of T-
schema instances).9
 Despite the similarities between the methods of radical interpretation and radical 
translation, it is worth stressing how rich the concept of truth becomes for Davidson in his quest 
to account for meaning.
  Her experimental attitude in constructing the list—since she will emend it to 
deal with any behavioural counterexamples that surface—gives her good empirical reason to 
believe that she has a T-theory for the native language that can be “projected to unobserved and 
counterfactual cases” (RF, 36).  In short, according to Davidson, she can deduce from the fact 
that her T-theory meets the empirical constraints that she has a working theory of interpretation 
for the native language.  She can now use her theory to attribute further propositional attitudes to 
the natives (about what they hope, desire, etc.) and engage them in meaningful conversation 
about the shared world.   
10
                                                 
8 For instance, she might replace “the natives hold true ‘patooi’ if and only if they see the sky light up followed by a 
loud bang” with “‘patooi’ is true in the native language if and only if there is a thunderstorm nearby.”  
  For Davidson, it is part of the concept of truth, which is sui generis, 
that the evidence to which a theory of truth for a language must answer is the utterances that 
9 There is some room for trial and error here.  If the interpreter cannot find a theory that perfectly entails the 
statements of her list, she may experiment with attributing some false beliefs to the natives.  
10 In chapter four, I shall argue that Quine’s and Davidson’s competing conceptions of truth is the heart of their 
dispute.   
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users of that language make about things in the shared world.  We are only entitled to attribute a 
grasp of the concept of truth to a being who has a great many true beliefs about the world we 
share, and, inverting Tarski, the structure of the T-theory that allows us to so attribute truth also 
allows us to understand the language.  Rendering the concept of truth intersubjective in this way 
is the heart of Davidson’s humanism, and its central role in his arguments make it a point to 
which we shall have frequent occasion to return.  
 Davidson asserts that charity is not a choice, but a demand of radical interpretation:  
if we cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other behavior of a creature as revealing a 
set of beliefs largely consistent and true by our own standards, we have no reason to count that 
creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying anything. (RI 193; cf. CTTK, 234-235) 
   
The objection to uncharitable interpretation is not that it evinces a mean-spirited imperialism, but 
that it is methodologically unsound.  One reason to which Davidson appeals is that, far from 
making disagreement with the natives impossible, charity makes “meaningful disagreement 
possible” (MTM, 207), since “we can make sense of differences [in beliefs] only against a 
background of shared belief” (200).  But critics have widely objected that this argument is 
inadequate.  Anil Gupta, for instance, charges it with relying on a “plainly invalid transition” 
(2006, 195).  Although it is plausible that interpreting natives requires some assumptions about 
their beliefs, Gupta denies that we are obliged to charitably assume a general agreement between 
our beliefs and theirs.  We could assume, for example, that the natives only have correct beliefs 
during the daytime and interpret from there.  But the more important reason that Davidson insists 
on charity is that finding meaning in the natives’ utterances is the only way to find the natives’ 
utterances meant.  He thinks that we are only justified in attributing cognition to beings whom 
we interpret.11
                                                 
11 Nicholas Rescher objects that we are entitled to ascribe cognition and beliefs prior to interpretation if the beings 
whom we observe are “obviously” intelligent (1980, 328 ff.).  He imagines encountering aliens who have 
constructed incredible architecture, but whose language we have yet to understand.  But “obviousness” is surely too 
  The eventual result of freely attributing false beliefs to the natives is not 
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concluding that they are foolish or irrational, but that they are non-rational, and that our impulse 
to interpret their squawks was misguided.  So against Gupta, Davidson’s point is not that charity 
is the only way to solve the problem of the interdependence of meaning and belief.  He is arguing 
that charity is the only way to solve that problem while sincerely searching for a theory of 
meaning at all.  Any other starting point risks judging some cognizers non-rational.  Just as 
Quine before him, Davidson takes the radical linguist’s basic assumption that the natives are 
speaking a language at all to be falsifiable on the basis of her continued observation.  So 
Davidson insists that attributing false beliefs must be a last resort, only legitimate if we would 
otherwise be unable to develop a rational explanation for the natives’ behavior.  
 This second, more important reason exposes the need to think of the requirement of 
charity in terms of justifying our ascription of the intersubjective concept of truth to the natives 
and finding them fellow cognizers, rather than in terms of optimizing agreement between us and 
finding them agreeably similar inquirers.  In practice, charitably ascribing true beliefs to the 
natives will be indistinguishable from optimizing our agreement.  Nevertheless, for Davidson, 
the force of the requirement stems from the fact that it is part of the concept of truth that the 
evidential basis for ascribing grasp of truth to a speaker are her utterances about the shared 
world, a fact which has the consequence that the beliefs of anyone to whom the concept of truth 
is correctly ascribed must be mostly true.12
                                                                                                                                                             
treacherous a ground for our theories of mind.  What initially appears to us as thoughtful architecture may, after all, 
turn out to be nothing but a complicated nest.  Perhaps Rescher will counter that it is verficationist to conclude that 
only those beings whose cognition we can verify (having developed an interpretive theory for their utterances) are 
cognizers, but I shall delay discussing the mistake in charging Davidson with verificationism until section two.   
   
12 Davidson writes: “it is impossible for an interpreter to understand a speaker and at the same time discover the 
speaker to be largely wrong about the world.  For the interpreter interprets sentences held true (which is not to be 
distinguished from beliefs) according to the events and objects in the outside world that cause the sentence to be 
true” (CTTK, 235).  I shall discuss how this conception of interpretation grounds Davidson’s answer to external 
world skepticism, particularly as that answer parallels but contrasts with Quine, in chapter four.   
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 Davidson’s understanding of the concept of truth also determines the central role of logic 
in radical interpretation. “Convention T and T-sentences,” he writes, “provide the sole link 
between intuitively obvious truths about truth and formal semantics,” (DCT, 66) doing so by 
employing logical resources to “reveal structure” in natural languages (MTM, 205).  Just as an 
early goal for Quine’s radical translator is finding a way to map her logic onto native utterances, 
Davidson, in a nod to Quine’s canonical logic, says that the radical interpreter may need to 
“read…the logical structure of first-order quantification theory (plus identity) into the language” 
(RI, 193).  But whereas Quine rules the translation of logic indeterminate (WO, 60-61; R, 314; 
319), and the attribution of our canonical logic to the natives a pragmatically justified way to 
devise a workable translation manual for them, Davidson writes that, “the semantic constraint in 
my method forces quantificational structure on the language to be interpreted, which probably 
does not leave room for indeterminacy of logical form” (RI, 193 n16; c.f. IR, 228).   
 What semantic constraint is Davidson thinking of here?  Radical interpretation is a matter 
of constructing a T-theory for a language L in use that meets the empirical demands necessary 
for it to count as a theory of meaning.  A language in use must have been learned by its (finite) 
users, and Davidson argues that, since natural languages have an infinite number of well-formed 
expressions, we need to account for “how an infinite aptitude can be encompassed by finite 
accomplishments” (TMLL, 8).  Accordingly, Davidson insists that an interpretive T-theory must 
not only be recursively axiomatizable, but finitely axiomatizable.  This constraint gives us an 
explanation of how finite speakers are able to learn it and disallows T-theories that fail to bring 
out the structure of how sentences depend upon their components for meaning (SNL, 56).13
                                                 
13 A simple example is the case where ML contains L, and a T-theory for L is constructed whose axioms are all 
sentences of the form “ ‘S’ is true if and only if S.”   
  Any 
interpretive T-theory for L must use a logic strong enough to express recursive clauses for L-
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expressions.  But why should these facts about the interpreter’s T-theory require reading any 
particular logic into L or attributing grasp of a particular logic to its users?  
 One might suppose the reason to be that because the recursive clauses of an interpretive 
T-theory not only express observed regularities about the natives (e.g., for all native utterances 
“x” and “y,” natives hold true “x blick y” iff they hold true “x” or they hold true “y”), but also 
establish the meaning of the native utterances (e.g., justify the conclusion that for all native 
utterances “x” and “y,” “x blick y” means that x or y), we are forced to interpret others as 
committed to our own logical truths.  For example, suppose that, on the basis of her observations, 
a radical interpreter judges 
1) For all native utterances “x,” natives hold true “x blick pok x” iff they hold true “x” 
or they do not hold true “x”  
 
She charitably transforms this sentence: 
2) For all native utterances “x,” “x blick pok x” is true-in-L iff x or not x  
But since for any utterance x, “x or not x” is a logical truth for the radical interpreter, the right 
hand side of the biconditional is true.  So from 2), she can infer  
3) For all native utterances x, “x blick pok x” is true-in-L 
In the context of her interpretive theory, 2) becomes 
4) For all native utterances x, “x blick pok x” means that x or not x  
3) and 4) together imply that the law of the excluded middle holds for the native language.  This 
argument can be run mutatis mutandis for any of our logical truths. 
  But the conclusion of this argument is far too strong.  It leaves no room for disputes about 
logic.  Extending this example, it would be impossible for an interpreter using classical logic to 
discover that the natives she observes are constructivists whose language only licenses 
intuitionist inferences.  At best, intuitionists would be parochially interpreted as cautious 
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reasoners who fail to grasp the classical logical truths of their language.  Instead, if the natives’ 
inferences turn out to be cautious, bold, or otherwise unlike our own, we ought to even-handedly 
credit them with employing a language with a weaker, stronger, or otherwise deviant logic.14  
This respects our interpretive goal of finding what they mean by their utterances, rather than 
uncharitably foisting false beliefs about the logic of their language upon them.  In turn, we may 
have to interpret their logical constants as behaving differently to our own.15
 One answer is that Davidson thinks a language’s quantificational structure is the only 
way we have to understand its ontology (RQ, 81).  So while different speakers might choose, on 
the basis of identical evidence, to endorse stronger or weaker inferences about the things that 
they talk about, if we are to interpret the natives as talking about things at all we are forced to 
read quantificational structure into their language and to attribute quantificational reasoning to 
  But now we seem 
in danger of losing any logical constraint on interpretation.  If I am right that Davidson believes 
beings using deviant logics are interpretable, in what sense does interpretation determine logical 
form?   
                                                 
14 Neil Tennant argues that to construct an interpretive T-theory, the radical interpreter need only find “analogues” in 
the native language for the introduction and elimination rules of her logical constants (1999, 72).  He also proves 
that constructing a T-theory only demands expressive resources that both classical and intuitionist, and even 
relevance intuitionist, logicians can agree upon (1987).  The upshot of these claims is that classical logicians, 
intuitionist logicians, and intuitionist relevance logicians can all interpret one another.  
15 But not too differently.  Davidson’s reason, as we shall see in a moment, is that all language users are interpreters, 
and since interpreting the infinite expressions of a learnable natural language requires a finitely axiomatizable 
recursive theory (and so, as shown by the structure of an interpretive T-theory, an expressively adequate set of 
logical constants), all language users have at their disposal an expressively adequate set of logical constants.  (This 
set need not be classical; see the previous footnote.)  Additionally, Simon Evnine persuasively argues that the 
development of operators playing the approximate roles of our truth functional operators is inevitable in any beings 
who possess the capacity to create theories (2001).  If Evnine is right, reading into the native language operators that 
approximate our truth functional operators will be necessary if we are to reason with them about the world.  This 
recalls Frege’s attitude to the first species of logical alien.  If we can view the practice of other beings as sensitive to 
at least some of the principles of inference, evidenced by their approximate grasp of our logical constants and the 
logical truths which they underwrite, then we can judge them reasoners and—if we learn to interpret their 
utterances—engage in reasoning with them.  If the native practice is not sensitive to any of the principles of 
inference, like that of the resolute second species of logical alien, the beings are not reasoners.  
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them.  A second (and more fundamental16) answer is that the only way that we know to construct 
a truth theory for a significant part of our own natural languages—which are the only natural 
languages we know—is to employ quantificational analysis.17  This gives us good reason to 
expect that any truth theory that we will be able to construct for a natural language with similar 
expressive resources to our own will be quantificational.  So if we are to interpret the natives as 
using a language in which truths can be stated, and so, as possessing the concept of truth, we 
must discover quantificational structure in their chains of reasoning.  These considerations act as 
constraints on logical form: all interpretable languages are quantificational.  Davidson’s further 
argument that all languages are quantificational is trickier; I will argue in section two that it does 
not presuppose verificationism.18
 Since it is uncontroversial that interpreting a person entitles us to ascribe beliefs about the 
world to her, and beliefs are necessary for cognition, one link between interpretation and 
  For now, let us turn to the second claim which, combined with 
this view of the sense in which quantificational logic provides the necessary structure for 
interpretation, reveals Davidson’s conception of logic’s relationship to cognition. 
                                                 
16 Although detecting an ontology in the native language is important to the interpreter’s project of finding the 
natives’ utterances meaningful, Davidson writes of his essay “Reality without Reference” that “how a theory of truth 
maps non-sentential expressions on to objects is a matter of indifference as long as the conditions of truth are not 
affected” (1984, xix).  Beyond demonstrating that Davidson follows Quine in the inscrutability of reference, this 
quote shows that the fundamental step in Davidson’s interpretation is developing a truth theory for the native 
language, which justifies attributing the concept of truth to the natives.  Whereas Quine treats “truth” and 
“reference” even-handedly, taking both to be secured by the acceptance of homophonic instances of the paradigms 
for truth and reference by speakers of the home language and extended to other speakers via translation, Davidson 
takes truth to be more fundamental than reference for cognition and for the interpretation of others.  
17 Truth-functional analysis, for example, fails to capture our patterns of reasoning about sentences that are not truth-
functionally compound, such as generalizations.  But Davidson shows how various parts of natural language admit 
of quantificational analysis against first impressions, such as our reasoning about actions (LFAS, 105-110).  
Disciples of Davidson have continued this project, and the quantificational analysis of natural language is a live 
program in linguistics (see e.g. James Higginbotham, 2009). 
18 Lepore and Ludwig, for instance, judge correctly that Davidson thinks “[quantificational structure is] a constraint 
on interpretation forced on us…by our concept of language and truth,” but lament that Davidson does not make clear 
“what reason could be mustered for holding a priori that any language we wish to interpret will be correctly 
interpretable with the recursive resources of standard quantification theory” (2005, 215, my emphasis).  In my view, 
Davidson’s humanism gives him a reason since, like Frege and Quine before him, he rejects the availability of the 
external standard of correctness that Lepore and Ludwig seek.  In Davidson’s view, anything we can call a language 
is correctly interpretable by us, and we have good reason to think using a quantificational T-theory will allow us to 
interpret any natural language.  I return to this point in section three.  
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cognition is clear.  But as I mentioned above, Davidson additionally claims that we are only 
entitled to ascribe beliefs to a person if we can interpret her.  So, he believes that we can extract 
from the conditions upon an interpretive theory the limits of other minds.  In fact, the claim in 
which I am most interested, and which distinguishes Davidson’s position from Frege’s and 
Quine’s, is stronger still.  Davidson argues that we are only entitled to ascribe beliefs to those 
who can interpret others, indeed, to those who have interpreted others (TT, 156).  This holds for 
the first person case as well as third person cases; insofar as we ascribe beliefs to ourselves, we 
must ourselves have interpreted other minds.19
 Here is a sketch of Davidson’s argument for this claim: 
  Davidson thus concludes that the capacity for 
cognition is resolutely interpersonal. 
1) Every cognizing being has beliefs.  
2) One possesses the concept of belief if and only if one possesses the concept of truth. 
3) Every being with beliefs has the concept of belief (and so, given 2), the concept of truth).  
4) Interpreting another person is the only way to acquire the concepts of belief and  
 truth.  
So  Every cognizing being has interpreted another person.    
 
Premise 1) is uncontroversial.  To be capable of knowing, one must be capable of believing.  The 
second premise is somewhat controversial.  Davidson’s argument for it is that “someone cannot 
have a belief unless he understands the possibility of being mistaken, and this requires grasping 
the contrast between truth and error—true belief and false belief” (TT, 170).  Lepore and Ludwig 
object that empirical study has shown children as old as three “pass through a developmental 
stage in which they are unable to recognize that they have had false beliefs” (2005, 395).20
                                                 
19 Pioneering sociologist George Herbert Mead’s argument that a “self” can only arise through social interaction, 
since it is only through communication that an individual treats itself as an object (“one is talking to one’s self as 
one would talk to another person” [1934, 140]) importantly prefigures Davidson’s argument from triangulation.  I 
plan to explore this connection further in later work. 
  But 
20 The studies they mention involve children, who, when faced with a candy box, naturally expressed their beliefs 
that the box contained candy (J. Perner, S.R. Leekam and H. Wimmer, 1987; A. Gopnik and J.W. Astington, 1988).  
Upon opening the box, the children found that it contained pencils.  The children subsequently claimed not only that 
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Davidson can insist that this research merely shows some children as old as three, just as 
prelinguistic infants and animals, lack beliefs (RA, 95).  If a being’s utterances are to count as 
expressions of beliefs—as expressions of our concept of “belief”—they must sufficiently 
resemble the role played by those of our own utterances we take to express beliefs.  If Davidson 
is right that our concept of belief “[stands] ready to take up the slack between objective truth and 
the held true” and that “we come to understand [belief] just in this connection” (TT, 170), then 
attributing “beliefs” to children who cannot grasp error is a mistake on a continuum with 
attributing beliefs about bananas to the monkeys who gesture at them or beliefs about daddy to 
the baby shrieking “Dada!”21
 To argue for 3), Davidson first notes that we use the word “belief” when we wish to 
ascribe the endorsement of a particular propositional content to some mind.  It is the paradigm of 
a propositional attitude.  But “in order to have any propositional attitude at all, it is necessary…to 
have a belief about some belief” (RA, 104), because this is the only way to explain the surprise 
experienced by a fallible believer who discovers that the world is not correctly described by the 
propositional content which she previously endorsed.  A surprised person is aware that although 
she believed p, she now believes not-p, and “such awareness…is a belief about a belief: if I am 
surprised, then among other things I come to believe that my original belief was false” (104).  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
they had always believed that the box contained pencils, but that other children who came into the room would also 
believe that the box contained pencils.   
21 One might object that this line is too hard.  Denying that mute brutes believe is one thing, but denying our three-
year old children believe is quite another.  Can’t we understand our children’s utterances as the expressions of a 
primitive sort of belief?  I think that for Davidson, this is already to concede the point he is trying to make.  
Certainly we could decide to call the utterances of three-year old children expressions of “proto-beliefs” because of 
their similarity to some features of actual fully-fledged beliefs.  According to Davidson, doing so would be to 
employ a metaphor.  In describing the behavior of children in terms of beliefs, what I say is literally false, but doing 
so allows me to articulate a striking feature of my world.  As he puts it, “metaphors often make us notice aspects of 
things we did not notice before; no doubt they bring surprising analogies and similarities to our attention; they do 
provide a kind of lens or lattice…through which we view the relevant phenomena” (WMM, 1984, 261).  
Nevertheless, the helpfulness of metaphorically attributing “beliefs” to children is on a continuum with those used in 
naïve science: “someone might easily have no better or alternative way of explaining the movements of a heat 
seeking missile than to suppose the missile wanted to destroy an airplane and believed it could by moving in the way 
it was observed to move (RA, 101). 
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Since one can only have a belief about a belief if one has the concept of belief, Davidson 
concludes that all believers have the concept of belief.22
 Hans Glock has recently criticized Davidson’s description of surprise, arguing that he 
“has no argument to rule out the possibility of a simply switching from a belief that p to a belief 
that q, without that switch involving a believing that its original belief was false” (2007, 287, 
original emphasis).  We might add that sometimes we are surprised because our new belief was 
unlikely on the basis of our current beliefs, not because we previously believed it false.  But 
Davidson’s point is not that everything we call surprise involves a belief about a belief, but rather 
that if a being lived its entire life without experiencing this sort of surprise, there would be no 
reason to call its attitudes “beliefs” at all.  We would have no way to understand a as recognizing 
the difference between the world as it currently appears and the world as it in fact is, and it is 
only in the recognition of this difference that our concept of “belief” finds purchase.
   
23
 Premise 4) is the most controversial.  Interpreting another person is surely one way that 
one might acquire the concepts of truth and belief.  In struggling to understand what our 
interlocutors mean by their utterances, we may judge their view of the world simply wrong, and 
 
                                                 
22 Some critics, such as Tomáš Marvan, mistakenly think that in the context of his denial of uninterpretable 
languages, Davidson’s argument from surprise relies on the anthropocentric assumption that surprise can be reliably 
detected in all those whom we interpret (2003, 100ff).  Marvan worries that we might be unable to interpret an alien 
language because we miss the aliens’ expressions of surprise.  But whether or not we could recognize alien surprise 
as surprise is irrelevant.  Davidson’s argument is just that if the aliens have beliefs, then they have the capacity for 
experiencing surprise.  We may find it difficult to interpret aliens who express their beliefs differently.  There is 
nothing unintelligible about a language that humans find hard to interpret.  Davidson’s claim that an uninterpretable 
language—a language that cannot be interpreted—is unintelligible is quite different, as we shall see in the next 
section.   
23 Similarly, Lepore and Ludwig’s objection that an omniscient being has beliefs but cannot be surprised is 
unconvincing (2005, 395).  They are right that an infallible omniscient being who knows the truth value of all 
propositions cannot be surprised in the sense of discovering that some content she had endorsed is false.  But there 
would be no reason to describe this being as having “beliefs” in our sense of the word, precisely because there 
would be no possibility that what she held true was not in fact true.   
    But if an omniscient knower lacks the capacity for beliefs, ought we doubt the first premise that I called 
“uncontroversial”?  I rather think that, on the contrary, Lepore and Ludwig’s case calls into question the capacity for 
humans to conceptualize an omniscient mind.  (Similarly, I do not think that Davidson’s reliance on his learnability 
requirement to exclude infinitely recursively axiomatizable truth theories for interpretable languages begs any 
questions against infinite aliens, since we have no clear grasp of what such beings would be like.) 
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by reflecting on the norm underwriting this “wrong”—and simultaneously interpreting 
ourselves—we might realize that our own view of the world could similarly be mistaken.  We 
grasp, that is, the potential for a gap between how we believe the world to be, and how the way 
the world truly is.  But why should we think that interpreting another person is the only way in 
which the concepts of truth and belief can be acquired?   
 Many have found Davidson’s reason wanting: his report that he has “[no] idea” how “one 
could come to have the belief-truth contrast” other than through communication with another 
person (RA, 104).  By relying on the limits of his imagination, Davidson leaves himself open to a 
critic who can articulate an alternative way of acquiring the twinned concepts of “belief” and 
“truth.”  Lepore and Ludwig have recently taken up this challenge (2005, 402).   They imagine 
an isolated being who has never communicated with another person looking back at a table at 
which she had previously glanced and thought she had seen a book, and now finding the table 
empty.  Lepore and Ludwig argue that simplicity might lead the isolated being to conclude her 
past perceptual judgment was mistaken, rather than supposing that a mysterious disappearing 
book is in the vicinity.  She would thus acquire the belief-truth contrast without help from 
another person.  
 Davidson introduces the term “triangulation” to describe the way that two communicators 
acquire the truth-belief contrast by acknowledging disagreements about the nature of the world 
that they mutually perceive.  Lepore and Ludwig effectively claim that a single creature could 
rely on her memory to triangulate with her past self.  But the triangulation Davidson thinks 
necessary for acquisition of our concept of “belief” involves more than merely finding three 
things to occupy its vertices.  We use the word “belief” to ascribe endorsed propositional 
contents about the world to minds.  If the cognitive processes of the beings in the triangle are to 
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count as beliefs, the triangle must somehow ground this relation of “aboutness.”  Davidson 
argues his interpersonal triangle does so because the occupants of the “I” and “you” vertices fix 
the parts of the world that their beliefs are about by mutually perceiving them.  He makes the 
same point in another way by insisting that the reference of the concepts possessed by a non-
linguistic animal cannot be intelligibly located at any particular place in the casual chain from 
the world to its senses (SP, 119).  So, against Lepore and Ludwig, if a person’s cognitive activity 
is to count as her believing things about objects in the external world, interpersonal triangulation 
(communication at a particular time with another person) is necessary.  This insight about the 
way triangulation fixes the content of our beliefs buttresses Davidson’s assertion that 
communication is the only way that our belief-truth contrast can be grasped.24
 Although I do not pretend to have provided a comprehensive defense of Davidson’s 
argument by showing how he can respond to some recent objections, I hope to have made his 
claim that interpretation is necessary for cognition somewhat plausible.  Before turning in section 
two to the charge that Davidson’s views presuppose verificationism, let me conclude this section 
with a statement of his humanist conception of logic’s relationship to cognition (I shall defend 
the label “humanism” later): 
   
HUM:  Attributing the concept of truth to another mind using 
  quantificational logic to structure the other mind’s language  
  is a necessary condition for being minded.  
 
                                                 
24 Davidson is taking up a thread from Wittgenstein in insisting that a person can only be said to have a concept 
about an object if there is an answer to question of which object the concept is about.  Here, as elsewhere, Davidson 
is not insisting that we as observers of Lepore and Ludwig’s self-triangulator—nor even the self-triangulator 
herself—must be capable of verifying which objects its concepts are about.  Rather, he is claiming that the 
application of our concept of “belief” demands that there be an answer to this question, which requires two people 
observing the world, each of whom can act as a standard for the other.  The self-triangulator only forms a square 
between her past self, her current self, the book seen by her past self, and the empty table seen by her current self.  
There is no principled way to isolate objects within the continuous stream of sensory information that affects her 
current self and her past self about which either could be interpreted as having beliefs (SP, 121).  
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This definition brings together Davidson’s claim that logic is required for interpretation (in the 
sense that interpreting a learnable natural language requires using a finitely axiomatizable truth 
theory which reads quantificational structure into the interpreted language) and his claim that 
interpretation is required for cognition (in the sense that all believers have interpreted others).  It 
is distinct from both Quine’s naturalist and Frege’s constitutivist conception of logic’s 
relationship to cognition.  Unlike Quine, who conceives of translating others as adopting our 
canonical logic as a pragmatic step justified by our desire to engage in inquiry with them, 
Davidson rules the use of logic to interpret others as fellow inquirers with a grasp of the concept 
of truth necessary for being an inquirer oneself.  In this way, Davidson recovers the force of 
Frege’s view that accepting the authority of logic is a prerequisite of cognition.  But while 
Frege’s constitutive view treats logical laws as norms of our inferential practice that any cognizer 
must acknowledge, Davidson articulates the conditions that must obtain for a cognizer to count 
as having acknowledged those norms, arguing that they can only be grasped interpersonally.  We 
can think of it this way: if the solitary alien whom we have met on a distant planet can be 
understood as conforming to our principles of inference, Frege would rule her a fellow cognizer; 
Davidson would insist that she only became a cognizer through learning how to communicate 
with us, for only through triangulation with us did her cognitive activity count as her forming 
beliefs about the world.  Frege’s constitutivism pales in comparison with Davidson’s nuanced 
account of the mutual emergence of the concepts of truth and belief in members of a community 
of cognizers who are capable of intersubjective inquiry into the objective world.  Eschewing a 
theory which purports to explain epistemic concepts in terms of others, Davidson instead 
elaborates the conceptual interdependencies between the ingredients of epistemology.  
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 In this section, I have argued that Davidson offers a third conception of the relationship 
of logic to cognition.  More than once, matters turn on his claims about the correct application of 
truth and belief.  Is Davidson’s account of these concepts, and others central to epistemology, 
correct?  Moreover, his argument that all languages we can interpret have quantificational 
structure only has bite in the context of his further argument that there are no languages that we 
cannot interpret, so that it follows from all cognizers being interpreters that all cognizers use the 
quantificational logic we recognize.  A litany of philosophers think this argument can only go 
through on the assumption of verificationism.25
 
  In the next section, I shall engage Simon 
Blackburn’s version of this objection, revealing why it mistakes Davidson’s position.  This work 
will allow me to articulate the commitments of Davidson’s humanist conception of philosophy in 
section three, and show how those commitments underwrite his conceptual analyses of the core 
terms of epistemology. 
2. The Charge of Verificationism and Davidson’s Transcendental Argument 
Tarski is right, I think, in proposing that we think of natural languages as essentially 
intertranslatable.  The proposal idealizes the flexibility and expandability of natural languages, but 
can be justified by a transcendental argument. (DCT, 72) 
 
 In this section, I shall argue that Blackburn’s criticisms misunderstand Davidson’s 
rejection of uninterpretable languages.  By denying, with Quine, that our theories of reality are 
independent of our theories of how we know about reality, Davidson leaves no room for the 
charge that he is a verificationist who presupposes the knowability of what there is.  The 
transcendental argument about interpretation that Davidson actually offers (and from which he 
                                                 
25 See Blackburn (1984, 61), Dorit Bar-On (1994, 149), P.M.S. Hacker (1996, 306-307), Tennant (1999, 80), Gopal 
Sreenivasan (2001, 8-9), Marvan (2003, 95), Glock (2003, 198), Lepore and Ludwig (2005, 312-313), and Timothy 
Williamson (2008, 260).  Even Nalini Bhushan, who correctly sees Davidson’s transcendental aspirations, 
mistakenly accuses him of begging the critical question (1996, 253).   
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draws the denial of conceptual schemes as a consequence) depends upon his view that sharing 
the concept of truth is the cornerstone of the attribution of cognition.  
 Davidson’s argument that all languages are interpretable is meant to show the sterility of 
conceptual scheme rhetoric.26  Once liberated from such misleading vocabulary, epistemologists 
can identify the dualism between scheme and content as the “third dogma of empiricism” and 
acknowledge that we possess “unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our 
sentences and opinions true or false” (OVICS, 198).  Although Davidson thinks that recognizing 
the third dogma sounds the death knell for empiricism, he does not herald rationalism the victor 
(189).27
 Davidson has no objection to the use of “conceptual scheme” as shorthand for the 
unusual way that we might find our interlocutor describing our world.
  He seeks instead to overthrow the first-person Cartesian approach to epistemology that 
is shared by traditional empiricists and rationalists alike.   
28
 Davidson objects that the cogency of this “incommensurability” depends upon the 
cogency of a conceptual scheme being so different from our own that we cannot interpret it.  The 
  Rather, he objects to the 
rhetoric employed by thinkers like Thomas Kuhn, who claims that the difference between, for 
instance, a Newtonian and an Einsteinian, amounts to a difference of world lived in (1962, 134).  
Davidson takes Kuhn’s idea to be that some of an Einsteinian’s assertions simply cannot be 
understood by a Newtonian.  The schemes are, as Kuhn says, “incommensurable,” since in them 
the use of basic terms like “force” and “mass” differ (1970, 266-267).  Hence, each scientist is 
not merely unusual but unintelligible from the other’s perspective.   
                                                 
26 In fact, Davidson thinks conceptual scheme rhetoric is not merely sterile, but pernicious.  He thinks it leads to 
epistemological skepticism (MTE, 55-56).  I shall return to this point in chapter four.  
27 Despite endorsing a priori knowledge, rationalists have been just as guilty as empiricists of supposing there to be 
an intelligible distinction between scheme and content.  I owe both Shawn Standefer and Thomas Ricketts thanks for 
helping me see this point.   
28 Desert-dwellers might have a dozen finely grained predicates for our own “sandstorm,” for example.  There is no 
obstacle to interpreting these various predicates by adding modifiers to the predicates of our own language (such as 
“mild,” “moderate,” and “severe”).   
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language spoken by a person with such a scheme would have to be similarly uninterpretable.29
 To make sense of the uninterpretable language “organizing” something, there must be 
some plurality being organized.  The likely contenders are things in the world, or experiences of 
L-speakers.  But the case of L organizing things in the world reduces to that of an unusual, but 
interpretable, language.  Although L-predicates may organize the world differently than English 
predicates, Davidson shows that a skilled interpreter fluent in either L or English can develop an 
interpretive T-theory for speakers of the other language and use it to judge the meaningfulness of 
their predicates.  Suppose instead that L organizes an L-speaker’s experiences.  Davidson argues 
that we are entitled to use the word “organize” only if we have some way to individuate natives’ 
experiences into a plurality.  But this individuation—for example, judging that the world 
stimulates L-speakers’ sensory organs in such and such a way—provides the resources necessary 
for radical interpretation of their utterances (OVICS, 192-193).  Once again, this case reduces to 
an unusual, but nevertheless interpretable, language. 
  
Davidson aims to show that this is not intelligible.  Ex hypothesi, the vocabulary of an 
uninterpretable language cannot be systematically defined in terms of our own language.  So 
some criterion is required by which we can identify a putative uninterpretable language L in use 
as a language independently of its relationship to our own language.  Davidson proceeds to argue 
that the two families of metaphors philosophers employ in lieu of such a criterion, that 
“conceptual schemes (languages) either organize something, or they fit it” (OVICS, 191), are 
inadequate to the task. 
                                                 
29 At least, it would have to be uninterpretable when the speaker is talking about her uninterpretable scheme.  My 
focus (like Davidson’s) will be on totally uninterpretable languages, but Davidson also argues against the possibility 
of partially uninterpretable languages.  Since interpretation demands charity, he says the difference between the 
conceptual schemes of speakers of L1 and L2, where some part of L1 cannot be translated into L2, is only a 
difference in degree and not in kind: “we improve the clarity and bite of declarations of difference, whether of 
scheme or opinion, by enlarging the basis of shared (translatable) language or of shared opinion.  Indeed, no clear 
line between the cases can be made out… [W]hen others think differently from us, no general principle, or appeal to 
evidence, can force us to decide that the difference lies in our beliefs rather than in our concepts” (OVICS, 197). 
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 Turning to the second metaphor, Davidson notes that empiricists claim a person’s sensory 
stimulations constitute her sole evidence for holding particular sentences of her theory true, and 
that a theory “fits” the world if ongoing sense experiences square with its predictions.  So, under 
empiricism, a theory is true just in case it successfully “fits” the total possible sensory evidence.  
But now, Davidson objects that, “the notion of fitting the totality of experience…adds nothing 
intelligible to the simple concept of being true” (OVICS, 193-194).  The criterion that conceptual 
schemes must “fit” experience thus comes down to the claim that conceptual schemes must be 
(largely) true.  Davidson argues that our best grasp on the desiderata for a theory of truth for an 
arbitrary L is Tarski’s theory, and his T-schemata presuppose the notion of translation to explain 
“truth-in-L.”  Since to translate a language is to interpret it, we have made no progress.  
Davidson concludes that neither metaphor engenders a criterion for languagehood that can be 
applied to a practice independently of our capacity to interpret that practice in terms of our own 
language. 
 Davidson’s final move is to argue that since we cannot make sense of a radically 
different conceptual scheme—only one that is unusual and perhaps difficult to interpret—we 
ought to jettison talk of conceptual schemes from epistemology.  He thinks that, “it would 
be…wrong to announce the glorious news that all mankind…share a common scheme and 
ontology,” for if we lack a criterion for saying conceptual schemes differ, we lack a criterion for 
saying conceptual schemes do not differ (OVICS, 198).  We lack, that is, any way of making out 
a tenable dualism between individuals’ uninterpreted experiences of the world and the “system” 
that they each employ to structure that experience.  There is no epistemic intermediary between 
us and the world.   
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 In Spreading the Word, Simon Blackburn voices an objection that has since become 
prevalent in Davidson scholarship:  
[Davidson’s] idea is that we can tell when a group is expressing ideas which are new to us only 
after we have become good at translating them in general.  Davidson wants this point to sustain 
the conclusion that we can have no conception of what it might be for a group to have a language 
which expresses concepts and beliefs radically different from ours—too different to provide the 
backdrop of shared thoughts which make mutual translation generally possible.  Such an argument 
relies on a principle of verification—an inference from the fact that we cannot verify that 
something is the case to the conclusion that we cannot conceive as a genuine possibility that it 
might be the case. (1984, 60-61, original emphasis)  
 
Blackburn goes on to assert that there is now a “common consensus” that verificationism is 
dubitable.30
 But Blackburn misreads Davidson.
  Yet, even were Davidson to be granted his principle of verification, Blackburn 
claims, his argument fails.  Although a translator whose own language lacks the requisite 
vocabulary may be unable to verify that her interlocutor has a conceptual scheme, one who takes 
the time to learn her interlocutor’s language—in so doing, expanding her own vocabulary—can 
do so.  (The conceptual scheme skeptic, Blackburn suggests, is like an ignorant listener who 
dismisses the Scottish bagpipes as noise.)  Radically different conceptual schemes are perfectly 
intelligible once we acknowledge that we may need to acquire more vocabulary to verify their 
existence.   
31  Blackburn objects that an untranslatable language 
is intelligible because the object language may outstrip the expressive resources of the 
translator’s subject language.  Yet interpretation is not restricted to translation.32
                                                 
30 This is the result of the perceived failure of logical positivism.  A common objection is that the verification 
principle “all meaningful possibilities are verifiable” is itself unverifiable, and so meaningless by its own lights.  I 
think that this objection vastly oversimplifies the guiding principles of different members of the Vienna Circle, and 
the extent to which logical positivism failed, but I cannot discuss this here.  For recent contributions to this growing 
area of historical research, see Thomas Uebel (2004), Maria Carla Galavotti (2007), and Richard Creath (2011).   
  Davidson 
would agree with Blackburn about the intelligibility of there being one language that is 
31 I suspect that the misreading results from taking Davidson’s paper in isolation, since in it he uses the terms 
“translation” and “interpretation” interchangeably (see e.g. OVICS, 196). 
32 As Quine would later put it, it is trivial that contemporary English is untranslatable in classical Arabic, since 
classical Arabic lacks the requisite vocabulary to express our concepts, but English is interpretable by speakers of 
classical Arabic (WWD, 75).   
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untranslatable in another.  His objection is rather to the intelligibility of an uninterpretable 
language, one for which users of a natural language are unable to construct an interpretive truth 
theory.  In his view, the sole reason we can have for calling some practice a language (or some 
cognitive process a conceptual scheme) is our capacity to interpret its users (RI, 184).  
   Nevertheless, the specter of verificationism still haunts Davidson’s argument.  Even 
granting that we can only verify some practice is a language if we can interpret its users, why 
should we be forced to conclude that there are no languages whose existence we cannot verify?  
If we join Blackburn and the “common consensus” in rejecting verifiability as a condition of 
possibility, is Davidson’s argument undermined? 
 Davidson is well aware that one could appeal to verificationism to argue against 
conceptual schemes.  But he says to do so—to directly infer from the fact that we cannot verify 
that a practice is a language that the practice is not a language—would be an uninteresting 
argument by fiat.  If we take him at his word, the reason he unpacks the conceptual scheme 
metaphors at length is to demonstrate their emptiness, and so, to provide a positive argument 
against conceptual schemes based upon the meaningfulness of “truth” and “language.”  
Nevertheless, those critics sympathetic to Blackburn’s objection may push it further and argue 
that, despite his protestations, verificationism underlies Davidson’s dismissal of the second 
metaphor.  Consider this passage: 
[Convention T] isn’t, of course, a definition of truth, and it doesn’t hint that there is a single 
definition or theory that applies to languages generally.  Nevertheless, Convention T suggests, 
though it cannot state, an important feature common to all the specialized concepts of truth.  It 
succeeds in doing this by making essential use of the notion of translation into a language we 
know.  Since Convention T embodies our best intuition as to how the concept of truth is used, 
there does not seem to be much hope for a test that a conceptual scheme is radically different from 
ours if that test depends on the assumption that we can divorce the notion of truth from that of 
translation. (OVICS, 194-195) 
 
But, one might object, Convention T only requires that all sentences of L are translated in some 
ML in which the T-theory for L is constructed.  Nowhere in Tarski can we find Davidson’s 
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additional requirement that “we know” ML.33
 I think that this objection, which I shall call the “hidden premise” objection, mistakes the 
character of Davidson’s argument.  To see why, compare Martin Hollis’ earlier rejection of 
conceptual schemes: 
  What prevents a T-theory for a language we 
cannot interpret being expressed in a metalanguage that we also cannot interpret?  Since in this 
case we would not understand ML, we would not be able to verify that this T-theory for L was a 
T-theory.  Yet to conclude from this that there are no uninterpretable languages seems to rely 
upon a principle of verification.  Despite Davidson’s claim to have avoided arguing by fiat, has 
exposing this hidden premise shown he did just that?  
If anthropology is to be possible…the natives must share our concepts of truth, coherence and 
rational interdependence of beliefs.  Otherwise we are confronted as theorists with vicious circles.  
In other words Western rational thought is not just one species of rational thought nor rational 
thought just one species of thought. (1970, 218-219) 
 
Hollis’ argument is explicitly conditional: if anthropology is to be possible—if, that is, we can 
develop theories and acquire knowledge of the native culture—then the natives must share our 
concepts.  One may object that Hollis’ conclusion relies on the premise that anthropology is 
possible.  Just because it may not be possible for Westerners to construct anthropological 
theories of a culture with a radically different, non-Western conceptual scheme, it does not 
follow that no non-Western cultures exist.   
 Returning to Davidson, the hidden premise objection supposes his argument similarly 
rests upon a conditional whose antecedent is a dubitable epistemological claim: if we are to know 
that some practice L is a language, then we must know an interpretive T-theory for L, and so 
know the language ML in which the T-theory for L is phrased.  But, the objection continues, a 
practice may be a language even if we cannot know that it is a language.  The only way to derive 
                                                 
33 Bhushan, for example, objects: “Davidson is not justified in…simply taking it for granted that the only way to 
understand Convention T is in terms of translatability into a language we know” (1996, 253).   
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a negative existential from a conditional whose antecedent expresses a condition for our 
knowledge is to rely on an ultimately dubitable principle of verification.  
 But Davidson’s argument against conceptual schemes rests upon no such conditional.  
According to the hidden premise objection, Davidson’s argument turns on his claim that 
Convention T makes essential use of the notion of translation into a language we know.  But this 
reading does not fit Davidson’s text.  Davidson writes: 
Convention T suggests, though it cannot state, an important feature common to all the specialized 
concepts of truth.  It succeeds in doing this by making essential use of the notion of translation 
into a language we know. (OVICS, 195) 
 
If the reading grounding the hidden premise objection were correct, then Davidson ought instead 
to have written that Convention T or It makes essential use of the notion of translation into a 
language we know.   His actual wording speaks rather to the capacity Convention T has to 
suggest something important about the specialized concepts of truth.  So Davidson neither 
misunderstands the formal requirements of a theory satisfying Convention T, nor smuggles in an 
illicit connection between Convention T and languages we know.  Instead, he claims that 
Convention T is only able to suggest something important about the concept of truth if we 
assume that the ML into which the sentences of L are translated is translatable into a language 
we know.  Without this assumption, Tarski’s logical machinery is idle.  So Davidson’s point is 
not only that we recognize the pertinence of Convention T to the concept of truth because of its 
application to our language; Convention T is only pertinent to the concept of truth so long as the 
connection to our language is preserved.  Further, Davidson claims that Convention T embodies 
our “best intuition as to how the concept of truth is used” (205).  So Davidson’s objection to 
conceptual schemes is that it is contradictory to suppose a theory could be both largely true—i.e. 
expressed in an L whose ML T-theory is translatable into English—and uninterpretable.  
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 Having exposed the irrelevance of the hidden premise objection, it is worth emphasizing 
the transcendental structure of Davidson’s argument.  He begins with the contingent empirical 
truth that we do interpret each other.  That is to say, we find each other’s utterances meaningful 
and meant.  He proceeds to expound the conditions that must obtain for our interpretation of 
others to be possible—centrally, the justified attribution to our interlocutor of the concept of 
truth—and concludes that those conditions obtain.  He analyzes core epistemic concepts like 
“truth” and “belief” by reflecting on interpretation because this is the process through which we 
find meaning in each other’s utterances, and so, the activity that makes our words meaningful.  In 
his view, “[Our] successful communication proves the existence of a shared, and largely true, 
view of the world” (MTM, 201), a conviction that drives Davidson’s conclusion that we can 
make no sense of people having radically different conceptual schemes or speaking 
uninterpretable languages—thinkers or talkers who inquire about the world but whom we cannot 
understand.    
 On my reading, Davidson’s argument rests upon two claims:  
1)  Convention T only plausibly expresses the conditions of a theory of truth for L on 
 the assumption that the ML in which the T-theory for L is given is translatable 
 into English.  
2)  Convention T is our best way of understanding the concept of truth. 
 
There are two reasons for thinking that Convention T plausibly expresses the conditions for a 
truth theory of our own language.  Firstly, disquotational English T-sentences for English (e.g. 
“snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white) are obvious.  Secondly, their availability 
adequately explains our widespread practice of semantic ascent, one of the central uses of the 
word “true.”34
                                                 
34 Furthermore, Davidson is optimistic that we can explain contexts in which we use the word “true” that do not 
straightforwardly relate to particular disquotational T-sentences (TM, 168-170).  One sort of problem case, for 
example, is the use of “true” in the English sentence “Anything Amira says is true.”  A Davidsonian might explain 
  These considerations explain Convention T’s appeal given our intuitions about 
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how “truth” works in English.  To evaluate 1), we must consider whether these considerations 
carry over to cases where we apply Convention T to other languages.   
 In the case of a known foreign language L, we can mention an L-sentence and ascribe 
truth-in-L to it just in those cases where we know it is accurately used.  For example, knowing 
German, I can say: “Schnee ist weiss” is true-in-German if and only if snow is white.  However, 
this T-theory for German would make little sense to a German who did not understand English.  
A T-theory that such a German could understand would need to be expressed in a ML that 
contained German (for example, “Schnee ist weiss” ist wahr genau dann, wenn Schnee weiss 
ist).  A German-English bilingual understands that this T-sentence is part of a theory of truth 
because she understands German.  A monolingual English speaker cannot.  Does this sever the 
connection between Convention T and truth for monolinguals?   
 The answer is no, because, although the English monolingual does not understand 
German, she can interpret some of her fellow English speakers who do.  She may acquire a 
justified belief that the T-sentence is part of a truth theory for German if a trusted bilingual tells 
her that it is.  Additionally, the monolingual can grasp what it is for a sentence she does not 
understand to be a sentence of a truth theory for a foreign language because of hypothetical 
bilinguals who can provide a link between her grasp of truth and the meaningfulness of the 
foreign language.   
 However, the important case for evaluating 1) is when the ML in which the T-theory for 
L is expressed is uninterpretable to an English speaker.  The proponent of the hidden premise 
objection tried to claim that the English speaker can grasp the possibility of what it is for an ML 
sentence to be part of a T-theory for L just by reference to her familiarity with T-theories, even if 
                                                                                                                                                             
this in terms of the speaker’s beliefs about the satisfaction of the conditions given by the T-statements of each of 
Amira’s future utterances.  
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ML is not interpretable.  Such an English speaker would not, of course, be able to tell that a 
given ML sentence is part of a truth theory for L, but the critic insists that this epistemic claim 
has no bearing on the negative existential that there are no uninterpretable languages, unless a 
verification principle is somewhere operative.  But Davidson’s point, and I think he is right, is 
that in this case formal T-theorizing is simply irrelevant to the intersubjective concept of truth.  
Convention T plausibly expresses criteria for a truth predicate only so long as we preserve the 
theoretical link between our shared use of the word “true” and the sentences of the object 
language, so 1) is justified.  
 Let us turn to 2).  Davidson’s agreement with Quine that the analytic/synthetic distinction 
must be abandoned (and, hence, that there is no firm line separating the meaning of language 
from the truths of theory), acts as an important constraint upon potential ways he thinks that we 
can grasp truth.  In his view, we can have no understanding of truth applying to theories that 
comes apart from our understanding of the truth predicate within our language.  Although this 
constraint—and the need to reject the analytic/synthetic distinction—has been disputed, 
discussing objections to it here would take us too far afield.35
 A number of critics think not.  In discussing the second metaphor, Davidson writes that, 
“if a theory quantifies over physical objects, numbers, or sets, what it says about these entities is 
true provided the theory as a whole fits the sensory evidence” (OVICS, 193).  But if this is right, 
  Given this constraint, is Davidson 
right that Convention T is our best way of understanding the use of “truth”?   
                                                 
35 Hacker, for example, complains that our ordinary conception of truth makes no mention of languages.  He insists 
that “truth is not a property of sentences at all” (1996, 299), and that Davidson fails to recognize that “what is said 
(stated, asserted, claimed, etc) is that p, and it is this, not the sentence used in saying it, that is true or false” (300).  
For Hacker, it is not Convention T that captures our basic intuitions about “truth,” but our agreement that, for 
example, it is true that grass is green if grass is, in fact, green.  He thinks it an accidental fact that to convey this 
agreement we must make a statement in a particular language.  But this view relies upon the coherence of 
propositions, of which truth is a property.  I am unconvinced that Hacker satisfactorily answers the doubts Quine 
raises about the tenability of propositions, given that they lack clear individuation criteria, but space prevents me 
from further discussion here. 
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critics object, what licenses Davidson’s subsequent focus on the sensory evidence available to 
humans in his account of truth?36
 But, does this charge of anthropocentrism constitute an objection?  Some defenders of 
Davidson, such as Marvan, have thought it a mere observation (2003, 105).  On Marvan’s 
modest reading, Davidson would admit that beings with radically different sensory capabilities 
can be said to have radically different conceptual schemes.  Nevertheless, since humans share 
sensory capabilities, Convention T remains the best way of grasping the use of the concept of 
truth for beings like us.
  Convention T makes truth predicates relative to particular 
languages, but they should also be relative to the sensory capabilities of particular languages’ 
speakers.  We should count a theory largely true for a group of beings if that theory fits the (total 
possible) sensory evidence available to that group of beings.  Once we have made this 
concession, we can surely imagine a theory being largely true for a group of aliens, expressed in 
a language that is uninterpretable to humans, simply because our sensory experience of the world 
fails to coincide with the aliens’ sensory experience of the world.  Davidson’s claim that 
Convention T is the best way of understanding truth, the critics assert, is (perhaps unwittingly) 
anthropocentric.  
37
                                                 
36 For versions of this objection, see Rescher (1980, 328ff), Hacker (1996, 300), Tennant (1999, 80), and Glock 
(2003, 198). 
  The incommensurable human conceptual schemes invoked by the 
37 But, one might object, not all humans do share sensory capabilities.  Might the blind have different conceptual 
schemes to the sighted, or at least be incapable of interpreting color vocabulary?  I am not sure what Davidson 
would say here.  He acknowledges that the blind and the sighted can communicate (OQP, 191), but, to the extent 
that communication depends on interpretation, could the blind empirically confirm an interpretive T-theory for color 
vocabulary?  Perhaps a blind person could use a device that transformed light frequencies into sound waves to 
identify the color of objects.  But then, although it seems that she could construct a T-theory for a sighted person—
“grass is green” is true-in-L if and only if my device makes a certain sound when pointed at grass—it is unclear that 
she could justifiably use this T-theory as a theory of meaning.  After all, the sighted person does not mean that the 
device makes a certain sound.   
     On the other hand, Davidson might argue that by uttering “grass is green” in this context the sighted person did 
mean that the blind person’s device makes a certain sound, because the utterance was directed to her: “The speaker 
wants to be understood, so he intends to speak in such a way that he will be interpreted in a certain way.  In order to 
judge how he will be interpreted, he forms, or uses, a picture of the interpreter’s readiness to interpret along certain 
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philosophers Davidson targets remain unintelligible.  However, I think that Marvan’s modest 
reading fails to do Davidson justice.  The humanist backdrop of Davidson’s transcendental 
argument permits a stronger response: namely, we lack any way to understand beings with 
radically different sensory capabilities possessing the intersubjective concept of truth that 
enables inquiry into the objective world, and so, as having cognition at all.  
 
3. The Humanist Approach 
Aspects of our interactions with others and the world are partially constitutive of what we mean 
and think.  There cannot be said to be a proof of this claim.  Its plausibility depends on a 
conviction…a priori if you think, as I tend to, that this is part of what we mean when we talk of 
thinking and speaking.  After all, the notions of speaking and thinking are ours. (CKVP, 294) 
 
 This quotation, taken from one of Davidson’s final papers, speaks of his a priori 
conviction that interacting with others is “partially constitutive of what we mean and think.”  I 
think that apprehending the source of this conviction—that at which Davidson gropes by saying 
that “speaking” and “thinking” are notions that belong to us—is paramount if we are to 
understand him.  This conviction forms the backdrop of his argument against uninterpretable 
languages, which is what gives force to his conception of the relationship between logic and 
cognition.  Grasping Davidson’s insight that our concepts belong to us reveals what I call his 
“humanist” conception of proper philosophical activity.  The controversial analyses of “belief” 
and “truth” upon which his epistemological program depends are rooted in his commitment to 
our words only being meaningful in the context of our (human) interpersonal activity.  Thus, 
humanist philosophers are committed to addressing problems by elaborating features of our 
shared inquiry. 
                                                                                                                                                             
lines” (NDE, 260).  Perhaps Davidson would accept, as I think he should, the interpreter’s “readiness or capability” 
as a friendly amendment to this claim, explaining the interpretability of the sighted by the blind.  
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 Given Davidson’s avowed anti-empiricism, and that he places no special weight on the 
biological category human, one may wonder why I am not content to call his position 
“rationalist.”38  But just as I see Quine’s naturalism as prior to his commitment to empiricism, I 
see what I am calling Davidson’s humanism as prior to a rationalist strain in his thought.  
Humanism drives his repeated appeals to “our” concepts and “our” language (RQ, 85; WQVT, 
84).  Here, we might helpfully contrast Davidson with Kant.  Kant’s practical and theoretical 
philosophy is intended to hold for any finite intellect equipped with the faculty of understanding 
and something like our faculty of sensibility (1999, A 230/B 283).  His epistemic agents are 
abstract rational agents.  But Davidson views mutual interpretation among humans based on our 
shared grasp of truth as the epistemic starting point.  Our capacity to interpret each other, to 
attribute beliefs and desires to each other about the things in the world that we talk about 
together, is what makes us believers and desirers ourselves.  Those whom we humans can 
interpret become—in that act—rational agents.  Although it is unfortunate that the word 
“humanism” is pregnant with other meanings, it does serve to firmly locate Davidson’s 
philosophy in reflections on our practice, which is more immediate to us than the practices of 
(our conception of) rational beings.  The name also calls to mind the contrast between the 
human—or social—sciences and the natural sciences which are fundamental for Quine.39
 From his humanist perspective, the major epistemic claim that Davidson seeks to defend 
is that an inquirer in possession of a radically constructed T-theory for another language has the 
capacity to interpret speakers of that language, in the sense of justifiably attributing the 
intersubjective concept of truth to those speakers, knowing something about their beliefs, desires, 
   
                                                 
38 My thanks to Anil Gupta and Jamsheed Siyar for pressing me here.  
39 The potential alternative “socialism” is just as pregnant, and risks confusion of Davidson’s externalism with Tyler 
Burge’s social externalism.  Unlike Burge, Davidson does not think that one’s society is a relevant parameter for 
semantic theorizing (KOOM, 27).   
170 
 
and other propositional attitudes, and having the capacity to say what they are talking about.  He 
thinks reflecting on this feature of radical interpretation will bring out the importance of the 
grasp of truth in everyday interpretation of other inquirers.  In my view, just as Quine would 
relinquish empiricism but not naturalism if science demanded it, Davidson would relinquish his 
claim that we could necessarily construct a quantificational T-theory for any interpretable 
language but not his humanist insistence that the concepts we are investigating are generated 
through and depend upon intersubjective interpretation based on the shared concept of truth if he 
were presented with (for instance) undeniable speakers whose natural language proved 
quantificationally impenetrable.40
 This principled humanism undermines the intelligibility of the anthropocentrism 
objection, which supposes that although we may grasp the concept of truth as a result of using 
our language with each other, our resulting grasp of the concept of truth can be applied 
independently of our ongoing practice.  If this were right, then nothing would prevent us from 
hypothetically applying the concept of truth to other languages used by beings with radically 
different sensory capabilities, even though we would never be able to attribute grasp of truth to 
them.  But Davidson’s humanism denies the applicability of the concepts we use apart from their 
interpersonal, human, linguistic origin.  The sole grasp we have of our concepts comes through 
our use of language, which is the sense in which our notions “belong to us,” us human speakers.  
In this way, Davidson gives a humanist spin to Quine’s rejection of cosmic exile.  He believes 
   
                                                 
40 Although we would be unable to interpret the speakers of this hypothetical language using a T-theory, Davidson 
would insist that they must be interpretable by us as possessing a grasp of the intersubjective concept of truth if they 
are rational beings at all.  Davidson admits as a remote possibility that such a language could exist: “supposing it 
were clear (which it is not) that the deep structure of English (or another natural language) cannot be represented by 
a formal language with the usual quantificational structure, it still would not follow that there was no way of giving 
a theory of truth” (SNL, 58).   
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that there is no position outside of our ongoing inquiry which we could occupy and employ the 
concepts that only found expression within our language.   
 So, Davidson does not think it anthropocentric to think about the world humanly.  There 
is no choice.  To repeat, thinking and speaking are human concepts.  To think or speak just is to 
think or speak humanly.  As we saw in section one, we acquire the concept of truth—the 
truth/belief contrast—in virtue of speaking and interpreting other speakers of our language.  We 
can extend a grasp of this concept to speakers of other languages only through interpretation.  
Davidson is unabashed about his focus on our practice, not because he only cares about 
conceptual schemes humans can have, but because “conceptual scheme” is, like all of our 
concepts, an ineluctably human concept.41  Since Davidson  views the primary application of 
“truth” to be contexts where we judge the world to accord with our beliefs, he concludes that 
“truths” are such as to be recognizable by humans, leaving no room for verficationist doubt that 
he conflates truths with truths recognizable by those equipped with human sensory capacities.  
(We might, perhaps, generate a new concept that allows the existence of truths we cannot 
recognize, but this is not the primary application of the intersubjective concept of truth with 
which we are concerned.42
 I think that we can see Davidson driving home a further consequence of his humanist 
rejection of uninterpretable languages in a late paper.  Just as recognizing that there are no 
)   
                                                 
41 Tennant detects anthropocentrism in Davidson’s conception of “reality,” which he thinks the empiricist takes to 
refer to all possible sensory experience, not all possible human sensory experience  (1999, 83-84).  But, once again, 
Davidson can retort that we only grasp “reality” through interpreting each other as talking about the world.  We can 
extend grasp of our concept of reality to others only by interpreting them, a process which has them acknowledging 
our reality as reality.  As Bhushan colorfully puts Davidson’s attitude, “In the end, ‘language’ [and, I should add, 
‘truth’, ‘reality,’ and every predicate] is an English predicate, not one for which God alone knows the correct 
extension” (1996, 261).   
42 This argumentative pattern should be familiar from chapter two.  There, we saw Quine arguing against Stroud that 
the radical skeptic failed to grasp the meaningfulness of “reality” in our scientific discourse and that there was no 
non-philosophical use for a conception of “reality” capable of fuelling skeptical doubt.  Here, Davidson argues that 
the critic pushing the anthropocentrism objection fails to grasp the meaningfulness of “truth” in our interpretive 
theories and that there is no use for a conception of “truth” capable of fuelling verificationist panic.  
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radically different conceptual schemes means recognizing that there are no conceptual schemes, 
recognizing that there are no uninterpretable languages means recognizing that  
there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and 
linguists have supposed.  There is therefore no such thing to be learned, mastered, or born with.  
We must give up the idea of a clearly defined shared structure which language-users acquire and 
then apply to cases. (NDE, 265)43
 
   
Davidson motivates this rejection by reflecting on our capacity to deal with malapropism.  The 
title of Davidson’s paper, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs,” is a case in point.  If sincerely 
uttered in conversation, a charitable listener will interpret this utterance to mean “A nice 
arrangement of epithets.”  Davidson notes that we regularly encounter speakers who use words 
in ways that we think are wrong, but rather than cutting short our conversation and staring at 
them in confusion, we are practiced in readjusting our theory of interpretation for them on the fly 
and continuing to communicate.  This flexibility poses a problem for theories of language, like 
Carnap’s, which suppose that competent users of a language L are able to communicate using it 
in virtue of sharing a more or less fixed interpretation of L’s component expressions.  Instead, 
Davidson argues, we need a theory of language use in which the “conventional meaning” of 
words for every speaker drops out.   
 His solution is once again grounded in the primacy of mutual interpretation for the 
humanist understanding of meaningfulness.  We communicate with our interlocutors in terms of 
successively improving our passing theories of the meaning of their utterances, based on our 
prior theory of what we tacitly assume that particular words mean:  
For the hearer, the prior theory expresses how he is prepared in advance to interpret an utterance 
of the speaker, while the passing theory is how he does interpret the utterance.  For the speaker, 
the prior theory is what he believes the interpreter’s prior theory to be, while his passing theory is 
the theory he intends the interpreter to use. (NDE, 260-261)   
                                                 
43 It is worth noting that Davidson’s late denial of languages does not undermine the learnability requirement he 
imposes upon interpreting languages, which is what forces interpretive truth theories to be finitely axiomatizable.  
Phrased in terms more conducive to the later Davidson, the learnability requirement states that we must be able to 
explain how any being we judge to have the capacity to communicate using an infinite variety of expressions 
developed that ability through finitely many steps.     
173 
 
 
“Language” is explanatorily inert in this account.  It is grasp of the concept of truth through 
communication, not using language correctly according to some formal description, that is 
fundamental for mindedness.  If we like, we can use the word “language” to refer to the passing 
theories of groups of speakers which cleave to one another, perhaps for historical, geographic, or 
cultural reasons.  But it would be putting the cart before the horse to say that only those who 
speak the same language can communicate.  Rather, only those who can communicate can be 
said to speak the same language.   
 Because of his humanism, and unlike Quine, Davidson is hostile to the possibility of 
finite natural languages.  We can certainly design a T-theory for a language with finite 
expressions (as Tarski has shown us), but radical interpretation is meant to provide a T-theory 
that can be employed to detect communicators believing and acting for reasons, because the 
theory shows that they grasp the intersubjective concept of truth.  Although each of us is a finite 
being, who use only a finite number of sentences in our lifetime, we all share the capacity as 
communicators to identify sentences drawn from an infinite range as sentences (for example, 
malapropisms or compound sentences that are recursively constructed using truth-functional 
operators on simple sentences). Putative speakers of a finite language would lack this capacity, 
meaning that we would be unable to recognize—to borrow Wittgenstein’s phrase—them as 
sharing our “form of life” (PI, 23; 241).   
 Let us take stock.  I have argued that Frege, Quine, and Davidson agree that the logician 
seeks to codify the principles of inference that are implicit in our inferential practice.  To do so, 
the logician must make ineliminable reference to our practice because we have no practice-
independent grasp of valid inference.  As Nelson Goodman puts it, 
Principles of deductive inference are justified by their conformity with accepted deductive 
practice.  Their validity depends upon accordance with the particular deductive inferences we 
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actually make and sanction…This looks flagrantly circular.  I have said that deductive inferences 
are justified by their conformity to valid general rules, and that general rules are justified by their 
conformity to valid inferences.  But this circle is a virtuous one…the process of justification is the 
delicate one of making mutual adjustments between rules and accepted inferences; and in the 
agreement achieved lies the only justification needed for either. (1983, 63-64) 
 
All three philosophers agree with Goodman that the principles of deductive inference are our 
principles of deductive inference.  Nevertheless, they develop this insight in importantly different 
ways.  This results in their different conceptions of the relationship between logical and 
cognitive ability.  Quine’s naturalism, unlike Frege’s constitutivism, does not claim that basic 
truths of our canonical logic express prerequisites necessarily acknowledged by all thinkers.  
Davidson reintroduces and transforms Frege’s constitutivism socially, by making the concept of 
truth which our laws of logic unfold graspable only by communicating beings.  Under humanism, 
the privileged relationship of logic to cognition is a function of logic’s role in structuring truth 
theories.  
 This feature of humanism means that, unlike Frege and Quine, for Davidson the deviant 
patterns of reasoning exhibited by putative logical aliens is not the source of the problem.   
Whereas Frege and Quine both understand the patterns of inference that our logic codifies to be 
the base line for the attribution of cognition, Davidson takes the attribution of the intersubjective 
concept of truth to be fundamental.44
                                                 
44 In contrast to Quine and Carnap, who he characterizes as interested in logic because they are “interested in 
improving on natural language,” Davidson writes that he “[views] formal languages or canonical notations as 
devices for exploring the structure of natural language.  We know how to give a theory of truth for the formal 
language; so if we also know how to transform the sentences of natural language systematically into sentences of the 
formal language, we would have a theory of truth for the natural language.  From this point of view, standard formal 
languages are intermediate devices to assist us in treating natural languages as more complex formal languages” 
(MTM, 203).  For Davidson, then, logic is in the service of truth. 
  In his view, beings with no grasp of truth are not fellow 
cognizers, and, since we have reason to think that beings who have a grasp of truth are 
interpretable using an interpretive T-theory that structures their language by imposing 
quantificational logic, logical aliens are ruled out.  
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 Davidson’s rejection of languages is strikingly consonant with Quine’s rejection of 
meaning.  Just as Quine argues meanings are unnecessary for explaining communication, 
Davidson jettisons fixed, formally specifiable languages in favor of dynamic interpretive theories 
between speakers.  Both rejections are calls for philosophers to keep the subject matter they are 
attempting to explain firmly in view, and to avoid the temptation for extraneous theoretical 
assumptions that can distort rather than clarify.  But despite this consonance, Davidson was 
convinced that his view was a substantive critique of, and improvement upon, Quine’s 
philosophy of language.  Quine disagreed.  In the next chapter, I will sharpen the similarities and 
differences between their philosophical views by evaluating Davidson’s objections, and suggest 
how we should resolve the debate between naturalism and humanism. 
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Disagreement in Philosophy: The Case of Naturalism Versus Humanism  
Readers of Davidson and me are bound to be struck by how deeply we agree, and hence puzzled the 
more by occasional points of apparent disagreement. 
         W.V. Quine (my emphasis) 
 
 Donald Davidson admits to being perplexed by W.V. Quine’s paper “Where Do We 
Disagree?”.  Their views concerning the role played by sensory stimulations in translation “have 
converged” (RQ, 82), but he “[does] not see how to reconcile” Quine’s empiricist epistemology 
with his own externalist semantics (84).  Although Quine takes their remaining differences to be 
little more than a matter of emphasis, Davidson suspects that their disagreement is substantive.1
 There is little critical consensus about how to resolve disagreement between Quine and 
Davidson.
 
2  They undoubtedly agree about a number of controversial claims in the philosophy of 
language and mind: both reject the analytic/synthetic distinction, both accept anomalous 
monism, and both think translation and reference are indeterminate.  The points at which they 
part—such as how to define observation sentences, and the extent to which logical form is 
indeterminate—seem technical (perhaps even peripheral) in contrast.  This has tempted some 
commentators to concur with Quine and to conclude their “disagreement” is only apparent.3
                                                 
1 Of the three divergences with Davidson that Quine identifies, he casts their disputes about ontological relativity 
and observation sentences as essentially terminological (WWD, 73, 74), and suggests that his own views on truth are 
“closer to Davidson’s than he seems to have thought” (77).  Davidson denies the first two claims (RQ, 81-82), and is 
puzzled about how to evaluate the third (85), which I unpack below in some detail.   
  If 
they agree upon all the essentials, we can isolate the shared features of their philosophical 
framework and criticize them together.  Yet, I think that this approach deflects our attention from 
the most puzzling, and philosophically important, aspect of their discussion: what makes their 
differences seem incidental from Quine’s perspective and fundamental from Davidson’s?   
2 Each have advocates who, at least, unite in finding them different.  For a defense of Quine, see Dirk Koppelberg 
(1990) and Lars Bergström (2001); for a defense of Davidson, see Richard Rorty (1991) and John McDowell (1994).   
3 See, for example, Folke Tersman (2001).  Others, such as George Romanos, find their differences of “very little 
philosophical interest” (1983, 183). 
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 In this chapter I will diagnose why Quine and Davidson disagree about their 
disagreement.  I will argue that this second-order disagreement stems from their differing 
naturalist and humanist conceptions of philosophy.  Although Quine finds “naturalizing” the 
substance of Davidson’s philosophy conducive to his program, Davidson finds no philosophical 
value in “humanizing” Quine’s work, resulting in opposed evaluations of their intellectual 
relationship.  To suppress their differences is to obliterate the subtleties distinguishing their 
conceptions of philosophy and the corresponding limits they place on intelligibility.   
 In section one, I argue that Davidson’s claims that naturalized epistemologists cannot 
respond to skepticism about the external world and that naturalists mistakenly admit 
unconceptualized reasons fail to engage Quine’s view.  In section two, I argue that Davidson’s 
real objection to Quine concerns the nature of truth and objectivity under naturalism.  Although 
articulating their naturalist and humanist commitments serves to differentiate Quine and 
Davidson, it does not adjudicate their dispute.  In section three (contributing to recent scholarly 
interest in the epistemology of disagreement), I use their dispute to examine options for resolving 
philosophical disagreement.  I tentatively endorse a version of tolerance which, by forcing us to 
occupy that perspective which our current inquiry demands, avoids the fragmentation of 
philosophy into distinct totalizing programs. 
 
1. Davidson’s Skeptical Attacks Against Quine 
 Davidson’s criticisms of Quine range from incisive to misguided.  In this section, I want 
to clear away those of his objections which misfire by exposing their various misunderstandings 
of, or lack of force against, Quine’s naturalism.  This will allow me in section two to distill the 
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core of Davidson’s objection to Quine’s epistemology, which, I contend, concerns their different 
conceptions of truth and objectivity.   
 Davidson initially names Quine one of the philosophers in the grip of the third dogma of 
empiricism (OVICS, 191).  But although Davidson quotes him using the phrase “conceptual 
scheme,” Quine does not subscribe to the crude empiricist view that an individual’s 
unconceptualized sensory experience is the evidence for her theories.  He recognizes that we 
typically know nothing about our stimulations, and rarely if ever cite stimulations as the 
evidence justifying our beliefs.  Rather, in developing his naturalist account of our epistemic and 
linguistic capacities, Quine follows current science in taking the access that beings like us have 
to the world to be sensory.  As a physicalist, Davidson similarly believes that by impinging on 
our sense organs the world causes us to have beliefs about it.  The dualism to which Davidson 
objects is thus not straightforwardly part of Quine’s view.   
 Quine intends empiricism, as he puts it in his initial response to Davidson, to be a theory 
of warranted belief, not truth (OVITD, 39).  He had explicitly rejected Charles Sanders Peirce’s 
pragmatist definition of truth in terms of idealized warrant for belief (WO, 23-24), and if that 
was the source of Davidson’s anxiety about a third dogma, Quine happily concurs with his 
conclusion: “what Davidson imputes to [empiricism is then] rightly imputed and rightly 
renounced” (OVITD, 39).4
                                                 
4 Quine thinks that we cannot define truth by equating it with the ideal scientific theory of the world, not just 
because our theories are underdetermined by the total possible evidence we could have for them (thus making it 
doubtful that there is a single ideal scientific theory), but also because of semantic holism.  We cannot hold the 
sentences of our current theory to be true if and only if they “match” sentences within the ideal scientific theory, 
because isolated sentences are “meaningless intertheoretically” (OVITD, 24).  Quine concludes that seeking an 
account of truth that goes beyond Tarski’s analysis is idle.  In section two, I will examine the deeper significance 
that Davidson awards the concept of truth.  
  Nevertheless, naturalism demands philosophers align themselves 
with scientists.  Given that our best scientific theories take us to be physical parts of the physical 
world, epistemologists ought to hold that we are warranted in believing those theories which best 
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explain and predict our sensory experience.  If empiricism is so understood (as an account of the 
conditions to be met by any theory in which we are justified in believing) Quine sees no problem 
with describing the different—and increasingly sophisticated—scientific theories that we have 
developed as “schemes” employed to better predict and understand the world.   
 In “Meaning, Truth, and Evidence,” Davidson turns to skepticism to try and explain once 
again why scheme/content dualism is not an innocent feature of any epistemology, even one that 
(like Quine’s) conceives of empiricism as a theory of warranted belief.  He acknowledges that 
stimulations do not play the role of “evidence” in Quine’s theory of evidence (MTE, 52).  But, 
since Quine uses his behavioristic ersatz of meaning—“stimulus meaning”—to explain our 
construction of meaningful scientific theories (WO, 12), he appears to think stimulations play a 
semantic role.5  Because of his emphasis upon an individual’s sensory organs, Davidson coins 
the term proximal to describe Quine’s conception of the way that stimulations are semantically 
relevant, in contrast to his own distal view which makes the world itself the sole semantically 
relevant stimulation.6
 Davidson begins his argument by instructing us to imagine an interlocutor stricken with a 
“rearranged sensorium” (MTE, 55).  This causes her to have rabbit-stimulations instead of 
  Since naturalized epistemologists seek to elucidate the evidential support 
that each individual has for her theory, and make ineliminable reference to private, proximal 
stimulations in doing so, Davidson finds a problematic scheme/content strain in Quine’s thought.  
According to Davidson, this strain precludes naturalized epistemologists from accounting for our 
interpersonal knowledge of the world.  
                                                 
5 For present purposes, we can define the stimulus meaning of an utterance u for a speaker S as the ordered pair of 
sets of stimulations that would elicit assent and dissent respectively from S if asked “u?” (Quine discusses some 
complications in WO, 32-34.)  
6 Davidson acknowledges, however, that elsewhere Quine seems to defend a distal view.  In discussing ostensive 
learning, Quine argues that objects in the world, perceivable by both speakers, are the relevant locus for determining 
meaning: “The child and the parent must both see red when the child learns “red,” and one of them must see also 
that the other sees red at that time” (RR, 10).   
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warthog-stimulations whenever she is near warthogs.  He points out that if we know of our 
interlocutor that she is being rabbit-stimulated in warthog situations, Quine’s theory, by making 
private stimulations semantically relevant, tells us that we should translate her utterances in 
warthog situations to concern rabbits.  In turn, we must conclude that our interlocutor is 
systematically mistaken about the world.  But, having now appreciated that the “warrant” 
naturalism accords our beliefs is based solely upon how well our scientific theory predicts our 
stimulations, we must accept that we might be radically mistaken about the public world.  Our 
own stimulations may be just as defective in presenting us the environment: 
Although each speaker may be content that his view is the true one, since it squares with all his 
stimulations, once he notices how globally mistaken others are, and why, it is hard to think why he 
would not wonder whether he had it right.  Then he might wonder what it could mean to get it 
right. (MTE, 55-56) 
 
The last sentence suggests that Davidson is applying pressure to the account of normativity 
allowed by Quine’s naturalism.  His skeptical argument should not only undermine the 
naturalist’s confidence that she knows about the world; he thinks it should make her question the 
very intelligibility on her view of knowing about—of being “right” about—the world.  Davidson 
claims the only way to deny the skeptic this purchase upon epistemology is to reject the third 
dogma.7
 However, as I argued in chapter two, Quine’s naturalism has the capacity to rebut 
numerous skeptical attacks.  There, I also showed how a Quinean could respond to Ebbs’ doubts 
  The only “stimulation” relevant to our knowledge of the public world is the world 
itself, with which humans thus possess unmediated contact (OVICS, 198).  
                                                 
7 Nalini Bhushan misses this point (1996).  She claims that, despite Davidson’s argument against conceptual 
schemes, we can say that a single human conceptual scheme exists with which all humans organize their sensory 
experience.  But in Davidson’s view, single conceptual scheme epistemology falls to skepticism.  Since it leaves the 
dualism intact, the skeptic can cogently doubt her putative knowledge on the basis that she might be a deviant 
human—or the next evolutionary step—whose internal wiring presents the world differently to her than to other 
human inquirers.  
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about the naturalist’s account of normativity.  Can Quine similarly disarm the two strands of 
Davidson’s warthog argument? 
 Quine admits that the warthog argument demonstrates a problem with characterizing 
observation sentences as sentences whose stimulus meaning is approximately shared by 
members of a group.  The radical translator begins constructing her manual by matching 
observation sentences in the native language to sentences in her own language.  But the 
particular ways in which individual natives are stimulated should have no bearing upon the 
semantic question of how to translate their utterances.  For translation, all that matters is 
detecting others reliably using the same expressions in the same contexts, which we can then 
translate with expressions we reliably use in those contexts.  Davidson’s argument depends upon 
“imagining someone who, when a warthog trots by, has just the patterns of stimulation I have 
when there’s a rabbit in view” (MTE, 55).  Quine’s solution is to admit that people with unique 
neurophysiologies cannot “share” a stimulus-meaning.  Another person can never have “just the 
pattern of stimulation” which I do.  Removing “intersubjective likeness” of physical stimulation 
from his account, Quine now argues that intersubjectivity comes only with language use.8
 Quine can now appeal to naturalism to defuse Davidson’s skeptical objection in much the 
same way that he defuses Stroud’s.  He would ask Davidson to fill out the details of his 
challenge.  If we have empirically discovered that some people have deviant warthog 
neurophysiologies—perhaps when they are wired to brain scanners, different parts of their brain 
  
Choosing a manual which translates the warthog deviant as talking with us about rabbits is the 
best way to promote our ongoing communication.  
                                                 
8 Quine writes, “what floats in the open air is our common language, which each of us is free to internalize in his 
peculiar neural way” (PT, 44).  He now defines a sentence as observational if it has a constant stimulus meaning for 
an individual over time, and observational for a community if, firstly, it is observational for each member, and 
secondly, if the members assent to or dissent from the sentence in the same observable circumstances.  
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light up when they see warthogs compared to the parts of the brain that light up in most of the 
population—and the skeptic is a constructive skeptic worried that she might be a deviant, the 
naturalist response is that she should get her brain scanned.  If the point is instead that 
undiscovered deviant neurophysiologies might exist, the naturalist will counsel this pessimistic 
skeptic that, although our neurophysiological theories are fallible and doubtless incomplete, 
scientific realism is currently our best theory of reality.  If the skeptic turns radical, and suggests 
that science may never reveal the “true” nature of “reality” to us, we ought to rebuke her for 
allowing her imagination to overrun her knowledge of semantics.  She has failed to describe a 
meaningful possibility in the terms of our language.   
 It is worth taking a moment to observe the similarity between Quine’s views here and 
Davidson’s own response to skepticism about the external world, since the similarity is one 
reason that scholars have thought Quine and Davidson to be in fundamental agreement.  
Davidson thinks that observing the principle of charity is necessary when interpreting another 
speaker.  To identify another person as having a mind, as being an entity capable of believing, 
we must attribute truth to those beliefs we interpret the mind having in terms of the world in 
which we both live.  Davidson insists that a parallel act of interpretation occurs if we reflect upon 
our own beliefs.  Determining what it means for me to so much as have a belief involves 
isolating my beliefs and ascribing truth to them in terms of the shared world in which I live with 
my linguistic community (CTTK, 236).  So it is incoherent to worry that all of our beliefs might 
be false, because, in the first instance, our concept “belief” is correctly attributed to a mind only 
if most of the things we call its beliefs are true.  Davidson, like Quine, charges the radical skeptic 
with having made a semantic error. 
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 Were Davidson’s imputation of the third dogma to Quine essentially a challenge to refute 
skepticism, then it is clear from Quine’s perspective that it fails to breach his naturalism.  But 
although Davidson thinks skepticism an inevitable consequence of any epistemology, such as  
Quine’s, which refuses to jettison the third dogma, he insists that:  
[the] central argument for rejecting empiricisms that base knowledge on something 
unconceptualized is that nothing that is unconceptualized can serve as a reason for an empirical 
belief, or for anything else, since the relation of a reason to what it supports is conceptual and so 
demands that the reason have a propositional content. (CKVP, 286)   
 
Davidson thinks one can only justify one’s knowledge by appealing to one’s other beliefs, not by 
appealing to physical facts, such as how one’s sense organs are being stimulated.  Of course, 
one’s beliefs about how one is being stimulated can be a reason for one’s other beliefs—but in 
Davidson’s view, this is just to accept that everything relevant to epistemology is conceptualized, 
and thus, that one ought to reject scheme/content dualism.   
 But, once again, Quine need not be compelled.  The quarrel now seems to amount to 
terminological wrangling over the word “epistemology.”9
                                                 
9 Because of Quine’s predilection for scientific methodology and his attention to neurology, Davidson claims that 
Quine is a biologist, while he is the “true” epistemologist (RQ, 83).  Quine insists that he is the “true” epistemologist 
because he is concerned with our knowledge of the external world, labelling Davidson a semanticist (WWD, 74).   
  What is the central concern of 
epistemology?  Quine’s naturalized epistemologists seek “the rationale of reification” (TI, 3): a 
scientific explanation of how it is that we develop knowledge of the world, where science tells us 
that “we” are physical organisms equipped with five senses, and our experience is vibrant, 
conceptually complex, and of a world composed of diverse objects.  Since our scientific theories 
hold that the physical world (of which we are a part) is governed by causal laws, our 
epistemological account ought to explain how the world causes us to have beliefs about it.  
Naturalism demands that we look to science to find our epistemic starting point.  Current science 
returns with the answer: our sensory stimulations.  The philosophical objection Davidson levels 
against this account, that unconceptualized facts cannot be “reasons” for beliefs, strikes Quine as 
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belying a retrograde explanatory stance.10
 Davidson’s theoretical inroads into our use of mentalistic predicates (which Quine agrees 
are indispensable for everyday discourse) and the dependence of thought upon language use can 
easily be integrated into Quine’s naturalist program (PT, 72-73).
  Quine agrees that our personal experience of 
justifying our beliefs involves appealing to our other beliefs.  Nevertheless, he thinks tailoring 
our theory of knowledge to our personal experience is to privilege introspection over scientific 
method, and so, to overlook the lessons we ought to learn from empirical investigation.   
11
 Quine unrepentantly continues to talk about various “conceptual schemes” of reality in 
subsequent articles (SN, 406; NLWOM, 471).  But Davidson disagrees with Quine’s evaluation 
of their relationship, remaining opposed to the naturalist account of epistemological justification.  
He is adamant that “an appeal to naturalism will not help” (MTE, 54) in satisfactorily defusing 
the third dogma he identifies.  Why?   
  Davidson agrees with Quine 
that the physical world stimulates human organisms, which eventually results in individuals 
knowing about the world.  Quine takes himself to be sketching an account of this entire causal 
story.  He thinks Davidson is focused on (and produces a number of insights concerning) the 
later, social stages, in which inquirers learn how to gainfully respond to each other’s speech.  In 
this way, Quine thinks he can “naturalize” the parts of Davidson’s work with which he agrees 
(anomalous monism, for example), and takes their viewpoints to be fundamentally consonant.  
 The reason is that neither skepticism nor the possibility of unconceptualized reasons gets 
to the heart of Davidson’s misgivings about naturalism.  Earlier, I noted that a second strand in 
his warthog argument concerned normativity.  This gestures towards Davidson’s real criticism.  
                                                 
10 Quine rebukes non-naturalized philosophers for engaging in theoretical “make-believe” by imposing conceptual 
structure onto epistemology, rather than discovering structure by attending to the science of psychology (OR, 75).  
11 This is not to say that Quine accepts all of Davidson’s theories (for instance, unlike Davidson, Quine believes that 
we can sensibly talk of animals thinking despite lacking language [FTL, 479]), but that he views Davidson’s 
theories, based as they are in physicalism, scientifically (and hence naturalistically) assessable. 
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Elaborating on his dissatisfaction with Quine, Davidson writes that “[Quine’s] epistemology 
remains resolutely individualistic…there is no reason in principle why we could not win an 
understanding of the world on our own” (E, 10), because “[Quine] makes the content of 
empirical knowledge depend on something that is not shared with others” (CKVP, 291), namely, 
private stimulations.  In Davidson’s view, “this is not a position which can get a grip on the 
objective character of thought” (E, 10), since the content of our beliefs would then lack a 
connection with the public world, and any external “control” (RQ, 84).  Is it fair to characterize 
Quine’s epistemology as “individualistic”?  Is Davidson right that Quine lacks an account of the 
“objectivity” of thought? 
 
2. Truth, Objectivity, and Solipsism 
My epistemology starts from intersubjectivity, that is, from the experience of sharing 
objectivity…thinking presupposes intersubjectivity.  This will remain an irreconcilable dispute 
between Quine and me.  (Davidson, quoted in Borradori 1994, 53-54) 
 
 I have argued that Davidson’s challenge of skepticism about the external world and his 
doubt about the intelligibility of unconceptualized reasons are ancillary considerations of his 
critique of naturalism that fail to properly engage Quine.  His central objection is rather to the 
naturalist account of the objectivity of thought.  In this section, I shall distinguish Davidson’s 
position from Ebbs’.  In chapter two, I argued that Ebbs motivates his alternative, “participant 
perspective” on language use by claiming that the naturalist misdescribes the norms grounding 
our dispute-resolving linguistic practices.  Yet we saw that it was Ebbs who misdescribes Quine 
as having an idiolectical conception of language.  In contrast, Davidson finds the naturalist 
account of objectivity epistemically wanting.  He thinks it inadequate to explain what it means to 
“get it right” about the world, not because Quine lacks an account of getting it right, or of how 
inquirers putatively justify their knowledge to each other, but rather because Quine cannot 
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properly explain how inquirers’ knowledge counts as being about the world at all.  This is, I 
think, the root of Ebbs’ misgivings about the naturalist’s explanation of our dispute-resolving 
practices, an account which Davidson likewise finds unappealing.  But unlike Ebbs, Davidson 
has developed an independently motivated, humanist alternative to naturalism, under which our 
conception of objectivity is dependent upon our intersubjectivity.  I will not only show that 
humanism differs from naturalism in counting solipsism unintelligible, but explain why its 
privileging of our grasp of the shared concept of truth as a condition for linguistic ability and 
cognition makes intersubjectivity the precondition for any epistemological theory.  
 To begin clarifying Davidson’s position, let us unpack his charge that Quine cannot 
capture the “objective character” of thought (E, 10).  This refers to Frege’s claim, discussed in 
chapter one, that communicators can be said to agree or disagree only if they share some 
“content.”  In Frege’s view, we ought to distinguish the resolution-demanding contradictory 
attitudes that characterize scientific disputes from the merely differing opinions that underlie 
disputes about taste, and recognize that it is only in scientific, truth-apt cases that disputants 
count as agreeing or disagreeing about something.  Frege concludes that although each inquirer’s 
thinking is subjective, the thoughts that each thinks cannot have a purely subjective character.   
 Neither Quine nor Davidson—nor, I have argued, Frege—posits a category of Platonic, 
ontologically objective entities to satisfy the demand that thoughts not be purely subjective.  (On 
the deflationary reading I have pursued, Frege rather conceives of the “objectivity” of our 
thoughts in terms of the features that distinguish our practice of inquiry from other practices in 
which we engage.)  But in arguing that translation is indeterminate, both Quine and Davidson 
reject Frege’s idea that inquirers’ utterances have univocal meanings at all, be they Fregean 
“thoughts” or the more contemporary “propositions.”  Nevertheless, Davidson endorses Frege’s 
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view that communicators must share something if they are correctly to be called communicators.  
In contrast, Quine rejects Frege’s account of communication.  His deflationary, behaviorist ersatz 
of “agreement” as constituted by seeming to enjoy “fluent dialogue and successful negotiation” 
(quoted in Dreben 2004, 289) with one’s interlocutor makes communication very thin.  Quinean 
communicators do not mutually grasp and endorse some “content.”  Their attributions of 
“beliefs” to each other are fallible parts of their theories for predicting each other’s dispositions 
to vocally react to stimulation by the world.   
 Quine thinks that he can adequately explain objectivity, and our beliefs and utterances 
being “about” the world, within this framework.  Taking himself to have learnt the lesson 
Davidson wished to teach him by eliminating shared stimulus meanings from his theory, Quine 
appropriates Davidson’s triangulation metaphor in the title of a very late paper, “I, You, and It: 
An Epistemological Triangle.”  There, Quine argues that although we share no stimulations 
intersubjectively, evolution ensures that both “You” and “I” subjectively respond to causal 
influence from similar parts of “It,” which allows “communication [between us to proceed] 
apace” (IYI, 486) in Quine’s attenuated, behaviorist sense.12
 But Quine here misappropriates Davidson’s metaphor.  He has begun describing a 
semantic triangle that purports to shed light on how our utterances come to be meaningfully 
about the world.  Quine explains the meaningfulness of our home language socially, 
interpersonally.  Since our beliefs typically find expression in language, Quine takes his triangle 
  To Quine, each individual’s 
utterances have the external control of other competent language users, who will object if the 
home language is misapplied to the shared world.  
                                                 
12 Since Quine here says that our ability to find others’ utterances meaningful depends on how we are both causally 
affected at the “It” vertex of the triangle, Davidson now counts him an ally in semantic externalism.  However, 
Quine would object to the intensionalist ring of Davidson’s preferred formulation of this doctrine, that our words 
have the semantic “content” which they do in virtue of causal chains stemming from shared, distal parts of the world 
to each of us.   
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to derivatively show how our beliefs concern the world.  But Davidson’s triangle is intended to 
be epistemological from the outset.  He wants to use it to shed light not merely on how our 
linguistically expressible beliefs are about the world, but on how we are capable of having 
beliefs that are about the world at all.  Whereas Quine continues to valorize the private, 
subjective capacity to recognize perceptual similarities as “vital…for all learning, all habit 
formation, all expectation” (IYI, 486)—in short, the biological precondition allowing each 
individual mind to develop theories—Davidson rules intersubjective communication the 
precondition for there being individual minds.  For Davidson, we cannot start epistemology prior 
to intersubjectivity.   
 The different uses that Quine and Davidson make of triangulation also highlight the 
methodological difference between naturalism and humanism.  For Quine, triangulation is a way 
of emphasizing the social nature of language.  It makes explicit the role of other people in each 
individual’s introduction into the practice of language use.  Since “teaching [a language] in the 
nursery” is, at the level of observation sentences, “a matter of perceiving that the subject is 
perceiving that p” (PT, 62-63), our language use depends upon mastery of the idiom “he/she 
perceives that p” which makes ineliminable reference to another person (c.f. RR, 10).  Quine 
thinks he has captured the epistemologically relevant points Davidson wished to make by placing 
triangulation in the context of Darwin’s theory of evolution.  Evolution accounts for members of 
the same species carving up their sensory experience of the environment in parallel ways, and so, 
explains how individuals within a community are able to master the idiom required for language 
use.  For Quine, triangulation features in a psychogenetic story of how the human species, and 
individual humans, develop the capacity to use language.  His theory dovetails with scientific 
theories of developmental psychology and evolutionary biology.  In contrast, Davidson’s theory 
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of the acquisition of the shared concept of truth is not psychogenetic, and is not under scientific 
constraints.  His arguments about triangulation are designed to expose conceptual 
interdependencies between the core concepts of epistemology, which, given the success of 
mutual human interpretation, show that we have the capacity to know about the world, and that 
that capacity is dependent upon our ability to interpret one another.  Davidson’s theory is meant 
to contribute to our self-understanding by forcing us to acknowledge the role of intersubjectivity.  
 This fundamental difference between their views is why Davidson calls Quine’s 
epistemology “individualistic” (E, 10).  Quine’s position remains essentially unchanged from  an 
early paper, where he evocatively writes: 
I am a physical object sitting in a physical world.  Some of the forces of this physical world 
impinge on my surface.  Light rays strike my retinas; molecules bombard my eardrums and 
fingertips.  I strike back, emanating concentric air-waves…our knowledge must depend thus solely 
on surface irritation and internal conditions. (SLS, 1, my emphasis)   
 
Quine thinks that invoking “surface irritation” (or the “stimulations” he later prefers) correctly 
depicts the epistemological subject as part of the causal structure of the physical world.  He also 
thinks that individuating an individual’s perceptions by her stimulations avoids the complications 
of specifying “the” cause in the external world of our interlocutor’s perception at a particular 
moment (PTF, 475).  But from Davidson’s perspective, this last restriction thwarts explaining 
our interpretive attempts to grasp what our interlocutor’s—and also our own—beliefs are about. 
 As we saw in chapter three, Davidson deploys the epistemological triangle to make vivid 
inquirers’ grasp of the contrast between the paired concepts of belief and truth.  In late papers 
where he tries to explain his continued problem with Quine’s view, Davidson objects to the 
limited status which Quine awards the concept of truth.  He asks Quine to clarify his “slightly 
mysterious” (MTE, 57)—and potentially belittling—description of truth as “immanent” (TTPT, 
22).  Quine responds that he is not claiming truth is determined by an individual’s current theory 
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(WWD, 77).13  Rather, he is emphasizing that cosmic exile is a myth.  Truth is judged from 
within one’s current theory, as a part of that theory.  The disquotational paradigm for truth (“s” is 
true if and only if s) uniquely determines the satisfaction conditions for a truth predicate over the 
sentences with which an individual is competent.  It follows that a speaker understands the 
ascription of truth to a sentence just in case she understands it: her ability to correctly use her 
truth predicate is secured by her linguistic competency.  Quine suggests a genetic explanation for 
the truth predicate on the basis of its usefulness in communication.14
 Despite all this, since Quine focuses on disquotation and truth’s transparent application to 
one’s own sentences, Davidson thinks him blind to the real significance of the concept of truth: 
its foundational epistemic role in applying to others’ utterances.  On Quine’s account, extending 
one’s truth predicate to someone else’s speech is merely a part of developing a theory of 
translation for her, and choosing a manual that accords with the disquotational paradigm is a 
powerful heuristic device—and so a significant desideratum—for convenient translation.  
Davidson thinks that this inverts matters.  His transcendental argument involves humanist 
analyses of “truth” and “belief” that expose sharing the concept of truth to be a condition upon 
interpretation.  Interpretive T-theories may or may not lead to manuals that are neatly 
disquotational, but they all attribute the concept of truth to the person interpreted.  The reason is 
that possessing the concept of truth is necessary for the subject of interpretation (be it another 
  He also grants that truth 
“doctrinally” transcends our theory: we do not say a discredited claim was true but became false, 
but that we thought it true though it never was (77).   
                                                 
13 Taking naturalized epistemology as his inspiration, Lars Bergström develops an “empiricist” theory of truth along 
essentially these lines, which Quine finds “appealing” but “disconcerting,” and explicitly rejects (IYI, 489).   
14 We can use a truth predicate to explicitly mention sentences in our utterances (“‘Grass is green’ is true if...”), and 
thereby avoid use/mention mistakes by signalling to our interlocutor that we are intending to convey what we take 
the sentence to mean (WO, 272).  A truth predicate also allows us to endorse another’s assertion without a lengthy 
repetition (e.g. “That’s true”), and to quickly defer to authorities (e.g. “Everything Einstein said is true”).  
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person or oneself) to be understandable as having beliefs about the world, and, according to 
Davidson, we can only acquire the concept of truth through interpreting others.    
 Will this argument about the need for epistemology to begin with the shared concept of 
truth compel Quine?  It is helpful to contrast it with the new skeptical objection that Stroud 
levels against naturalized epistemology.  Stroud thinks that, under naturalism, because each 
inquirer cannot check her beliefs concerning the world against an independent standard, no 
inquirer can justify holding her beliefs true (1984, 244).  As we saw in chapter two, Quine can 
respond to Stroud by leaning on the fallibility of science.  Our Humean predicament means we 
lack certainty about the world, but scientific realism is nevertheless the best theory we have 
according to the scientific tribunal, which is, in turn, the best standard we have for “justifying” 
our theories.  In contrast, Davidson goes beyond Stroud to insist that the independent standard 
needed for an individual’s beliefs is knowledge of another’s mind, for it is only by interpreting 
another’s mind that one can be said to have beliefs about the world oneself.  So, Davidson’s 
humanist criticism of naturalized epistemology is that, because each inquirer cannot check her 
“beliefs” concerning the world against the independent standard garnered by another mind, they 
cannot be counted beliefs at all.  How might Quine respond?  
 Quine’s view can easily absorb Davidson’s claim that linguistic animals (and humans in 
particular) appreciate the truth-belief contrast as they acquire language.15
                                                 
15 Indeed, Quine’s appeal to empathy demonstrates that he recognizes the need for a subjective-objective contrast in 
language acquisition (PT, 42).  In Quine’s view, a mother teaching her daughter language must empathetically 
project herself into her daughter’s position and imagine what aspect of their shared environment she is attending to 
in order to appropriately reward or admonish her intermittent utterances.  
  But the force behind 
Davidson’s humanist epistemology is his claims that the only intelligible genesis of a mind is its 
acknowledgement of the truth-belief contrast, which can only occur through communication with 
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another mind.  In an interview with Giovanna Borradori in 1990, Davidson encapsulates his 
position:  
The empiricists have it exactly backwards, because they think that first one knows what’s in his 
own mind, then, with luck, he finds out what is in the outside world, and, with even more luck, he 
finds out what is in somebody else’s mind.  I think differently.  First we find out what is in 
somebody else’s mind, and by then we have got all the rest.  Of course, I really think that it all 
comes at the same time. (Davidson, quoted in Borradori 1994, 50) 
 
Quine can see no way to establish Davidson’s claims naturalistically.  Davidson’s report that he 
cannot imagine how the truth-belief contrast could arise except via communication is just an 
introspective claim, scientifically unfit to establish a standard for “mindedness.”  Quine thus 
appeals to his naturalist methodology to refuse Davidson’s distinctively humanist 
epistemological claim.   
 But this cuts both ways.  The emphasis Davidson lays on our concepts belonging to us, 
and his resulting inability to conceive of how beings could develop what humans call “minds” 
with “beliefs” about the external world except through linguistic interpretation, undermines the 
import of Quine’s naturalist theory of reification, based as it is on an individual’s sensory 
stimulations.  So despite being unable to undermine naturalism on Quine’s terms, Davidson’s 
objections are not empty.  His humanist epistemology captures a thought absent from naturalist 
epistemology, namely, that being answerable to each other about how we believe the world to be 
is a condition for our beliefs to count as being about the world at all, as opposed to our private, 
subjective experience.   
 One way of appreciating this difference is to compare Quine’s and Davidson’s respective 
rejections of solipsism.  Quine appeals to his deflationary notion of fluency—the lack of 
conversational breakdown—as the sole criterion of successful translation.  There are no semantic 
constraints upon the recognition of fluent discourse in others; fluency is behaviorally discernible 
even by those not fluent in the language.  To promote fluency in the initial stages of translation, 
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the translator must suppress the difference between how things are and the way she believes 
them to be: she reckons her interlocutor’s sentences true just in case (in her current manual) they 
translate sentences she calls true.  This entails that the corrective epistemic standard provided by 
other inquirers whom she translates as “disagreeing” with her only holds for as long as she stands 
by her current manual.  In the face of sustained “disagreement,” she may develop a new manual 
rather than seriously question the veracity of her own beliefs.   
 Exactly the same principle applies to our home language.  What favors our (typically 
unthinking) use of homophonic translation is its tendency to result in fluent discourse with other 
home language speakers.  Since our semantic theory at home is a fallible part of our web of 
beliefs, the “control” we offer for each other’s theories about the world is a standard that can, in 
principle, be refused.  I am not suggesting that Quine thinks that the naturalist should refuse this 
standard: far from it, given the fluent conversations she generally enjoys with others.  The point 
is rather that she may intelligibly refuse it.  Even if every member of her speech community were 
to object to one of her beliefs, the stubborn naturalist may choose to explain the “disagreement” 
by supposing that the fault lies in her semantic theory, her translation manual, rather than her 
own beliefs about the world.  She will then have to justify her hypothesis at the scientific 
tribunal. 
 So, Quine finds skepticism about other minds to be a constructive skepticism that is 
naturalistically answerable: the possibility that I am the sole inquirer, and that everyone I 
translate as talking about the world are mere automata (whose regular noises I have mistaken for 
utterances intended by other minds) is conceivable, but ultimately falls to Darwin.  Positing my 
evolution with fellow inquirers yields the best explanation I (currently) have for my own ability 
to inquire.  Notice that in contemplating this constructive skeptical hypothesis, Quine, ever the 
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behaviorist, would still think he shares a home language with the automata.  Language is a social 
art; utterances are only meaningful in virtue of the regularities in one’s verbal behavior in 
coordination with that of one’s community.  If Quine’s is the sole mind, he thinks it nevertheless 
in a shared home language that he acquiesces to questions about ontology (or, better, noises he 
takes to be questions).  The norms underwriting the dispute-resolving behavior in which he 
engages with the automata—contra Ebbs—is explicable by reference to the scientific standards 
he takes them all to share.   
 In contrast, Davidson makes imputation of the grasp of the concept of truth the goal of 
interpretation.  The interpreter is not simply projecting her application of the truth predicate onto 
her interlocutor’s utterances, but attributing to her interlocutor recognition of an independent 
standard transcending them both.  (Recall from chapter three that this was the force of the 
principle of charity for Davidson, rather than it being merely convenient to find the natives 
agreeing with us.)  If this attribution is justified, she is obliged to treat her interlocutor’s beliefs 
seriously as a possible corrective to her own.  This is why Davidson holds disagreement over 
words to be cause for mutual reinterpretation about the world.  Communication is a constant 
struggle to interpret, and to make ourselves interpretable to, our interlocutor (NDE, 102).  
Davidson concurs with Ebbs that the onus of justification borne by the individual who judges 
against the group is not, as Quine thinks, merely a matter of us all being subject to the scientific 
tribunal.  Instead, it is a function of (so we might say) our metaphysical epistemic situation: we 
are inquirers who count as seeking objective truth only because we recognize that none of us 
have a privileged grasp of how the world really is.  
 Davidson rules the solipsistic threat (i.e., that every interpretation manual I use is 
mistaken since I am the sole inquirer) radical, not constructive.  He thinks solipsism based on a 
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semantic error.  Solipsism cannot be formulated without ascribing a mind to oneself, which 
requires ascribing the truth-belief contrast to oneself on the basis of the epistemological triangle, 
which in turn demands ascribing beliefs to another mind.  While solipsism is naturalistically 
answerable, it is humanistically unintelligible.   
 It is worth emphasizing that although I have revealed Davidson’s opposition to Quine to 
be principled, his humanist insistence that other inquirers constitute a robust epistemological 
standard to which each individual theorist is responsible is not a knockdown argument against 
Quine.  Quine can simply refuse to accept that this standard is as robust as Davidson claims and 
embrace the “individualistic” inquiry Davidson abhors as the epistemic lot of the naturalist.   
I ended the previous section by noting that, from Quine’s naturalist perspective, Davidson’s 
focus is the “far end” of the causal chain that extends from the world through our sense organs to 
eventually bloom into our scientific theories about the world.  To Quine, Davidson’s radical 
interpretation is an interesting (and naturalizable) account of how linguistic animals develop 
theories of each other as minded.  In contrast, Quine’s empiricism is uninteresting from 
Davidson’s humanist perspective because it describes stages prior to socialization.  He thinks 
that no organism can count as acquiring “knowledge” of the objective world on the basis of its 
private sensory stimulations, so Quine’s naturalized “epistemology” is merely a metaphorical 
mentalistic extension of biology.  Davidson believes that we will only understand ourselves, and 
our position within our world, once we leave Cartesianism behind.  Our capacity to think and 
talk—our status as minded communicators—depends on our interpretation of each other.  
 To further sharpen the difference between Quine and Davidson, I should like to end this 
section by returning to the thought experiment with which I began this dissertation.  Suppose that 
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we were to encounter a roughly human-looking alien species who appear to be communicating.16
 To Davidson, this suspicion reveals a semantic error.  He thinks “an uninterpretable 
language,” like “a radically different conceptual scheme,” is a contradiction in terms.  Either the 
aliens lack language and are unminded or they are using a language that we are currently 
experiencing difficulty interpreting; there is no third possibility.  The linguist’s error is tempting 
because we cannot speak every language of which we are aware, and it seems only a small step 
to allow the possibility of languages so different from our own that they exceed our ability to 
learn them.  But Davidson insists on inverting this dependence: something being a language is 
predicated on our ability to interpret it as meaningful.   
  
An intrepid linguist starts trying to decode their language.  A philosopher friend suggests she 
look to Quine’s and Davidson’s radical linguist experiments for guidance.  Now, the interest of 
this case surfaces when we suppose the linguist gets into serious difficulties.  Try as she might, 
she cannot devise an entering wedge into the alien tongue.  Whatever initial hypotheses she 
makes about its structure, she quickly encounters counterexamples.  She begins to suspect that 
the alien language is uninterpretable.   
 Davidson criticizes Quine’s discussion of this case: 
Quine says we might see that members of some group, from outer space, perhaps, are fluently 
conversing, though we could find no way to map our entities onto parts of their sentences.  But 
how would we identify what we were witnessing as conversation? (RQ, 81-81)  
 
Despite Davidson’s dissatisfaction, Quine’s evaluation of the case seems extremely similar to his 
own.  Quine would stridently encourage the disheartened linguist to consider her hypotheses 
                                                 
16 Discussing a similar case, Ludwig Wittgenstein suggests we may have evidence that the aliens are communicating 
if, when we gag them, “their actions fall into confusion” (PI, §207).  There are a surprising number of weird and 
wonderful aliens that philosophers have imagined encountering to test their intuitions about language ascription (see 
especially Neil Tennant [1999] and Tomáš Marvan [2003]).  Nevertheless, since my aim here is to explain how 
Quine and Davidson differ in evaluating these sorts of cases rather than to defend a particular claim in the 
philosophy of language, I shall restrict my focus as far as possible to this relatively pedestrian “human-like” alien 
species.  
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scientifically.  Having chided her for suspecting that the aliens speak an uninterpretable 
language (since it is possible that future linguists will succeed where she has failed), he would 
defend the more conservative hypothesis that the alien language currently resists interpretation.17
 Although neither Davidson nor Quine tolerates the supposition of an “uninterpretable 
language,” the tones of their rejections importantly differ.  Echoing Frege’s dismissal of resolute 
logical aliens as mad, the humanist’s ascription of mindedness to her interlocutor is inseparable 
from recognizing her interlocutor as using a language that cleaves to logical norms, one that she 
can employ to refer to objects in the shared world.  While Frege wrote metaphorically that the 
laws of logic “unfolded” the content of the word “true” (1979, 3), Davidson’s theory is an 
account of why logical aliens must be excluded from what we can call having cognition (and 
speaking a language): if a group of beings are uninterpretable, in the sense that first-order logic 
cannot be read into their language, then we cannot construct a truth theory for them.  It follows 
that they lack the truth-belief contrast fundamental to our practice of inquiry, and that they have 
no capacity to inquire about the objective world.   
 
 In contrast, from Quine’s naturalist perspective, the import of first-order logic for the 
philosophy of language and mind is exhausted in recognizing that fixing the logical structure of 
the alien language is (currently) crucial to radical translation.  More generally, the significance of 
logic to naturalized philosophy is in characterizing the entailment relation demanded by our 
current scientific theories.  Yet, because our scientific theories are fallible and revisable, so too is 
the logic at their core.  If we were to develop scientific theories better able to explain our world 
                                                 
17 Quine may add that the linguist ought to consider alternative hypotheses.  Perhaps the alien noises merely function 
as warning cries, like the cries of seagulls.  We might, that is, be able to locate alien “observation sentences” and 
translate them after a fashion (perhaps they always cry “gavagai” when near a predator), but, because we cannot find 
any logical structure in their noises, be disinclined to call their cries “language” (unless we wish to say seagulls use 
language).  The details of the case will determine which hypothesis is preferable.  To take just one example, the 
length of observation will be a relevant parameter.  If the linguist is venting her frustration after working for a few 
hours, we may fault her; if she has been working for a few years, we may question the aliens’ capacity for language. 
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than our current theories, yet which could not be regimented into our current canonical logic, we 
ought to excise both our current theories and our current logic from our web of belief.  Quine 
would describe this as a paradigm shift, an evolution in our conceptual scheme.  Since Quine 
thinks scientific development might require us to extract even central beliefs from our web, he 
recognizes no firm link between first-order logic and mindedness.   
 Unlike Davidson, Quine thus accepts the possibility that aliens might use a language that 
is uninterpretable (in the sense that we cannot project our logic onto their speech).  To Davidson, 
Quine’s naturalistic openness stretches the application of our words to their breaking point.  
Beings whose “language” lacks the quantificational structure necessary for us to develop an 
interpretive T-theory—the only way we know of to create a truth theory for a language—are not 
beings who we cannot understand, but beings who cannot be understood, in virtue of lacking 
what we call “beliefs.”    
 This case indicates a Davidsonian argument against radically different logics that 
parallels his argument against radically different conceptual schemes.  An epistemologist who, 
like Quine, supposes that we develop theories about the world using some logic cannot answer a 
new sort of skeptic, for, on this view, logical aliens may be developing theories about the world 
using a “logical” principle that we regard unfounded.  But having recognized that from their 
perspective they are doing nothing wrong, we can wonder whether we are in a similar 
predicament, developing theories about reality in a way that the aliens think unfounded.  We can 
go on to wonder whether our logic is the right logic, and so, come to question whether it even 
makes sense to say that an inquirer has a right logic.18
                                                 
18 It should be clear that Quine would not be troubled by this new skeptical argument.  To the naturalist who 
appreciates that all science is fallible, wondering “whether our logic is the right logic” upon encountering such 
aliens (where “rightness” is just adequacy for future theorizing) is the appropriate attitude to have. 
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 Davidson would have us reject the dualism upon which this skeptic relies.  Just as there 
are no schemes by which humans organize empirical content, so, too, there are no logics by 
which inquirers theorize about that content.  Humans reason logically about the world with 
which they are in unmediated contact, since to reason just is to obey the prescriptions of our 
logical laws.   
 
3. Resolving Philosophical Disagreement 
 I have extracted the following distinct conceptions of logic’s relationship to cognition 
from Quine and Davidson: 
NAT:   A person must exhibit speech behavior that can be translated as  
  reasoning in conformity with the laws of our canonical logic if we are  
  to engage in inquiry together.   
 
HUM:  Attributing the concept of truth to another mind using   
   quantificational logic to structure the other mind’s language is a  
  necessary condition for being minded.  
 
Quine’s naturalist conception denies the necessary connection between cognitive ability and 
facility with our logic that Davidson’s humanist conception affirms.  The competing conceptions 
are each grounded in a nuanced approach to philosophy that entails claims in philosophical 
methodology, epistemology, and the philosophy of language and mind.  Which, if either, 
approach ought we to adopt?  
 The disagreement between Quine and Davidson is of particular interest in the context of 
recent attention to the epistemology of disagreement.19
                                                 
19 See Thomas Kelly (2005), David Christensen (2007), and the contributions to Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield 
(2010).  
  When equally competent peers with 
access to identical evidence disagree, to what extent should their confidence in the truth of their 
own positions be shaken?  Is each under an epistemic obligation to learn about alternatives to 
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their view?  Most of the current literature on disagreement focuses on moral and religious cases.  
In this section, I hope to use Quine’s and Davidson’s dispute to draw some lessons about the case 
of philosophical disagreement.   
 The hopeful thought that I want to pursue is that although Quine and Davidson have 
important and philosophically revealing disagreements, the projects in which they engage do not 
conflict; they only differ.  But this hope looks liable to be dashed in view of their various 
conflicting claims.  In the above sections, we have seen that both are committed to calling their 
own projects “epistemological,” and denying the other that label.  Both propose methodological 
constraints upon properly “philosophical” inquiry, and neither develops theories that meet the 
other’s requirements.  Nor are their views terminological variants: the differences between their 
conceptions of logic and cognition lead them to disagree about the limits of intelligibility, 
resulting in a variety of low-level conflicts about the meaningful application of particular 
concepts.  For instance, Davidson cannot accept Quine’s receptivity to a finite natural language 
counting as a “language,” and Quine cannot accept Davidson’s restriction that attributing grasp 
of “truth” to one’s interlocutor is “necessary” for communication.  Some work is required to 
explain why these conflicting claims do not entail that Quine’s and Davidson’s epistemological 
projects conflict.  
 Firstly, it is worth emphasizing that the disagreement between Quine and Davidson is 
intractable.  Some disputes can be resolved by appealing to a standard on which disputants 
agree.  For example, a dispute about the number of beans in a jar can typically be resolved by 
tipping out the beans and counting them.  Some philosophical disputes are similarly resolvable.  
For instance, purported ontological proofs of God’s existence can be scrutinized for soundness 
and validity and found wanting.  But the dispute between naturalism and humanism is not so 
205 
 
clear-cut.  Each approach counts different considerations persuasive, different cases intelligible, 
different methods properly philosophical, and characterize not only the goal of rational inquiry, 
but our grasp of that goal, differently.  Arbitrating between them using the standards of 
evaluation which they share is inconclusive; no demonstrative argument favors one account 
while undermining the other.  But arbitrating using a standard of evaluation that only one 
approach endorses begs the question against the other.  
 We saw an example of this in section two.  Quine might object that Davidson’s argument 
for the necessarily interpersonal origin of the truth/belief distinction is introspective and 
unscientific, and Davidson may count Quine’s conception of objectivity inadequate to explain 
our status as subjective inquirers who share a world.  Neither objection is persuasive from the 
other’s perspective.  The naturalist can defend her austere epistemology at the scientific tribunal, 
and the humanist can defend her social epistemology by appealing to her transcendental 
argument upon the conditions of interpretation.  This parallelism results in a philosophical 
standoff, and makes any naturalist or humanist who thinks their own perspective true and the 
other false look like an objectionable philosophical egoist. 
 Writing about Quine, P.F. Strawson suggests: 
[T]he choice between [Quine’s naturalism and ordinary language philosophy] is ultimately, 
perhaps, a matter of individual temperament; and if I have made my own preference clear, it is no 
more than that—my own preference.  It has been said that the best conceptual scheme, the best 
system of ideas is the one that gets us around best…For one content to lead his life—at least his 
intellectual life—in the rarefied atmosphere of science, the choice…will go one way.  For one 
content to lead his intellectual life in the muddier atmosphere of the more mundane…it will go the 
other. (1990, 318, original emphasis)  
 
If Quine’s preference for naturalism over humanism—or Strawson’s ordinary language 
philosophy—is ultimately a matter of his temperament, we have reason to think that viewing his 
disagreement with Davidson as a conflict between their views, at most one of which can be true, 
is wrongheaded.  Their disagreement is intractable because it is grounded in differences between 
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their preferred form of inquiry, preferences which brook no argument.  The situation recalls 
Carnap’s metaphilosophy.  In The Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap argues that some 
philosophical disputes can only be resolved indirectly.  Inquirers who share a temperament will 
pragmatically agree upon an argumentative framework and will mutually benefit from engaging 
each other.  But to engage an inquirer who disagrees about the framework in which arguments 
are to be evaluated on anything but pragmatic grounds is futile.  Carnap recommends that we 
instead tolerate an inquirer whose argumentative framework (and temperament) we do not share.  
Once competing projects have developed in tandem, the theories generated under each 
perspective can be compared.  A pragmatic adjudication between temperaments may then be 
possible.20
 The present disagreement cannot be captured using Carnap’s syntactic method.  He 
argues that inquirers must agree on which truths they consider “analytic” before they can debate,  
yet Quine and Davidson both reject the analytic/synthetic distinction.  Nevertheless, if the 
dispute between naturalism and humanism comes down to opposed temperaments, we might 
think that these disputants warrant a similarly tolerant attitude.  Carnap himself sought 
philosophical “progress,” hoping to shift argumentative focus away from (what he saw as) 
fruitless metaphilosophical discussions to clearly demarcated philosophical programs.  Should 
we likewise postpone judgment about whether naturalism or humanism are “true,” and 
pragmatically decide in the future which approach has allowed for the best theories? 
  
 I think that this would be a mistake.  One reason is that delaying often promotes 
sidelining, and this dissertation has demonstrated that a grasp of naturalism and humanism (and 
                                                 
20 This is how Carnap suggests we ought to treat the disagreement between classical and constructive 
mathematicians.  Philosophers should choose formal language I or II depending on their temperament, tolerate those 
who make a different choice, and get on with the business of analyzing scientific language.  At some future time, 
philosophers could reflect on which logic had allowed for the best explanation of science (2002, 164-165; 332). 
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constitutivism) are necessary to properly understand the arguments developed by Quine and 
Davidson (and Frege).  We are thus in danger of misunderstanding our recent history if we elect 
to ignore this dispute.  But a second danger is that, in this case, Carnapian tolerance encourages 
the fragmentation of philosophy into distinct, incommensurable schools.  Although Quine and 
Davidson focus on particular problems in logic, epistemology, and the philosophy of language 
and mind, the methodological consequences of their views about the correct way to pursue 
philosophical inquiry mean that their disciples can apply naturalism or humanism to various 
problems across philosophy.  Unlike the disputants that interest Carnap, naturalists and 
humanists do not share standards of success, and so, there is no reason to think that they will 
agree in the future about which approach’s theories are better.  Tolerating another’s naturalism or 
humanism at a distance—thinking her temperament beyond the reach of rational argument—
inhibits dialogue between philosophers of different stripes.  
 A similar problem affects a metaphilosophical position that seeks to justify holding one’s 
own philosophical approach correct or true even in the face of competitors.  In a moral case that 
parallels the philosophical one I am discussing, Kieran Setiya (forthcoming) argues that 
“epistemic localism” is necessary to avoid the twin pitfalls that come with an evidential moral 
epistemology: parochial egoism (thinking one’s own moral theory correct) and unsatisfactory 
skepticism (thinking no moral theory is correct).  The epistemic localist denies that “the 
fundamental standards of epistemic justification are topic neutral” (19) and takes moral 
education to involve learning the standards of epistemic justification in morality.  This entitles 
her to hold her own moral theory fallibly correct, based on the perceived efficacy of her moral 
education, and to justly rebuke “moral monsters” (19) with different, purportedly moral views.  
Setiya suggests that epistemic localism is necessary to overcome egoism and skepticism 
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wherever radical disagreement occurs (n27).  So, might philosophical education likewise involve 
learning the standards of epistemic justification in philosophy, entitling those taught naturalism 
and those taught humanism to each hold their approaches fallibly correct?  The danger with such 
epistemic localism is that it gives inquirers no incentive to learn about other approaches and the 
insights those approaches might yield when applied to particular problems.  It is a desideratum of 
one’s metaphilosophical theory that some such incentive is in place, so as to avoid licensing 
parochial bias of one’s own education while nevertheless maintaining a tolerant attitude.   
 To clarify the position I propose, let us consider the metaphilosophical attitudes that 
Quine and Davidson would have to their own disagreement.  I think that we can reconstruct such 
attitudes from their late disagreement about empirically equivalent theories (PT, 95-102).21  Call 
two theories empirically equivalent if and only if whatever observation counts for (against) one 
theory counts for (against) the other.  Call a theory a global system if it is a theory about our 
whole world that claims to fit all of our possible observations.  Now suppose two scientists, 
Jerome and Janine, discover differences in their empirically equivalent global systems.22  Their 
vocabularies—ranging from observational through to theoretical—are (phonologically speaking) 
identical.23
 In one case, once their theories are presented systematically, structural similarities 
between them emerge—for instance, perhaps Jerome consistently uses “proton” when Janine 
  But although they agree upon all observation sentences, such as “mailboxes are 
blue,” each denies theoretical sentences that the other affirms.   
                                                 
21 Beyond mentioning their opposed views, Quine does not go into very much detail about the cases that he, 
Davidson, Dagfinn FØllesdal, and Burton Dreben discussed in their closed conference at Stanford in 1986.  Since, in 
contrast with their interest in the scientific principles for theory construction, my interest in their dispute is 
metaphilosophical, I shall make certain stipulations to make the case that interests me more precise.  
22 Let us stipulate that, on the basis of inductive reflection on their past conversations, Jerome and Janine are 
confident that their theories are empirically equivalent.  
23 Although some words are clearly observational (“red,” “round”) and some are clearly theoretical—meant to 
explain unobserved reality (“quark,” “dark matter”)— Quine and Davidson both think that observational and 
theoretical vocabulary differ only in degree and not in kind. 
209 
 
uses “neutron” and vice versa—which means that they can treat their theories as terminological 
variants.  But in a second case, Jerome and Janine find no way to map their theoretical 
vocabularies onto each other.  Since they agree about observational sentences, Janine decides to 
teach Jerome her theory of natural science from the ground up.  In time, Jerome is able to 
reliably predict how Janine uses her theoretical sentences and to do science with her.  
Nevertheless, because their competing theories are phrased using phonologically identical 
vocabulary, Jerome finds himself denying sentences when using Janine’s theory that previously 
he had affirmed.  Jerome judges the two theories to be on a par according to the principles of 
theoretical construction: they are equally simple, conservative, etc. (although his own is a good 
deal more familiar).  What should Jerome’s attitude be toward the truth of his two theories? 
 Jerome and Janine’s situation bears an important resemblance to Quine and Davidson’s.  
Quine and Davidson agree upon observation sentences—and, unlike Jerome and Janine, a good 
deal of empirical science—but not about philosophy.  Their different naturalist and humanist 
views are phrased in the same vocabulary (each makes claims about “truth,” “epistemology,” 
etc.), are not terminological variants, and entail that there are sentences that one affirms and the 
other denies (such as HUM).  Were Quine and Davidson to learn how to speak each other’s 
philosophy, what should their attitude be toward the truth of humanism and naturalism?   
 Although Quine fluctuated on the issue of whether or not to hold empirically equivalent 
theories true,24
                                                 
24 See RIT, 178-183; EC, 28-29; PT, 100.   
 he came to favor a “sectarian” view: Jerome should hold his theory true and 
Janine’s false, but feel free to swap and use Janine’s theory (holding his own theory false) if the 
new perspective he gains in doing so is helpful.  Davidson disagreed.  On his “ecumenical” 
alternative, Jerome should use subscripts to eliminate the formal inconsistency that seemed to 
threaten his own utterances (since he affirms sentences when using his theory that are 
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phonologically identical to those he denies when using Janine’s) and hold both theories true 
within a larger, inclusive language. 
 Quine came to favor sectarianism over ecumenism because naturalism trumps empiricism 
(PT, 100).  As an empiricist, Quine finds ecumenism attractive since both theories are 
empirically adequate, and so Jerome and Janine are equally warranted in believing them.  
However, naturalism requires Jerome to follow the standards of the scientific tribunal.  
Simplicity favors choosing either his own theory or Janine’s, since using subscripts as Davidson 
suggests to create a combined theory that incorporates both sets of theoretical vocabulary is 
ontologically extravagant.  Jerome would have to admit, for instance, that protonsJEROME and 
protonsJANINE exist, yet just one theory was sufficient to explain the observable data.  Moreover, 
the familiarity of his own theory points in its favor.  Having learned Janine’s theory, Jerome can 
always adopt it for a time if he needs to do theoretical research with her—and can certainly 
appeal to it if doing so is helpful.  In other cases, since they do not disagree about non-theoretical 
sentences, he is entitled to hold his own global theory true and hers false.  When phrased in 
canonical logic, Janine’s theory wrongly endorses existential claims that Jerome’s theory denies. 
 Quine is more tentative about his sectarian attitude to empirically equivalent theories than 
he is to allowing acquiescence in the home language to questions of ontology.  Unlike the proxy 
functions that make cases of deviant ontologies precise, imagining structurally distinct, equally 
simple and conservative, empirically equivalent global theories is far-fetched.  If we were really 
to be confronted with two such theories, the attitude that we should take to their truth would 
depend upon the details of the case.25
                                                 
25 Alexander George makes a similar use of Quine’s discussion of empirically equivalent theories to question 
Quine’s view of his disagreement with Carnap (2000).  George quotes Quine: “the cosmic question whether to call 
  Nevertheless, it is clear why naturalism leads Quine in the 
direction of sectarianism. Why does Davidson prefer ecumenism?  
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 As Davidson views matters, Jerome and Janine have attributed grasp of the shared 
concept of truth to each other by mutually interpreting observation sentences.  But if Jerome 
adopts a sectarian attitude, he effectively treats Janine as massively mistaken in her theoretical 
beliefs about the world.  He adopts a proprietary attitude to the concept of truth.  
 A proprietary attitude to truth is legitimate if one can justify thinking that one has better 
access to truths than one’s interlocutor.  For instance, an interlocutor with a theological global 
theory that has weak predictive power is justly refused.  But Janine’s theory of unobserved 
reality is not wantonly extravagant or mysterious; it has exactly the same predictive power as 
Jerome’s own.  Given this, Davidson’s humanism denies that Jerome is entitled to hold himself 
as having privileged access to truths.  The objectivity of truth is explained in terms of our shared 
intersubjectivity, and acknowledging our metaphysical epistemic situation, as I put it above, 
requires recognizing that truth is the shared goal of all inquirers to which no inquirer has 
privileged access.  Once we ascribe grasp of the concept of truth to an interlocutor, we are 
obliged to hold her beliefs true as far as we possibly can.26
 We find a second reason for ecumenism in the formal constraints of interpretation.  
Davidson’s interpreter is not trying, like Quine’s translator, to further shared projects with her 
interlocutor, but to acknowledge her interlocutor as a rational being.  Suppose an interpreter tries 
to interpret a sectarian student of Jerome and Janine—Justin—who has learnt both of their global 
   
                                                                                                                                                             
two such world systems true [simmers] down, bathetically, to a question of words” (PT, 100-101), and concludes 
that Quine “opts, as it were, for an ecumenical approach to the dispute between the sectarian and the ecumenist” 
(21).  But the quote does not sustain George’s reading.  Quine takes the abstract dispute between the sectarian and 
the ecumenist to be a question of words, given that a real decision about what to do with two given empirically 
equivalent global systems would depend upon the details of the case (such as how many of our interlocutors use the 
alternate theory, for example).   Nevertheless, I think that he sees a genuine difference between sectarianism and 
ecumenism applied to particular cases, and makes his own preference for sectarianism (given naturalism) clear. 
26 Quine acknowledges “the satisfaction of conferring the cachet of truth evenhandedly” but insists that since “the 
sectarian…can still be evenhanded with the cachet of warrantedness” the gains of ecumenism are “not evident” (PT, 
100).  His thought is that Jerome can think Janine warranted in holding her theory true while nevertheless judging it 
wholly false.  But from Davidson’s view, Jerome badly misunderstands his epistemic situation if he fails to confer 
the cachet of truth evenhandedly between every inquirer who he interprets as grasping the shared concept of truth.   
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theories, finds them equally familiar, and who has decided to switch between them when useful.  
To avoid uncharitably concluding that Justin holds true contradictions (since he affirms 
sentences using one theory that he denies when using the other) the interpreter isolates the two 
theories Justin is using and gives truth theories for them separately.  Abiding by the principle of 
charity, she will count both of Justin’s theories mostly true.  Hence, she will interpret Justin 
ecumenically, holding both theories true in the terms of her language.  Since this interpretive 
policy will go as well for self-interpretation as for the interpretation of others, we ought to be 
ecumenical if we learn two empirically equivalent global theories ourselves. 
 In terms of their own metaphilosophical disagreement, Quine’s naturalism will lead him 
to be sectarian about their dispute, while Davidson’s humanism will lead him to be ecumenical 
about their dispute.  Quine will count himself entitled to hold naturalism true and humanism 
false, while swapping to a humanist perspective if he finds doing so helpful.  Davidson will hold 
both naturalism and humanism true within a language that encompasses them both. 
 Quine’s sectarian metaphilosophical attitude might seem to avoid the problem of 
fragmentation that I mentioned earlier.  Naturalists have some incentive to learn about 
humanism, because it might offer them a new, helpful perspective on certain problems.  But, on 
the other hand, the problems that one thinks one must face are intertwined with one’s 
perspective.  Quine, notably, was quite at peace with naturalism, happy, as he wrote in his last 
paper, to “confess” his “confirmed extensionalism” (CCE, 498).  He found little of value in the 
problems occupying non-naturalized first philosophers.  So the incentive for naturalists to learn 
about humanism under sectarianism does not amount to a requirement to adopt humanism for 
certain investigations, nor to consider the problems that humanist philosophers face.  Since 
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naturalist methodology can be applied across philosophy, the naturalist who is convinced that she 
has little to learn from humanism is still licensed to work in isolation.  
 In contrast, Davidson’s ecumenical metaphilosophical attitude forces us to acknowledge 
that other people have a grasp of truth, and that what at first looks to us like others’ eccentricities 
may be important insights.  Choosing to restrict ourselves to the approach we find familiar to 
determine which problems to consider, and how those problems are best considered, becomes 
parochial.  The onus is placed upon us to familiarize ourselves with other schools of thought and 
to determine, by temporarily adopting their approach, which problems demand our attention and 
whether a different perspective will help us with particular problems.  The strength of this form 
of tolerance lies in reminding us to look at philosophical problems in more than one way, 
determining the strengths and weaknesses of each method for approaching them as we do so.  
This avoids the fragmentation of philosophy into incommensurable schools by forcing us to 
adopt that perspective which is demanded by our current inquiry.27
 Although I cannot explore the connections in detail here, the form of tolerance I am 
defending is similar to John McDowell’s quietism (2009), as well as recent interpretations of 
Wittgenstein’s late methodology.
  
28
                                                 
27 Although I am defending the metaphilosophical ecumenism that Davidson’s humanism promotes, I think that 
there are numerous philosophical problems  that we ought not approach as humanists.  For instance, to develop a 
meaningful environmental ethic I think we must see ourselves as part of nature rather than in a unique, privileged, 
and dominant humanist epistemic position.  Approaching problems in environmental ethics humanistically is 
objectionably anthropocentric.  In contrast, I think we ought not be naturalists when approaching problems in social 
philosophy.  Since contesting membership in the category of “human” is the core of numerous debates about our 
obligations to each other, such as abortion, slavery, and marriage equality, approaching social problems 
naturalistically is objectionably misanthropic.  
  These connections expose the difference between my 
position and Gary Ebbs’.  In chapter two, while praising Gary Ebbs’ attention to metaphilosophy 
in thinking about Quine, I criticized his argument that naturalism was incapable of capturing our 
dispute-resolving practices.  Although Ebbs begins his book with the Wittgensteinian rhetoric 
28 See particularly Oskari Kuusella (2008) and Marie McGinn (2009). 
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that he hopes to “loosen the hold” of naturalism (2001, 1) and ends with the recognition that “no-
one who has ever been in the grip of Quine’s picture of meaning and assertion will be 
immediately convinced by the foregoing reasons for resisting it” (309), I think that he fails to 
live up to his own metaphilosophical ambitions by claiming that his arguments amount to 
criticisms of Quine (4; 92).  Similarly, he objects that if McDowell’s criticisms of Crispin Wright 
on rule-following are intended not as arguments but as attempts to “show us a different way of 
looking at our linguistic practices,” then they are too “elusive” to be persuasive and fail to 
explain why “Wright’s picture is unacceptable” (89-90).  What Ebbs misses is that Wright’s 
picture is acceptable from Wright’s perspective.  The rhetoric of “criticism” and “argument” 
does not find application at the metaphilosophical level, because the approach for arguing about 
this topic is precisely what is at issue.  According to McDowell, all the quietist philosopher can 
do is to try to show a different way of looking at things by elucidating the best (and, prior to 
infection by a particularly compelling view, already natural) way to think about particular cases 
(2009).  If we find the quietist’s remarks elusive, it is up to us to reinterpret them, rather than to 
reboot the beguiling rhetoric of argument and criticism.   
 In my view, disciples of Quine and Davidson should not waste time trying to develop 
arguments aimed to convince each other that naturalism or humanism is correct.  Instead, they 
should learn both naturalism and humanism, examine problem cases by applying the 
methodology each view commends, and evaluate how features of particular cases demand 
different approaches.  I suspect the same advice applies to other, seemingly intractable cases of 
philosophical disagreement.   
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Afterword: A Note on Philosophy and History 
 According to Alasdair MacIntyre, “Quine has joked that there are two sorts of people 
interested in philosophy, those interested in philosophy and those interested in the history of 
philosophy.”1
 Twentieth-century analytic philosophy is sometimes characterized by its emphasis on 
Frege’s new logic.  Attending to conceptions of logic from recent history, as I have done in this 
dissertation, is thus to reflect on what philosophical methodology was and how what it was has 
shaped what it now is.  Beyond deepening our understanding of Frege, Quine, and Davidson, I 
hope to have shown that recognizing the centrality of logic to rational inquiry does not entail a 
monolithic, restrictive philosophical methodology.  By acknowledging the intelligibility of 
alternate, but nonetheless logical, approaches to philosophical problems, we free ourselves to 
adopt whichever approach yields satisfying answers. 
  Like MacIntyre, I think that this is a mistake.  Philosophy cannot be separated 
from its history.  Our philosophical questions are framed in time, using the language of our 
current moment, and so, are already historical.  Attending to historical figures does not merely 
yield potential answers to the philosophical problems in which one is interested; it shows why 
those problems became problems, and thus, why they have the shapes that they do.   
                                                 
1 “The Relationship of Philosophy to Its Past,” Philosophy in History, Eds. Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind and 
Quentin Skinner, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984.   MacIntyre’s “counter-joke” is that, under this conception, 
those who do philosophy today will be studied only by those doing history of philosophy tomorrow.  To the extent 
that the original joke is meant to malign historians, the joker must abashedly acknowledge her future philosophical 
irrelevance.  
